



Daily Report

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CONTENTS

29 June 1990

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Research Center Cites USSR Strategic Changes [TASS] 1

COMMUNIST RELATIONS

CEMA Special Commission Holds Press Conference [Moscow TV] 2

CEMA Reform Commission Ends Session [TASS] 2

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Gremitskikh 28 June Briefing on World Issues 3

Shevardnadze at Cold War Seminar [TASS] 3

On Paraguay Bill on Relations [TASS] 3

On KGB Involvement in CSFR [TASS] 3

Chilean Envoy Appointment Hailed [TASS] 4

On El Salvador Peace Talks [TASS] 4

Shevardnadze Meets Historians [TASS] 4

Shevardnadze Views Berlin Two-Plus-Four Talks [East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 27 Jun] 5

Reciprocal Commitments Regarding Germany Urged [Moscow Radio] 5

Need for European Security Doctrine Seen [PRAVDA 24 Jun] 6

Deputy Premier Ryabev Talks With IAEA Head [PRAVDA 27 Jun] 8

Talks With SFRY Delegation on Germany Unity [Belgrade TANJUG] 8

Shevardnadze Greets Mediterranean Meeting [IZVESTIYA 25 Jun] 8

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

Baker's 28 June Press Briefing Cited [TASS] 9

U.S. Suspension of Talks With PLO Criticized [Kuwait KUNA] 9

Lukyanov Urges Contacts With U.S. Politicians [TASS] 9

Soviet, U.S. Scholars Discuss Cold War Origins [TASS] 10

U.S. Scientist Awarded Moscow University Degree [TASS] 10

China

Nishanov Receives Chinese Friendship Delegation [TASS] 10

Chinese Communist Youth Leader Interviewed [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 26 Jun] 11

China's Fang Lizhi Given Permission to Leave [IZVESTIYA 26 Jun] 12

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Rally Recalls Korean War, U.S. Involvement [Moscow TV] 12

Investigation of Illegal Korean Fishing Continues [TASS] 13

Soviet War Veteran Interviewed on North Korea [Moscow International] 13

Korean War, Potential for Unity Examined [Moscow International] 14

Moving U.S. Military Base in S. Korea Viewed [Moscow International] 15

ROK Relations With Socialist Nations Discussed [Moscow International] 15

Developing Economic Links With Japan Urged [TASS] 16

Sakhalin Halts Raw Material Exports to Japan [Moscow International] 16

Campaign Against U.S. Bases in Japan Noted [Moscow International]	16
Further on Hokkaido Governor Visit, Agreements [Moscow TV]	17
Japan's Kaifu on Northern Territories Issue [TASS]	17

Near East & South Asia

Kabul Rocket Attack Kills 14, Damages Apartments [TASS]	18
CPSU Central Committee Greeted Afghan Congress [PRAVDA 27 Jun]	18
Israel Should End 'War of Words', Try Diplomacy [Prokofyev on Moscow Radio Peace and Progress]	18
Israel's Sharon on Settlement of Soviet Jews [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Jun]	19
Trade Union Chief Meets Israeli Delegation [TASS]	19
Interior Ministry Sends Firefighters to Iran [TASS]	19
Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovskiy on Middle East [IZVESTIYA 26 Jun]	19
Iran's Position in Afghanistan Examined [Andreyev on Moscow International]	20

East Europe

Troop Pullout From Czechoslovakia Viewed [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 27 Jun]	21
Visit Reveals Many Problems [Moscow TV]	22
Ryzhkov Congratulates Chairman of CSFR [TASS]	22
Problems Beset Troop Withdrawal From Hungary [IZVESTIYA 27 Jun]	22
Conflict in Polish Solidarity Causes Concern [Ulyanov on Moscow Radio]	23
Poland's Deputy Defense Chief Interviewed [Moscow TV]	23
Polish Broadcasting Chief on Media's Evolution [Moscow TV]	24
Despite Reforms, Romania Faces Many Crises [PRAVDA 22 Jun]	24
Romania's Iliescu Thanks Gorbachev for Greeting [TASS]	26
Parliamentary Delegation Ends Talks in Yugoslavia [TASS]	26

West Europe

Hijack Attempt to Land Plane in Turkey Foiled [TASS]	26
Further on Shevardnadze's Visit to Netherlands [PRAVDA 28 Jun]	27
Abalkin Receives Netherlands Foreign Minister [TASS]	28
Kohl Plans To Visit Gorbachev in Moscow [TASS]	28
Air Force Official Yefimov Ends Visit to Finland [TASS]	28
Norway Exchanges Correspondence on Fishing [TASS]	28

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political & Social

Central Committee Holds Plenum on Party Congress	29
Congress Scheduled To Go Ahead [AFP]	29
Revenko Describes Plenum [Moscow Radio]	29
Plenum Speakers Noted [TASS]	29
Gorbachev Delivers Report [TASS]	29
Further Reportage on Run-up to 28th Congress	30
Revised Draft CPSU Statutes [PRAVDA 28 Jun]	30
Gorbachev, Ligachev on Outlook [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 29 Jun]	36
Medvedev on Party Ideology [PRAVDA 29 Jun]	38
Report on Medvedev Press Conference [PRAVDA 28 Jun]	43
Lukyanov Interviewed on Congress [PRAVDA 24 Jun]	44
Razumovskiy Interviewed on Issues [PRAVDA 26 Jun]	47
Democratic Platform Gives Briefing [Moscow Radio]	52
Armed Forces Delegates Meet [Moscow Radio]	52
'Political Dialogues' Viewed [Moscow TV]	52
Combining Posts, 'Purity' Viewed [PRAVDA 29 Jun]	54
Five Minutes of Silence Held as Protest Action	55
'Murder' of Culture Lamented [Moscow Radio]	55
Culture Protest Held [TASS]	55

KGB's Kalugin Interviewed on Career [MOSCOW NEWS No 25]	55
Vorkuta, West Ukraine Miners Plan 11 Jul Strike [Moscow TV]	58
Dashichev Discusses Crisis of Perestroika [Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 23-24 Jun]	59
Perestroika Information Center Established [Moscow Radio]	61
New Consortium of Newspaper Publishers Viewed [Moscow Radio]	61

Economic

Ryzhkov Chairs Talks on Market Economy Transition [TASS]	61
Abalkin Deplores Supreme Soviet Action [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 19 Jun]	62
'Vremya' Summarizes Current Economic Developments [Moscow TV]	64
Advance Toward Joint Stock Bodies Viewed [IZVESTIYA 22 Jun]	65
New Hard Currency Trade System Deployed [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 22 Jun]	66
Development of Automated Control System Blocked [Moscow TV]	67
Vladivostok Freight Jam Causes Acute Shortages [Moscow TV]	67
Tankers Leave Nakhodka for Far North [Moscow Radio]	68

Agricultural

Farms Receive Radioactive Fertilizer From Syria [Moscow TV]	68
Stroyev Cited on Agro-Industrial Complex Reform [PRAVDA 27 Jun]	69

Military

Baklanov Interview on Defense Conversion [TASS]	71
Russian Draftees Demand To Serve in Russia [Moscow TV]	72
PRAVDA Discussion of Military Reform Viewed [PRAVDA 22 Jun]	72

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Debates on Lithuanian Moratorium Continue [TASS]	80
Landsbergis Reads Draft Statement on Moratorium [Vilnius Radio]	80
Vilnius Radio Carries 28 June Supreme Council	80
Moscow Talks Discussed	81
Landsbergis Reports to 28 June Supreme Council [Vilnius Radio]	82
Prunskiene Addresses 28 June Supreme Council [Vilnius Radio]	83
Lithuanian Parliament Discusses Moratorium [Vilnius International]	84
Lithuanian Deputies Disagree on Moratorium Issue [TASS]	84
Lithuanian Moratorium 'Vital' for Gorbachev [Vilnius International]	85
Gorbachev Asks Pope To 'Calm Down' Lithuanians [Vilnius International]	85
Lithuania's Shved on Citizenship Attestation [Moscow TV]	85
Estonian Deputies Protest New Immigration Law [TASS]	87
Estonian Immigration Law Provisions Examined [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 27 Jun]	87
Estonia, Leningrad Sign Cooperation Communique [Moscow Radio]	88
Independent Baltic Communist Parties Meet [TASS]	88

RSFSR

Kuzbass Council Supports 11 July Miners' Strike [Moscow Radio]	89
Vorkuta Strike Supported [Moscow International]	89
Primakov Comments on Russian Party Conference [TASS]	89
Polozkov Asked About Servicemen's Problems [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Jun]	89
Ligachev Interviewed at Russian Party Congress [SELSKAYA ZHIZN 22 Jun]	90
Sobchak, Shevardnadze Cited on Party Congress [PRAVDA 22 Jun]	91
Undelivered Delegates' Speeches To Be Published [SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 21 Jun]	91
Isayev on Draft Law on Constitutional Changes [Moscow Radio]	91
'Stormy Atmosphere' Noted at Moscow Soviet [Moscow Radio]	92
Moscow CPSU Plenum Discusses Draft 'Position' [MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 1 Jun]	92
More on Draft 'Position' [MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 2 Jun]	100

Gidasov Criticized at Leningrad Meeting [TASS]	105
Gidasov Interviewed on Russian Union Congresses [PRAVDA 16 Jun]	105
Leningrad Party Declaration to CPSU Congress [LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA 15 Jun]	108
New Leningrad Leader Elected, Interviewed [Moscow TV]	111
Kaliningrad Oblast Called Fourth Baltic State [TASS]	111
New Islamic Party Established in Dagestan ASSR [Tehran Radio]	111
'Unity' Association Holds Founding Congress [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Jun]	112

Western Republics

Donbass Miners To Stage 'Political Warning Strike' [Moscow TV]	112
Regional Council Meets [Moscow TV]	113
Pro-CPSU Youths in Clashes in Donetsk Region [Moscow International]	113
Masol Reelected Council of Ministers Chairman [TASS]	113
Controversy Marks Ukraine 'Liberation' [TASS]	114
Moldavian Supreme Soviet Appeal Published [SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA 8 Jun]	114
Moldavian Decree on Lithuanian Independence [SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA 8 Jun]	115
Amendments to Moldavian Criminal Code Noted [SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA 8 Jun]	115

Caucasus

Armenian Communist Party Committee Plenum Opens [Yerevan Radio]	117
Congress Platform Discussed [Moscow Radio]	117
Armenian Party Leader Comments on Situation [Yerevan Radio]	117
Armenian Favors Single Presidential Candidate [Yerevan International]	119
Armenians Reportedly Kill Azeri Shepherds [TASS]	119
NKAO Elects Delegates to CPSU Congress [Yerevan Radio]	119
Azerbaijan Central Committee View NKAO Problem [Baku Radio]	119
Azerbaijan Central Committee Officials Elected [BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY 10 Jun]	120
Georgia Discusses Law on Economic Independence [Moscow TV]	120

Central Asia

Tashkent City Official Favors Party Unity [TASS]	121
Tajikistan Party Central Committee Holds Plenum [Moscow Radio]	121
Society Formed To Aid Tajikistan Migrants [IZVESTIYA 25 Jun]	121

Research Center Cites USSR Strategic Changes

*LD2806100890 Moscow TASS in English 0945 GMT
28 Jun 90*

[By TASS correspondent Stanislav Lunev]

[Text] Washington June 28 TASS—The central link of strategic changes in East Europe is formed by the Soviet Union's unilateral measures to cut its armed forces, specialists of the Centre for Defence Information, a prestigious Washington research organisation, have concluded.

Their report released here says the Soviet Union is taking active steps to modify its military doctrine and policy as well as the structure of its armed forces in order to make them consistent with the reasonable sufficiency principle. This is illustrated by the reduction of Soviet defence spending and military production and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East European countries.

Given these fundamental changes overturning all earlier American ideas concerning the nature of threat to U.S. national security, the report stresses, the Bush administration should splash the American presence in Europe and agree to the Soviet proposal to withdraw all foreign troops from the region by 1995.

At present, the United States maintains a total of 336,000 troops armed with the latest weapons and about

3,700 units of short range nuclear arms in Western Europe. The upkeep of these servicemen and their families costs the American taxpayer 160-170 billion dollars annually, which is more than all America's NATO allies in Western Europe taken together allocate for military purposes.

At the same time, the centre's director, retired Rear-Admiral Gene Larocque told TASS, the American economy badly needs the money spent on American troops in Europe. This money could best be used to cover the U.S. federal budget deficit, or to pay for the most acute urgent social programmes, including above all the building of housing for the homeless, the anti-drug campaign and the reconstruction of old bridges and roads.

In this respect, the Bush administration's proposals to cut conventional arms in Europe appear to be worse than insufficient, as more than 260,000 American troops will remain in the region even after the proposed measures are implemented.

The cold war is over, the U.S. rear admiral stressed. After wars end, troops return home. The new international security climate, created mainly by the Soviet Union's efforts, enables the United States to cut considerably its military presence in foreign countries. In this connection, Europe appears to be the most suitable place to begin, he said.

CEMA Special Commission Holds Press Conference*LD2806214390 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A sitting of the special commission of the CEMA, which took place in Moscow, was devoted to the reform of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid. Its participants held a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists.

[Begin recording] [video shows exterior of CEMA building; participants at the meeting are then shown in close-up and long-shot; members of the press are seen to be present] [correspondent A. Panov] The international Gosplan [State Planning Committee], as CEMA is called, is seriously ill. An economy managed by ideology never worked efficiently, and six months ago in Sofia the old formula of the EEC was brought to mind—to trade in a civilized way is to trade in a mutually beneficial way. At the same sitting it was decided to set up a special reform commission.

At the press conference, participants in the commission noted that it is premature to bury CEMA and that the preservation of economic relations with the Soviet Union remains of vital importance for the countries of East Europe. We will not forget the Soviet supplies of fuel and raw materials. Within the framework of the natural exchange implemented in CEMA for a good many years, stable economic links have been formed despite everything. You won't renounce them or what has been begun. And the task now is to gradually transfer to market relations. But well, the question here is not of the date. One of the problems is political, that is the various interests inside the CEMA. As Western observers note, while Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland are being drawn to Western mode's of society, the USSR, Bulgaria, and Romania are gambling on renewed socialism. And so the work on the reform is continuing, but the differences in views remains.

[B. Kadar, Hungarian minister of international economic relations, chairman of the sitting, identified by caption—in Hungarian with Russian translation by correspondent] The old CEMA separated its participants from Europe, from the rest of the world. We see in the future a fully renewed organization uniting countries with different economic and political interests, with different levels of development, with a transition without fail to world market prices and the creation of convertible currencies. The problem lies in how to combine all that in a flexible way. After all, world practice has not yet known such a thing.

[S.A. Sitaryan, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, permanent representative of the USSR to the

CEMA, identified by caption] And it seems that we can speak not of an attempt being made so far to temporarily preserve things of the past, but an attempt somehow to impart new life to them, and with the help of new instrumental mechanisms, on the one hand, to further the dynamic development of each country, and on the other, to promote the smoother and more natural entry both of each country and of the community as a whole into the European economic space. [end recording]

CEMA Reform Commission Ends Session*LD2806145390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1355 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[Report by TASS special correspondent Georgiy Meyzrov]

[Text] Moscow, 28 June (TASS)—Ways to radical reform of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance activities and changes to the machinery for cooperation among the member countries of this international organization were discussed at the latest session of its special commission which ended here today. It was established on a decision of the 45th CEMA session in January 1990 to work out a single approach to the council's reorganization.

Summing up the results of the commission's work its chairman, Bela Kadar, Hungarian minister of international economic relations, said the concept of a new type of cooperation within the framework of the CEMA, which was presented for its consideration, had been prepared in consideration of the sociopolitical changes taking place in the council's member countries and was linked to world economic processes. The commission stated that it was necessary to transfer the mutual accounts of the countries who are in the CEMA to world prices with payment in freely convertible currency. In parallel with this, a consensus was reached on the issue of the sovereignty of each CEMA member in the adoption of economic decisions.

However, the minister noted, it cannot be said that consensus has been reached on all problems concerning cardinal reform of the CEMA. And the diversity of opinions here, of course, reflected the contemporary sociopolitical and economic realities of the Council's member countries. The commission has therefore taken certain steps to smooth out the differences which exist. For example, it has been agreed that for countries with less developed economies, the transition of the machinery for cooperation within the framework of the CEMA to the new conditions will take place in stages and will take account of the changes taking place in those countries.

Bela Kadar also said the special commission had instructed groups of experts to work out new rules for a possible successor to the CEMA.

Gremitskikh 28 June Briefing on World Issues

Shevardnadze at Cold War Seminar

LD2806133990 Moscow TASS in English 1332 GMT
28 Jun 90

[TASS correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev report from the press center of the USSR Foreign Ministry]

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze today met Soviet and U.S. historians and political scientists who participated in a Moscow seminar on the origins of the cold war, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here.

Gremitskikh quoted Shevardnadze as saying at the meeting that the scientific analysis of the lessons of the past "is particularly important at the current, crucial stage, when politicians have to take fundamental decisions laying the foundation for the future and affecting the vital interests of all nations of the world".

This, the minister said, referred also to the Soviet and U.S. leaders who were switching relations between the two countries from confrontation to partnership.

He described the end of the cold war as the "most important achievement of the present generation".

Asked about major tasks of Soviet-U.S. relations after the Washington summit, Shevardnadze said "the need to put an end to the arms race determines the remaining, and perhaps even growing, priority of disarmament issues.

"In addition, the Soviet Union and the United States should develop bilateral relations in all areas in a bolder way."

The Soviet and U.S. scientists spoke about the results of their seminar and expressed satisfaction with the transition from confrontation to deeper mutual understanding and cooperation, taking place in science and politics.

On Paraguay Bill on Relations

LD2806141490 Moscow TASS in English 1355 GMT
28 Jun 90

[TASS correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev report from the press center of the USSR Foreign Ministry]

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh today welcomed the Paraguayan Parliament's resolution recommending relations with the Soviet Union.

Speaking at a briefing he said the USSR builds its relations with other countries on the basis of equality, mutual respect, reciprocal benefit, and strict non-interference in each other's affairs. This applies also to

its relations with nations in Latin America where, Gremitskikh said, considerable potential for partnership has been amassed in various fields.

This is why, the spokesman said, one can only hail "possible mutually advantageous contacts with also Paraguay along commercial, economic, cultural, scientific and official lines." These contacts, he said, would meet the interests of both nations.

Gremitskikh described the Paraguayan bill as a "unequivocally positive" development "opening up prospects for a new state of broad inter-state cooperation without ideological exceptions."

On KGB Involvement in CSFR

LD2806145590 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1403 GMT 28 Jun 90

[TASS correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev report from the press center of the USSR Foreign Ministry]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Jun—The USSR State Security Committee [KGB] has no relationship with the events in Czechoslovakia in November 1989. This is stated in a news statement delivered today at a briefing by Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the Foreign Ministry Information Administration.

The statement says that assertions occasionally appear in the CSFR about the alleged "involvement" of the USSR State Security Committee in the events in Czechoslovakia in November 1989 and some other actions. Thus, on 14 June at a news conference by the Soviet ambassador in Prague, a representative of "Civic Forum" and a number of journalists sought to clarify the fate of archives of the CSFR Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs which had allegedly been removed to the Soviet Union.

The USSR State Security Committee, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed today, maintains business relations with the CSFR Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs on the basis of equal rights and mutual benefit without permitting interference in each others internal affairs. These relations are regulated by appropriate official agreements and accords. The KGB and the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs have exchanged and do exchange information, the content and nature of which are exclusively determined by the transmitting side, he pointed out. According to the operative agreement, this relates first and foremost to mutual information on matters of international terrorism, the drug business, and organized crime.

"From all of this it follows that there is no need to speak about the presence in the USSR of any kind of CSFR Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs archives," Yuriy Gremitskikh stated. "It is our conviction that cooperation between the USSR KGB and the CSFR Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs meets the interests of the two countries and serves to ensure their national security."

Chilean Envoy Appointment Hailed*LD2806151290 Moscow TASS in English 1504 GMT
28 Jun 90*

[TASS correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev report from the press center of the USSR Foreign Ministry]

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh described the appointment of prominent Chilean politician Clodomiro Almeyda to be ambassador to Moscow as pointing to "special attention shown by President Patricio Aylwin of Chile to relations with the USSR".

He said that the Soviet Union has also appointed an ambassador to Chile.

Relations between the two countries were restored after a nearly 17-year break on March 11, 1990, and the Chilean charge d'affaires ad interim, Emilio Ruiz-Tagle, arrived in the Soviet capital on June 25.

The opening of the Chilean Embassy in Moscow and the planned opening of the Soviet Embassy in Santiago, Gremitskikh said, mean that "a new page is being opened in the history of bilateral relations, offering a real possibility to start dialogue on key problems of the times and launch mutually beneficial trade, economic cooperation, and cultural and humanitarian contacts".

Cooperation is already getting under way in the repair and servicing of Soviet fishing ships in Chile, and the Soviet Aeroflot airline plans to resume service to Santiago next month.

"We are prepared to develop relations with Chile in most diverse fields on the principles of freedom of choice, balanced interests, sovereignty, equality, and non-interference in internal affairs," the Soviet spokesman said.

On El Salvador Peace Talks*LD2806155790 Moscow TASS in English 1547 GMT
28 Jun 90*

[TASS correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev report from the press center of the USSR Foreign Ministry]

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here today that another round of talks between the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMNLF], which was recently held in Mexico, achieved positive results.

The talks were devoted to drafting understandings aimed to cease fire and create conditions to draw insurgents into the country's social life.

The meeting concentrated on the role of the armed forces in the country, a purge in the army, and punishment of the military guilty of violating human rights.

Gremitskikh stated that the talks failed to achieve specific understandings. At the same time he assessed their results "as positive."

To corroborate this assessment the spokesman said that, firstly, the Cristiani government, which refused to examine the question of the armed forces with the FMNLF until recently, discussed in detail this issue during the talks.

Secondly, the two sides confirmed readiness to continue the direct dialogue on how to settle the conflict.

The Soviet Union hopes that the Cristiani government and the FMNLF will do their best to stop the fratricidal war at the earliest and to achieve national reconciliation in the country, Gremitskikh stressed.

These efforts by the two sides accord with the interests of not only the overwhelming majority of Salvadoreans but of other Central American peoples. They promote the peace process and the final solution of the conflict in the region.

Noting that the next round of talks is scheduled for July 20-25 in Costa Rica, the spokesman expressed hope that in the forthcoming period the sides "will refrain from actions which could negatively tell on the general situation in the country and retard a political settlement."

Gremitskikh also expressed hope that the two sides would seek to preserve and multiply positive results achieved in this process.

Shevardnadze Meets Historians*LD2806162890 Moscow TASS in English 1612 GMT
28 Jun 90*

[TASS correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev report from the press center of the USSR Foreign Ministry]

[Excerpt] Moscow June 28 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze today met Soviet and U.S. historians and political scientists attending a Moscow seminar on the origins of the cold war, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told a briefing here.

Asked about major tasks of Soviet-U.S. relations after the Washington summit, Shevardnadze said "the need to put an end to the arms race determines the remaining, and perhaps even growing, priority of disarmament issues.

"In addition, the Soviet Union and the United States should develop bilateral relations in all areas in a bolder way," Gremitskikh quoted Shevardnadze as saying.

The spokesman said Moscow "has paid attention" to East German Foreign Minister Markus Meckel's interview with the MOSCOW NEWS weekly, in which Meckel supported a Soviet proposal for establishing new relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and said that both blocs should adopt a joint declaration formulating the principles of the new relations.

This approach, Gremitskikh said, "considerably supplements" the concept of transforming the blocs into predominantly political alliances and "promotes the creation of new European security structures." [passage omitted]

Describing Azerbaijan's relief aid to earthquake victims in Iran, Gremitskikh said that between June 23 and 27, 630 relief workers went there, including 282 medical workers. Azerbaijan also provided Iran with 259 vehicles and some 530 tons of food, medicines, clothing, blankets and other necessities. The combined value of the shipments, the spokesman said, adds up to 898,700 roubles.

Shevardnadze Views Berlin Two-Plus-Four Talks

AU2806154190 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 27 Jun 90 p 3

["Exclusive" interview with USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze by Olga Trofimova and Vladimir Markov; place and date not given: "Isolating Germany Would Not Be Useful"]

[Text] [Question] Mr. Foreign Minister, how would you comment on the results of the Berlin two-plus-four talks?

[Shevardnadze] In a comment on the meeting, one must above all emphasize the business-like and constructive way in which the objectives were selected, and the growing understanding between the participants concerning the parameters of the external aspects of German unity and the aspects of international law of German unity.

First, one must regard it as a positive contribution that the parliaments of the two German states adopted an identical resolution on the final recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. It is important that, at our next meeting of the Six in Paris, we will be able to conclude this question with the participation of the Polish foreign minister.

In Berlin the Soviet delegation submitted a draft document for discussion, which is intended to finally settle the German question under international law. Of course we do not consider our document to be the absolute and ultimate truth. It is a draft and we are ready to compromise and consider other options. Our objective is to work out a final agreement that would solve all aspects of German unity by the end of the year and to present it to the heads of the 35 CSCE states. By this, we stress that every state has a say in this key issue....

What is most important today is overcoming the military confrontation in Europe. In this respect the states of the Warsaw Pact have already brought forward their position—I am referring to the declaration that was recently adopted in Moscow.

A lot will now depend on how NATO reacts to the changes that are currently taking place in Europe. This will be shown at the forthcoming NATO meeting in London in July. I think that the decisions of this meeting might provide strong stimuli to the process of overcoming the division of Germany and the division of our continent.

The USSR is ready to take radical steps in this connection. One must change the character of relations between Warsaw Pact and NATO, modify their current structures and forms, and initiate cooperation in a wide range of questions. Besides, why should the two alliances, for example, not create a joint mechanism, a consultative council, in order to conduct a dialogue on the "architecture" of the future Europe?

[Question] Western circles currently hold the view that the Soviet position is leading to an isolation of the future Germany, that it is almost an attempt to delay its sovereignty. What can you say about that?

[Shevardnadze] It is of course absolutely wrong to assume that we want to discriminate against Germany and its people. We must turn over a new leaf, the remaining restrictions of German sovereignty must be eliminated, its new status must be determined, and stable conditions for its constructive cooperation with all other states, particularly the European states, must be created. This is a great challenge. We believe that it requires a certain transition period before everything is finally settled. This is only natural and the idea behind our concept is based on such an approach. It clearly outlines the final objective as well as the stages and deadlines for it.

We are convinced that it would not make sense to isolate Germany. The logic of our document consists of the setting up of stable peace structures in cooperation between the four powers and Germany. The ultimate objective is the construction of a new order of peace in Europe.

Reciprocal Commitments Regarding Germany Urged

LD2806204390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1800 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] Following talks in Moscow, Dutch Foreign Minister Van den Broek confirmed that the solution of the German question without security guarantees for all countries is impossible. Here is a "Latest News" commentary. At the microphone is Viktor Levin.

[Levin] Today, it may confidently be said that a powerful impetus in the search for a way of solving the problem was provided by the draft document "Basic Principles for a Final International Legal Settlement With Germany" which was submitted by the Soviet delegation at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the six states meeting in accordance with the two-plus-four formula—the foreign ministers of the FRG and the GDR as well as the four victorious powers: the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France.

It would of course be wrong to say that little attention was previously paid to ensuring and guaranteeing security. But, with the submission of that document, the discussion seems to me to have become more concrete and purposeful. The document tabled by the Soviet Union says that it is most important to reach an accord to the effect that the future Germany will build its policies in such a way that only peace emanates from its

territory, and no military action is undertaken against anyone, excluding instances of the exercise of the legitimate right to self-defense.

For their part, the four powers could be guided by the same obligations in relation to a unified Germany. The commitments must be of a reciprocal nature. This factor seems to me to be very important since now, in the first responses in the West to the Soviet draft, it has been possible to hear opinions to the effect that our proposals are aimed at measures to ensure such a situation: Our specific proposals on limiting the numbers of the German Armed Forces may, it is said, violate Germany's sovereignty. Sovereignty is a factor that must be reckoned with, and the Soviet Union's stressing of the fact that the commitments must be of a reciprocal nature does, it seems to me, remove possible apprehension over the infringement of German sovereignty.

I have started to talk of the upper limit that we are proposing to establish for the German Armed Forces. This is a question that, as one can say today, has found widespread understanding. How is the problem to be resolved? There are various alternatives here. As is known, there is not just one path toward a goal, and we say quite forthrightly that we are ready to listen to other opinions that can be accepted, and to other approaches. In the light of this it seems to me to be extremely important that the discussion has started and, on the other hand, quite definite proposals have already been put forward.

After the talks in Moscow, the Dutch foreign minister noted a readiness to sign a general declaration on full cooperation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This means that we are standing on the threshold of a genuine breakthrough in ensuring the security of all European states.

Need for European Security Doctrine Seen

*PM2806140990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
24 Jun 90 Second Edition p 7*

[Tomas Kolesnichenko "View From Moscow": "Rough Draft of a Doctrine"]

[Text] I could, of course, pick one of Marx' theses on Feuerbach and claim that it is necessary not to explain the world but to remake it. But it is better when these two processes are somehow synchronized. It is necessary to have a clear idea of the consequences resulting from a particular remaking of the world. Otherwise chaos could ensue.

The stormy events or, more accurately, the 1989 revolutions in East Europe have "remade" the political and social structure of a sizable part of our continent and, if you bear in mind their influence on geopolitics, of the whole of Europe. To what does this lead?

This is not so much a philosophical as a practical question. For not only the former regimes but also the

entire security system that had taken shape in Europe after World War II found themselves overthrown as a result of these "gentle," "velvet," "peaceful" revolutions—call them what you will, but they were precisely revolutions.

Poor though it may have been, that system ensured peace and stability on the European Continent and beyond its borders. Its basic component was the strategic balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In recent years it was reinforced by the Helsinki process and by the transformation of the CSCE into an institution for strengthening European security.

Now a vacuum is arising, and this is always dangerous for nature abhors a vacuum. And a great deal, a very great deal now depends on the substance which will fill the new structures of security and mutual understanding between East and West. Even though these concepts are now regaining their purely "geographic" meaning, we must not forget Kipling: "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet...."

I will begin with what, from my viewpoint, should not be done and which leads to dangerous destabilization. This means, above all, trying to score "bloc" points out of the situation that has come about: Let us say, to strengthen NATO against the background of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact's military structure. Nor, of course, should an attempt be made to integrate Germany posthaste into NATO's military structure while disregarding the security of other European states. All these are axioms about which much has already been written and said. However, neither the NATO Council session at foreign minister level held recently in the Scottish town of Turnberry, nor the statements by that bloc's leaders on the eve of the London summit meeting, make this question any clearer.

What is more, despite the general phrases about "the prospects for ending East-West confrontation" and the other constructive rhetoric, as it were, NATO strategists intend (at any rate for the immediate future) to preserve the bloc's basic military doctrines. These include "deterrence," "flexible response," the "first strike," "follow-on forces attack" strategy, and others. They do not even wish to forgo the plans to modernize tactical nuclear weapons.

As a result, the Warsaw Pact appeal to put the bloc's political functions in first place instead of their military functions has not yet received clear-cut support, although M. Thatcher, for example, who advocates "preserving the reliable defense" of the West, recognizes that "it is necessary to examine how to widen NATO's role from the prevention of war to the building of peace."

And here a sacramental question, to put it bluntly, arises: Why is it necessary to build a new security system on a NATO basis or on a bloc basis at all? Why must precisely NATO, as Thatcher also asserts, be "turned into a forum of transatlantic dialogue"?

Maybe because the Warsaw Pact is disintegrating and the "victory" is NATO's? First, the NATO bloc has not won. It is very important to state that it certainly was not the "position of strength" policy, which the United States and the NATO countries regarded as of paramount importance, that led to the historic changes in East Europe. They were made possible above all as a result of realizing the policy of new thinking. It was this, in the end, that "took by storm" the Berlin Wall. Any other storming would have ended in universal catastrophe. Therefore it is possible, I believe, to draw this conclusion: The danger of war in Europe has been reduced to a minimum. The relationship of "alliance" between the USSR and the countries of East Europe is getting its "second wind" on the basis of the development now of fully mutual advantageous economic and trade ties.

Second, NATO remains a military bloc however its facade is camouflaged, and the heavy "burden" of NATO military doctrines will continue to strongly dominate the bloc's political line and limit its effectiveness.

At the same time, institutions free of the military burden have now appeared in the European arena and are strengthening. As THE NEW YORK TIMES rightly pointed out recently, "NATO's enemy—the Warsaw Pact—is vanishing, but a very serious rival has emerged—the CSCE."

The concept of "doctrine" has recently once again become fashionable. Why not create a "new Europe doctrine" on the basis of the CSCE? And found it on the principle of equal security, trust, cooperation, and observance of mutual interests.

The essence of this doctrine (it could also be called something else) consists in replacing the bloc military structure with a fundamentally different system whose security would be founded not on military confrontation, not even on a balance or parity of forces, but on very broad and diverse cooperation. The interests of "Atlantic solidarity" would also be observed here for the United States and Canada are actively involved in the CSCE process. Indeed, why strengthen NATO if there is no threat? Why gamble on a military bloc when it is necessary to set in motion quite different functions as far removed from a "first strike" as the sky is from the earth?

I would like especially to point out one circumstance: Those people in the United States, or in the West in general, who are nonetheless thinking of destabilizing the international situation, nurturing plans to preserve NATO as the sole guarantor of European security, are playing with fire. In a situation when the "cold war" has been buried and the danger of a clash between the USSR and the United States is at its lowest point since World War II, the self-assertion of NATO without even abandoning the "first strike" doctrine can only be regarded as a challenge to the Soviet Union. And whether or not NATO wants this—I believe it does not—all this will

look like a threat to the USSR's security. A counterreaction is perfectly possible, for this would be a kind of "gift" to some people. They would include those who will demand, as happened a few days ago, that we not surrender "without a fight." Moreover, they might propose "catching up with and overtaking" NATO. Well, we are able to catch up militarily and achieve parity, although once again all this will not cost a mere kopek but billions of rubles. It will also entail big military spending for the NATO countries, bringing no one genuine security but merely initiating a new spiral of the arms race.

The doctrine of a united Europe must be founded not on a narrow national or state basis but on an all-European one. It would absorb the "common European home" of M.S. Gorbachev, the "integral and free Europe" of G. Bush, and the "all-European confederation" of F. Mitterrand. Its economic and social basis could be made up both of a "common market" from the Atlantic to the Urals and of the Delors plan for European integration—the united Europe plan.

The status of the future united Germany must be the core of the new doctrine. Our position as a whole has already been expressed repeatedly. Two days ago the Soviet delegation at the talks within the framework of the "two-plus-four" mechanism submitted for consideration a draft document based on a comprehensive approach to settling foreign policy aspects of German unity. The main points in the definitive settlement of this problem include, once again, its synchronization with the Helsinki process as the chief factor of stability in Europe. The "ball" is now in "their" court, as the saying goes. But even now I will note an important dynamic in the way this problem is formulated. Only a while ago we heard a stubborn "no" from the West when there was talk of any international status for Germany other than its integration in the NATO system.

Today a pluralism of opinions is "in evidence," as it were. The Hamburg Institute of Problems of Peace, for example, has reached the conclusion that certain models of Germany's future hardly meet the demands of a European security system. "The version involving Germany's NATO membership is a solution from yesterday, while the second version—its neutralization—is from the day before yesterday," the authors of a special study write. Their conclusion is that it is necessary to combine two aspects: the 10 principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe which could be "the nucleus for the creation of a nonbloc, permanently functioning organ of European security."

Unfortunately, diplomats and politicians—even those whose business cards begin with the words "Doctor of Sciences"—are lagging behind scientists in their conclusions. But time is pressing. The NATO leaders will gather in London in the very near future, and they have

to state, one way or another, their position both on the German question and on Europe's future security system.

It is no secret that "they" too are now elaborating new doctrines. It is important to make positions closer. For this painstaking and in many respects still rough work is needed. But if the longest journeys begin with the first step, all "doctrines" begin with rough drafts.

Deputy Premier Ryabev Talks With IAEA Head

PM2806132590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6

["Own information" report: "On Chernobyl and the AES"]

[Text] L.D. Ryabev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has received H. Blix, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the Kremlin. During the conversation H. Blix gave a briefing on the efforts being made by the IAEA to resolve a number of problems linked with ensuring the safety of nuclear power generation, and also to provide comprehensive assistance to the Soviet Union in studying and eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station] disaster.

During a detailed discussion of these issues the Soviet side expressed its gratitude to the agency for the help it has provided and expressed the hope that such cooperation will be further expanded and deepened.

H. Blix was briefed on the state of affairs in Soviet nuclear power generation, existing problems, and ways of resolving them. In this connection, particular attention was devoted to the need to comprehensively develop glasnost and openness on all issues connected with nuclear power generation, to involve broad public circles in their examination, and to create an effective system for cooperation with organs of local power.

V.F. Konovalov, USSR minister of nuclear power generation and the nuclear industry, took part in the conversation.

The conference "Nuclear Power in the USSR—Problems and Prospects" (ecology, the economy, law), organized by the USSR Nuclear Society, opened in the city of Obninsk yesterday. The conference, called upon to provide scientifically substantiated answers to the main questions of the development of nuclear power generation in the USSR in the immediate period and the more distant future, will listen to reports from leading scientists on questions of creating safe next-generation nuclear reactors and various aspects of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

Talks With SFRY Delegation on Germany Unity

LD2706195490 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1854 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Text] Belgrade, June 27 (TANJUG)—The Soviet Union believes that the unified Germany, which will itself choose its internal order, should guarantee security to other nations and states that a danger of war would never again be launched from its soil.

Aleksandr Dzhasonov, the head of a delegation of the foreign policy committee of the Supreme Soviet, said [this] here today at the end of talks with a delegation of the Yugoslav Federal Parliament.

Dzhastnov said that a wider circle of countries should be engaged on the international aspects of German unification.

The Soviet Union would like that Yugoslavia, as the chair-country of the non-aligned movement, as well as certain other members of the movement play a more active role in the current positive global process.

The head of the Yugoslav delegation, Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Yugoslav Parliament Aleksandar Simovic, said that the two countries believe that parliaments should play a stronger role, parallel with the efforts of the governments of certain countries to stabilize and further promote international security and cooperation.

Shevardnadze Greets Mediterranean Meeting

PM2706091990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Message to Participants in Meeting"]

[Text] In connection with the third conference of Mediterranean countries' foreign ministers opening 25 June in the Algerian capital, USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze has sent a message to the participants in the meeting.

The message, addressed to Algerian Foreign Minister S.A. Ghazali, welcomes the nonaligned states' consistent and constructive efforts to improve the situation in the Mediterranean and to turn it into a zone of peace, security, and cooperation. It stresses that these tasks are in keeping with the immutable goals of Soviet foreign policy in this region and have been reflected in the well-known proposals put forward by the Soviet head of state in Belgrade and Rome. In particular, the Soviet Union supports the idea of holding a broad conference on Mediterranean problems similar to the CSCE, preparations for which could begin in the near future.

In conclusion the message confirms the USSR's readiness to continue a dialogue with nonaligned Mediterranean countries aimed at a productive exchange of opinions and constructive collaboration.

United States & Canada

Baker's 28 June Press Briefing Cited

LD2806205790 Moscow TASS in English 2048 GMT
28 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Korolyov]

[Text] Washington June 29 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said at a White House briefing Thursday that the key question on the NATO summit agenda would be the revision of the North Atlantic alliance's strategy.

Baker added that this question would be discussed, taking into account the organisation's aims and the new challenges facing NATO today.

Noting that the forthcoming summit will be held against the background of dramatic changes in Europe, including democratisation in Eastern Europe and German unification, Baker said that these kaleidoscopic changes bring not only great hope but also uncertainty and even some danger.

Baker noted that the alliance should assist in German unification and preserve Germany a NATO member. In addition, it is necessary to promote peaceful democratic and economic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Dealing with Western nuclear forces, the state secretary emphasised that political and military changes show that NATO needs short-range nuclear system to a smaller extent.

The North Atlantic bloc should define a lowest possible number and types of nuclear weapons stability, Baker said.

He noted that the alliance should draft a position on new talks with the USSR on cutting short-range weapons.

Speaking of conventional weapons, the secretary said that the talks on considerable cuts in all armed forces in Europe are plodding ahead, and there is hope that an appropriate agreement would be concluded this year.

Nevertheless, Baker alleged that the Soviet Union would have the largest army in Europe and that the U.S. troops should remain in Europe till U.S. allies need them.

He also said that the summit would examine how NATO can help raise efficiency of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Now that democracy and market economy are expanding, the alliance should see how the CSCE can help draw the Soviet Union and other European countries into this process, Baker stressed.

U.S. Suspension of Talks With PLO Criticized

LD2806183690 Kuwait KUNA in English 1610 GMT
28 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, June 28 (KUNA)—A Soviet diplomat Thursday criticized the decision by the U.S. Government to suspend talks with the Palestine Liberation Organization, contending that the decision came as a response to mounting Zionist lobbying in Washington.

In a mini press conference for Arab reporters, head of the U.S. and Canada Section at the Foreign Ministry Sergey Sukhin said the Soviet Union will continue consultations with the United States on the Middle East.

While warning against the eruption of a new war in the Mideast region, Sukhin said Moscow will attempt to prevent such a war from taking place.

Internal changes in the Soviet Union, he added, will not deter Moscow from continuing its active policies and efforts in the Middle East area and ensuring security and stability there.

Lukyanov Urges Contacts With U.S. Politicians

LD2806135390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1205 GMT 28 Jun 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Vladimir Shishlin from the Kremlin]

[Text] Moscow, 28 June (TASS)—Anatoliy Lukyanov, USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, stressed the significance of personal contacts between political figures of the USSR and the USA in determining the future of Soviet-U.S. relations, when he received in the Kremlin today participants in the Dagomys meeting of young politicians of the two countries which ended yesterday. Pointing out that the stability of the world in the 21st century depends on them, the leader of the Supreme Soviet said: "You need to jointly answer the question: Can our two great states and two great peoples be together at this turning point in history; together in fulfilling the historic mission of deflecting the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and curbing the arms race; together in advancing the common European process; together in the struggle to overcome disease, poverty, hunger, the financial servitude of Third World countries and an ecological crisis of world scope in which humankind itself is literally capable of writing itself off; together in working for the establishment of just and totally non-discriminatory economic relations, for the affirmation of the high ideals of humanism and human rights and for overcoming all forms of racial and national enmity."

In spite of our remaining differences, Anatoliy Lukyanov noted, we have succeeded in making much progress, particularly over the last five years. There has been a positive change and we must apply all our effort to implementing the transition to mutually beneficial cooperation, in the long-term, to partnership. "Yes, of course," he said, "we are not yet ready today to repeat

after Hemingway: 'Farewell to arms!' However, it is beyond doubt that we do have opportunities to move along this path and there are real results."

The Supreme Soviet chairman touched in detail on the situation in the Soviet Union and on the tasks facing parliament. Setting forth his thoughts on this matter, he made frequent reference to American writers and poets among whom, he said, he particularly values Walt Whitman.

Replying to questions by the participants in the meeting, Anatoliy Lukyanov expressed hope for "the consolidation of healthy forces within the CPSU" which would make it possible to prevent a split in the party. He confirmed the adherence of the Soviet leadership and parliament to the policy of setting up a regulated market economy noting, in particular the need for economists to concentrate efforts on tackling the task of making the ruble convertible. The leader of parliament stated the readiness of the legislative body to complete examination of the USSR law on the freedom of conscience during the next session and to begin drawing up acts safeguarding the interests of veterans (including "Afghans"), the disabled, and other categories of people requiring additional legal protection.

Soviet, U.S. Scholars Discuss Cold War Origins

*LD2806201490 Moscow TASS in English 2003 GMT
28 Jun 90*

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Skripnikov]

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—A Soviet-American seminar has launched cooperation between the two countries social institutes—the United States Institute of Peace and the Scientific Coordination Centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry—in studying cold war sources.

This was the essence of a statement read out by History Professor Allen Weinstein of Boston University at a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists today.

Speakers at the news conference described the broad discussion between seminar participants on cold war sources. Virtually all scholars concurred in the opinion that the cold war was inevitable historically.

They offered various reasons: opposite political principles of the United States and the USSR which possessed ideological and military dynamism in the conditions of post-war political vacuum (Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger), the absence of readiness of Soviet and American leaders to understand political realities of the post-war world (Professor Mikhail Narinskiy), Stalin's model of a "surrounded fortress" and the need to create "the image of an enemy" (Walter Laqueur of the Centre of Strategic and International Problems).

Professor Richard Pipes expressed an idea that the cold war originated from the Bolshevik slogan about a worldwide revolution, and it began not in 1948 but in 1917.

Seminar participants did not reach unanimity on the question under discussion: Differences between American and Soviet scientists remained.

However, the seminar's sponsors did not have the aim of achieving an artificial consensus, said Pipes.

Aleksandr Chubaryan, director of the general history institute, said that he said that he saw the seminar's accomplishment in the fact that American and Soviet scholars tried to abandon a confrontational approach when discussing the origin of the cold war, one of the most acute themes of Soviet and American historians and politologists.

"All of us are ardent supporters of better American-Soviet relations," said Chubaryan.

Meeting participants will continue the dialogue in Washington between July 23-26.

U.S. Scientist Awarded Moscow University Degree

*LD2806195190 Moscow TASS in English 1702 GMT
28 Jun 90*

[By TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—American scientist and publicist William Fulbright said here that the most efficient form of international cooperation is scientific and cultural relations.

He spoke at a ceremony of awarding him the degree of doctor emeritus of Moscow University.

Presenting the doctor emeritus certificate to Fulbright, Moscow University Rector Anatoliy Logunov said that "a bill which later became a law on mutual pedagogical and cultural exchanges is one of the most important results of Fulbright's work."

"According to this act, which is now called the Fulbright Programme, some 116,000 foreign scientists and 60,000 American scholars got a chance to conduct research outside their countries and display their mastery in various arts."

Logunov noted that the Soviet Union joined the programme in 1958. Since that time about 2,500 American and Soviet experts have been able to conduct scientific and pedagogical activities in various countries.

China

Nishanov Receives Chinese Friendship Delegation

*LD2806164290 Moscow TASS in English 1630 GMT
28 Jun 90*

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—The Soviet people have always felt keenly about cool Soviet-Chinese relations in the recent past, Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the

Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities, today told a delegation of the Chinese Society for Friendship With Foreign Countries.

On the contrary, he added, Soviet citizens now approve measures by the Soviet leadership to establish active cooperation in all spheres with the great Chinese neighbour and ally in the construction of socialism.

The delegation is visiting the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Committee. Soviet-Chinese contacts in all fields, including parliamentary exchanges, especially improved after top-level visits to the USSR and China.

These contacts are acquiring a new dimension: There is an unprecedented growth in relations between China and union republics, especially the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan.

Meeting participants stressed the great role of the two countries' public in developing these contacts. Incidentally, the Soviet and Chinese public sought to be above political disputes even during the most unfavourable times.

The Chinese side described aims and tasks of the Chinese society for friendship with foreign countries and its activities to deepen relations with the public in various countries.

It was noted that friendly contacts with Soviet counterparts are gaining special importance in this respect.

The Chinese delegation was interested in perestroika: how all aspects of Soviet life are being renovated, what difficulties the Soviet people face and how they tackle these difficulties.

The meeting was attended by Chinese Ambassador Yu Hongliang.

Chinese Communist Youth Leader Interviewed

PM2806122190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jun 90 p 3

[Report by M. Morozov on interview with Chinese Communist Youth League First Secretary Song Defu: "Song Defu and 48 Million Others"]

[Text] A delegation of the Chinese Communist Youth League [CYL] headed by First Secretary Comrade Song Defu has visited our country.

This was the first visit by a CYL leader to the Soviet Union in more than 30 years, a period marked by well known problems in relations between our countries.

Despite the fact that he is no longer young, Song Defu is a new-generation youth leader. His outward appearance contains no hint of the previous image of the Chinese type of party functionary. He is democratic in personal contacts and easily wins over his interlocutor.

Comrade Song Defu and his colleagues are convinced that young Chinese fully support the reform which is being carried out in the country and which is opening the way for enterprising and determined people. The CYL sees its task as being to assist young people to reveal their potential and themselves create the conditions for a better life. And there are many problems, according to the Chinese leader: the extremely acute housing shortage, which hits young people in particular, the mass migration of rural young men and women to the cities, a phenomenon that is very familiar to us, the often low wages at state enterprises, and illiteracy. Song Defu repeatedly stressed that a CYL primary organization is only worth something when it can give concrete assistance to its members and protect their interests. At enterprises where most of the workers are young, the CYL seeks to organize democratic elections of leaders and conducts work to introduce new economically accountable forms of remuneration for the union's members. Commercial activity to supplement youth funds is also widely practiced by the CYL. It turns out that the CYL is even the guarantor of state credits issued to CYL members to set up cooperative and private enterprises. Unfortunately, I did not manage to question Song Defu about the millionaires who, let's face it, are members of the union.

"It is not easy for the CYL to work at enterprises founded on foreign or mixed capital," Comrade Song Defu said, "where most of the employees are young. "We have to find a common language with the 'capitalist sharks' for whom the most important thing is efficient output. Nevertheless, the CYL proves its viability as a youth organizer even in those enterprises. Incidentally, it must be noted that the union's overall membership is growing and already exceeds 48 million."

Song Defu and his companions willingly spoke about the CYL's work in the socioeconomic sphere. You could sense that they consider this direction to be very important in conditions of the reform and the developing market. Well, what is happening in ideology and politics?

[Morozov] Comrade Song Defu, the CPC leaders speak openly about the existence of bureaucratism, formalism, and violations of ethics and morality in the party. Are these phenomena characteristic of the CYL?

[Song Defu] Indeed, all this does exist in our union. There are also other problems connected with the expansion of foreign ties. The CYL is battling against such manifestations. We demand that CYL organs not lose touch with the people, and we call on them to go out into the streets and carry out specific actions for young people.

[Morozov] Twenty years ago Mao Zedong called on the people to "learn from Lei Feng." Why is China now again extensively turning to the ideas connected with this national hero?

[Song] Lei Feng was orphaned at the age of seven, trained to be a driver, and then went into the Army and became a department commander. He died in 1962 in the performance of his duty. Lei Feng served people all his life, and he was devoted to his people. His philosophy was expounded in his diaries. He wrote that "man's life is finite, but service to the people has no bounds." We are now calling on people to learn from Lei Feng because we want to change the situation, stimulate the healthy development of young people, and ensure a rational combination of social and personal interests. It is not important when Lei Feng lived. We need his spirit of unselfishness, self sacrifice, and moral purity today.

[Morozov] What is the CYL's attitude to the events on Tiananmen Square whose anniversary was observed by young people in many countries with a hunger strike?

[Song] There were disturbances in Beijing a year ago. They were provoked by internal reasons and miscalculations in work. Our union is opposed to demonstrations. We call on young people not to break the law. The younger generation should live according to the interests of the people and defend the people.

China's Fang Lizhi Given Permission to Leave

PM2706133390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Allowed to Leave"]

[Text] Beijing, 25 Jun—Professor Fang Lizhi, former senior scientist at the Beijing Observatory, and his wife Li Shuxian today received official permission to go abroad for treatment.

Fang Lizhi and his wife participated in last year's spring-summer events year in Beijing, as a result of which the Beijing City Public Security Administration ordered their arrest. They have been sheltering in the American Embassy in the PRC for more than a year.

Recently, the announcement says, the couple sent a letter to the Chinese authorities admitting that their actions contravened the country's Constitution.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Rally Recalls Korean War, U.S. Involvement

LD2806180290 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1400 GMT 28 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya newscast"]

[Text] Well, it seems that such problems as the explosion of prices and the presence of a large mass of money backed up by nothing—not even by goods for the population—does not overly concern the DPRK, a country which has practically rid itself of the difficulties and disorders of the free market, and which has preserved proud loyalty to the principles of a centralized economic management which knows no crises. But here is a report

from Pyongyang sent by our correspondent Kibelov, which is dedicated not to economic, but to historic and political problems.

[Belov] [video shows crowds gathered in square holding placards and banners bearing slogans; a giant poster of Kim Il-song is held high above the crowd; officials are seen addressing the crowd from the rostrum and are greeted by applause and clenched-fist salutes] Over the course of 36 years, this day in the DPRK has been celebrated as the day of the struggle against U.S. imperialism. This is written on this invitation which we received.

The mass rally on the Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang took place despite the warning by weather forecasters of a typhoon approaching the peninsula. Over 2,000 representatives of the capital's rayons came in an organized way with slogans: Down with U.S. imperialism! We support the anti-U.S. patriotic struggle of the people of South Korea; Down with national traitor, No Tae-u! Sworn enemies of the Korean people, U.S. imperialists, out of South Korea!

The DPRK thinks that the United States unleashed the three-year bloody war and that it is namely the United States which is guilty of preserving the split of Korea and for whipping up military tension. It is namely because of this that the population of the republic is constantly called upon to enhance its vigilance and to cultivate a feeling of hatred for the sworn enemies of the Korean people.

The rally, at which the inhabitants of Pyongyang stigmatized U.S. imperialism with frenzied enthusiasm, lasted for over an hour and a half.

[Announcer] Well, such mass rallies of working people, either supporting the intrigues of the DPRK in its ceaseless struggle against U.S. imperialism, or making it obligatory to mark another revolutionary anniversary with new labor feats, are almost the most widespread theme of reportages from our correspondent in Pyongyang. The rally which we have just seen was dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the beginning of the war on the Korean Peninsula, and you will agree that it also creates an impression by the frenzied enthusiasm, the hatred for U.S. imperialism, and the enthusiastic love for Kim Il-song, the great leader of the Korean people and the inspirer of all its victories.

But here, comrades, it is appropriate to recall that apart from the usual, so to speak, monotone interpretation of the causes for the outbreak of the Korean war—as the aggression of U.S. imperialism—that interpretation, that concept which has been repeated throughout the whole of these 40 years on the pages of our press, there is also another version, about which the NOVOYE VREMYA magazine recently reported in issue number 23 in a very interesting, good, and well-reasoned article. To put it briefly, this article talks of the possible and probable involvement in the unleashing of the war in the Korean

Peninsula of another great leader of nations—Josef Visarionovich Stalin. I am not a specialist; it is difficult for me to judge whether that is the case or not. I think that our scholars will still investigate that problem and try to analyse it. But so far, nevertheless, I recommend that you read issue 23 of the NOVOYE VREMYA magazine.

Investigation of Illegal Korean Fishing Continues

LD2706134190 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0740 GMT 27 Jun 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Leonid Vinogradov]

[Text] Nakhodka, 27 Jun (TASS)—The Japanese Government knows nothing about Japanese citizens working on board North Korean vessels detained in Soviet waters. Muramatsu Terumi consul general at the Japanese Consulate in Nakhodka, has told a TASS correspondent by telephone.

On Tuesday [26 June] he managed to visit the DPRK-flagged trawlers which have been detained by the Soviet fishing inspectorate for illegal salmon fishing in the USSR economic zone. When he had attempted to contact the Japanese on board these ships the previous day, their captains, DPRK citizens, would not permit the Japanese crew members to come on deck.

On each of these trawlers there are more than 10 navigators, mechanics, and seamen working alongside the Koreans. There are a total of 170 Japanese fishermen on the 12 ships which were conducted under escort by Soviet border guards to the roads of the Gulf of Nakhodka.

According to the consul, all of the Japanese fishermen are in good condition. They have no complaints. The city authorities have delivered 50 tonnes of fresh water and a large amount of food to each of the ships.

Meanwhile, it is expected that the Korean captains will be tried for illegal fishing. Representatives of the Soviet fishing inspectorate are continuing to investigate this case. So far, indictments against one crew have been handed over to the Nakhodka city court. On the basis of Soviet law, the fishing inspectorate has fined two others 10,000 rubles.

Soviet War Veteran Interviewed on North Korea

SK2906015990 Moscow International Service in Korean
1100 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] [First announcer] Dear listeners: 15 August is the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese occupation. On the occasion of this significant day we will continue to talk about those Soviet soldiers who had participated in the battles in Korea. Today, we will introduce a man whose name is today well known to many people in the DPRK. He is retired Major General Nikolay (Legachev). He was a member of the (?Military) Council of the 25th Army which liberated Korea in August 1945. Later, he commanded the civil government

headquarters of the Soviet Army in North Korea for four years. (Legachev) was one of the founding members of the USSR-DPRK Friendship Society and has worked for more than 30 years as vice chairman of the central committee of the society. Activists of the DPRK-USSR Friendship Association, too, know Nikolay (Legachev) well. He visited the DPRK several times in the past. From now on we will report a station reporter's interview with him.

[Second announcer] Many things in the house of Nikolay (Legachev) remind us of Korea. There was a drawing depicting Mt. Kumgang, various kinds of ornaments, [word indistinct], a color picture of Pyongyang City, and [words indistinct] in his house. All of these are gifts from his Korean friends. These things led the master of this house to recall the days when he was in Korea. The old general went to his bookcase and picked up a small old map. The markings of arrows and circles were shown on the map. The general said: This is a military map which I have kept.

[First announcer] In July 1945 Major General Nikolay (Legachev) served in the 25th Army which directly participated in liberating Korea. (Ivan Sichakov), former commander of the 25th Army and Soviet hero, wrote as follows in his memoirs: I think Nikolay (Legachev) is an outstanding political functionary and [words indistinct] between commanders and political functionaries. He was a member of the (?Military) Council of the 25th Army and was familiar with the status of combat readiness of the 25th Army and with the situation of the defense positions of the friendly and enemy units. On 9 August the Soviet Union declared war against imperialist Japan. The Soviet Army's attack began. Continuing attacks on the ground and sea our Army liberated cities and rural areas of Korea which were under Japanese occupation. The march of the 25th Army which had to pass through rugged roads and mountains was very arduous. Bridges, and wooden bridges in particular, were too weak to bear heavy artillery pieces, tanks, and trucks. On the tops of mountains enemy units attempted to block friendly units' attacks. However, the enemy units were unable to block the Soviet Army units' strong attacks.

General (Legachev) pointed to three red arrows on the map. He said: These arrows show the three main directions of our 25th Army's attack against the Japanese Army stationed in Korea. As a result of this attack, the Japanese Army units were isolated from their main forces in the east and west coasts.

General (Legachev) marched from the Soviet border far away to Pyongyang together with soldiers of the Soviet Army. Soldiers of artillery and tank units, pilots, and soldiers of engineering units saw him. His son, (Pulad-olim) [words indistinct] was somewhere around there. He commanded an artillery battalion as a captain. After the war ended, the father and son met in Pyongyang.

[Second announcer] General Nikolay (Legachev) said: Recalling the awfully sultry days of August 1945 I cannot but think of the Koreans, men and women, old and young, who warmly welcomed the Soviet soldiers.

The general continued to say: An aged Korean farmer with a red flag appeared on a street to welcome the Soviet soldiers. The aged farmer who was in rags and in poor health opened his mouth in excitement. The aged farmer told us: I have met many people in my life. They passed through our rural area, wielding fire and bayonets. They brought death to us and imposed misfortune and tears on us. You, Russians, do not have to be upset by my tears. This is entirely a different tear: it is a tear of joy. I am meeting not only the strongest army, but also the most just army for the first time. Good bye and good luck.

General (Legachev) continued to say: What I can remember most is the day 15 August 1945. This was the historic day for the Korean people. It was a clear day with no clouds. Nature, too, looked to be filled with joy, like the Korean people who greeted national liberation. Many flowers were laid before the graves of officers and men of the Soviet Army who had devoted their lives to the freedom and independence of the Korean people.

[First announcer] The war was over. However, [words indistinct]. The Japanese imperialists left numerous legacies such as destroyed enterprises and plants, [word indistinct], and (?restaurants). Under such circumstances, Soviet Army soldiers behaved as genuine internationalist fighters. They rebuilt destroyed enterprises and plants, repaired destroyed railways, and taught the Koreans how to operate locomotives and how to drive vehicles. Already in 1946 the first group of Korean youths was sent to universities and colleges in the Soviet Union to study there.

The civil government headquarters of the Soviet Army which was organized in Pyongyang played remarkable roles in giving effective assistance to the people in the Far East. Nikolay (Legachev) participated in the work of organizing and conducting the assistance. Nikolay (Legachev) received the Order of National Flag First Class of Korea for his active participation in the postwar rehabilitation work of the national economy of North Korea. He was also awarded the Lenin Medal for his work in the DPRK.

Returning to the fatherland, he became a founding member of the USSR-DPRK Friendship Society. The friendship society has today become a mass public organization and has branches in 14 republics of the USSR, enterprises, sovkhozes, kolkhozes, organs of science, schools, and [word indistinct].

Nikolay (Legachev), who is one of the leaders of the USSR-DPRK Friendship Society, has been actively participating in its work despite many other duties. He is now over 85 years old. The Presidium of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries awarded him the title of friendly

and honorary (?mayor) for his contributions to strengthening and developing friendship between the USSR and the DPRK.

[Second announcer] [passage indistinct] Therefore, he is still interested in reports on the situation of the DPRK. Newspapers and broadcast media are not the only media through which he has been informed of changes taking place in the DPRK. Saying good-bye to me, he stated as follows:

[Begin Nikolay (Legachev) recording in Russian fading into Korean translation read by first announcer] I visited the DPRK many times as a member of the delegation of the USSR-DPRK Friendship Society. Each time, I would automatically compare the DPRK of today with that of the past when I participated in it for its liberation and construction. I witnessed many outstanding changes in many fields. I truly rejoice over these changes. Excellent sons and daughters of the DPRK and the Soviet Union did not shed blood in vain. The Korean people are building their new lives with certainty. Each time I visited the DPRK, I firmly believed that friendship between us was strengthening. I would like to take this opportunity to extend congratulations to you, the listeners, in connection with the 45th anniversary of the liberation of Korea and, at the same time, to wish you good health and success and prosperity for your fatherland, the DPRK. Our friendship will be firm and inviolable in the future, too. [end recording]

Korean War, Potential for Unity Examined

SK2806120490 Moscow International Service in Korean
1100 GMT 25 Jun 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The date 25 June is an important one in the modern history of Korea. On this day 40 years ago, the Korean war broke out, and its consequences are still felt today. (Igor Lebedev), our station commentator, writes:

Early morning on 25 June 1950, military action started along the entire 38th Parallel. No one anticipated then that the war would continue as long as three years, that the major powers of the world would participate in the war, and that the war would cause incalculable loss to the Korean people. Nine million people died in the war. Of them, 84 percent were innocent civilians.

The U.S. Army provoked the Korean war, cruelly and brutally bombed the cities and villages of the DPRK, bombarded it with navy guns, and used (?napalm), chemicals, and even germ warfare. As if this were not enough, Washington was preparing atomic weapons. But the firm position of the Soviet Union—given that the United States was no longer the only country that possessed the atomic bomb—and some U.S. politicians' (?awareness of reality) stopped it from using atomic weapons.

Backing the DPRK with assistance were the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries. The assistance was given in material and political support. The Chinese volunteer soldiers' participation in the battle played a particularly important role.

Forty years have passed since the start of the Korean war which ended with the signing of the Armistice Agreement. However, no peace treaty has been signed up to the present time, and no durable peace has been established on the Korean peninsula. Korea still remains divided in two. In the southern half, the U.S. Army is deployed, equipped with nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we think that the situation on the Korean peninsula has changed considerably. The positive changes taking place in the Asia-Pacific region have not bypassed Korea. Hopes of solving their problems through talks is conspicuous both in the North and South of Korea. Among the recent examples are the South Korean proposal for a phased mutual reduction of the Armed Forces, and the DPRK's peace proposals for easing military tension on the Korean peninsula, including the proposal to South Korea for the resumption of the preliminary talks for the high level military and political talks.

For the normalization of the situation on the Korean peninsula, these proposals should be realized. To this end, there is all sorts of potential. Some time ago, the ROK president issued a statement again on the hope to ease confrontation in Korea and to explore ways to solve the fundamental national problems of the country. The development of inter-Korean dialogue is an important condition for the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea and an element of detente and a safeguard for the security of this region.

Moving U.S. Military Base in S. Korea Viewed

SK2806113190 Moscow International Service in Korean
1100 GMT 26 Jun 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] (Vasiliy Nikolayev), TASS correspondent in Tokyo, reports as follows: The content of the South Korea-U.S. accord on moving the U.S. military bases from Seoul by 1996 is, in essence, to have U.S. troops withdraw from Seoul.

This accord was signed jointly in Seoul by South Korean Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun and General Louis Menetrey, commander of U.S. Forces in South Korea.

According to comments made by commentators here, this step is designed to appease the anti-U.S. sentiment persisting in South Korea. The accord envisages the removal of all military facilities, including the headquarters of U.S. Forces in South Korea and the Combined Forces Command, as well as their staffs and members.

The accord also points out that the minimum military facilities to support essential U.S. troops in the northern area of Seoul will remain in the Yongsan military base near Seoul.

As pointed out in the document, the place to which the U.S. military base will move and the detailed plan for moving remains to be settled in the course of discussions, to be considered as a possible joint operation in the future.

According to the predictions of intelligence experts, the area near Taejon 140 km to the south of Seoul will emerge as the site. Both sides agreed to have the South Korean side bear all expenses required for moving the U.S. garrison.

However, Washington promised to effectively use existing facilities and (equipment) so that the expenses for removal are minimized and that the land for building the new military base is reduced as much as possible.

According to the estimate of General Menetrey, the total amount of funds needed for moving would be approximately \$1 billion. An official spokesman of the South Korean Defense Ministry stated that the relocation of the military base will be carried out in such a way as to not weaken the common defense potential of both sides but to strengthen cooperation between South Korea and the United States in the area of (security.)

ROK Relations With Socialist Nations Discussed

SK2606032190 Moscow International Service in Korean
0900 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] We will now carry a TASS commentary on "economic cooperation and development of Asian-Pacific nations."

The Mongolian People's Republic [MPR], which has adopted open economic policy, is seeking to gradually expand economic cooperation with its neighboring nations in the Asian-Pacific region. This fact is attested to by the recent working visits to China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand by Sharabsambuu, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MPR. The business circles of those nations are interested in cooperation with the MPR. The MPR's foreign investment legislation this year has paved the way for cooperation between the MPR and those nations.

Yi Son-ki, president of the Korea Trade Promotion Corp. [Kotra], said that Kotra would open trade missions in Beijing, Ho Chi Minh City, and Bucharest at an early date. He said that by doing this, Kotra trade missions to socialist nations would increase to 10. Saying that the Kotra trade missions, which will open soon, will contribute to expanding economic cooperation with socialist nations, he stressed that this would serve as a basic foundation to develop political dialogue with those nations.

According to the data released by the ROK Ministry of Trade and Industry, ROK trades with the East European nations are marking record-breaking growth this year. For example, the ROK has exported \$100 million worth of goods to East European nations during the first quarter of this year. This is as much as a 175 percent increase over the exports of the last year's corresponding period.

Meanwhile, the imports from the nations of the region are also impressive. The imports from East European nations have increased as much as 115 percent when compared to the last year's corresponding period.

Expanding trades and economic relations are followed by an unprecedented development of political relations. South Korea has already established diplomatic relations with Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Mongolia. Meanwhile, in this regard, an agreement has also been made in principle with the East Germany. At the same time, the Kotra mission has opened in Moscow.

In this course, South Korea has become more active in Asia. For example, South Korea is planning to resume talks with China for mutually establishing trade missions. Though psychological positiveness has reduced since the tragic incident took place at the Tiananmen Square last year, China still continues to remain as South Korea's largest trading partner among the socialist nations. Last year the trade volume between the two nations reached about \$3 billion.

The South Korean business circles are planning to establish close trade and economic relations with Vietnam as well. Despite Washington's negative stand, Seoul's stand is positive toward making progress in dialogue with Vietnam.

Washington still links the normalization of relations with Hanoi with the question of withdrawing the Vietnamese units which it alleges still remain in Cambodian territory.

Developing Economic Links With Japan Urged

LD2606105990 Moscow TASS in English 1041 GMT 26 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Yiriy Vitrichshak]

[Text] Khabarovsk June 26 TASS—The interest in developing and deepening mutually advantageous economic links was confirmed during the discussion at the third Soviet-Japanese meeting of cooperators which opened here today.

It is being attended by representatives of Siberian and Soviet Far Eastern consumer cooperative organizations and cooperators from Hokkaido Island.

"During the three years since the first meeting we were able to make considerable headway in economic interaction, take specific steps in cooperation between the

two countries' regions," chairman of the board of the Russian Federation Consumer Cooperative Union Valentin Yermakov told TASS.

"In exchange for the products manufactured by consumer cooperatives in the Soviet east, Hokkaido supplies consumer goods which are in great demand on the local market. Cooperation has been streamlined in the field of joint farm production.

"At the current meeting qualitatively new approaches to our contacts were charted. I mean the establishment of joint ventures, which will enable the Soviet side to curtail its raw materials exports and boost manufactured goods sales. One fish and sea-products processing factory is already in operation.

"We have agreed to organize the production of medical preparations, using Japanese technology and Soviet raw materials, and the production of foodstuffs from Far Eastern wild plants."

Sakhalin Halts Raw Material Exports to Japan

LD2606083990 Moscow World Service in English 0700 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Text] The Soviet island of Sakhalin is stopping supplies of raw materials for the Japanese market. From now on the local industrial facilities intend to process their raw materials themselves and to manufacture products which will be competitive on the world market. Experts links such a radical decision with the program of accelerated economic development that the new leadership of the island intends to realize. For this purpose domestic and foreign capital will be widely drawn into oil-processing, agriculture and the timber industry.

Campaign Against U.S. Bases in Japan Noted

OW2706063390 Moscow Radio in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Announcer-read report by Moscow Radio Tokyo correspondent Potapov]

[Text] Seventeen parcels of U.S. base lands with a total area of about 1,000 hectares in Okinawa will be returned to Japan. This has been agreed upon at recent Japan-U.S. negotiations and in the past few days.

The mass media in Japan have been reporting results of the Japan-U.S. negotiations. News on the results of the Japan-U.S. negotiations are arousing various reactions among ordinary people in Japan. Remarks and statements made by the conservative camp highly praise an agreement reached at the Japan-U.S. negotiations, calling it a historic event and maintaining that the agreement is a vindication of the U.S. Pentagon's new approach to meet the desires of Okinawan residents.

However, discontent with the agreement is mounting among some people in Japan. They are criticizing Prime Minister Kaifu's 23 June visit to Okinawa Prefecture as

a showy, halfway act designed to dampen the mounting campaign among Okinawan residents against U.S. military bases. Kosuke Uehara, who is a member of the House of Representatives hailing from Okinawa, stated his views as follows:

"As is known, U.S. military bases in Okinawa occupy 250,000 hectares of land, and 75 percent of U.S. forces in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa. Although nearly 20 years have passed since Japan regained administrative power in Okinawa, this state remains unchanged. The Okinawan people have strongly asked the government to take concrete measures and this has led to the announcement of a plan to scale down the size of U.S. military bases in Okinawa to some extent. Frankly speaking, the desires of Okinawan residents were betrayed because the agreement was no more than a showy measure. Therefore, Okinawan residents should carry out more vigorous activities to have U.S. military bases reduced and withdrawn in response to the world moving in a positive direction toward easing tensions. With the aim of putting an end to U.S. military bases in Okinawa, we are resolved to continue the campaign steadfastly and thoroughly. We plan to tenaciously ask the government to take concrete measures toward that end. This is what we Okinawans think. Repeating, we are not content with the latest agreement reached at the Japan-U.S. negotiations."

Further on Hokkaido Governor Visit, Agreements

LD2806111790 Moscow Television Service in Russian
0830 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Report by correspondent V. Feoktistov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Takahiro Yokomichi, governor of the island of Hokkaido, has described his visit to the Soviet Union as fruitful.

[Feoktistov] The results of the visit were the signing in Moscow of an agreement on friendly partnership between the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and Hokkaido, and thorough talks on trade, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation, which Yokomichi held in Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and here in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. He had a meeting with Professor Fedorov, chairman of the Sakhalin Oblast executive committee, and with people's deputies and managers of enterprises and associations. He also gave a news conference for Soviet journalists and Japanese newsmen accompanying him.

In Moscow, Takahiro Yokomichi said, we signed an agreement on developing new cooperation between Hokkaido and the Soviet Far East. Now it is up to us to implement it in practice. The governor of Hokkaido expressed regrets over recent cases of mass poaching by Japanese fishermen in the northwestern sector of the Pacific Ocean, which we reported on in the "Vremya" program.

In the traditional Japanese form, Takahiro Yokomichi touched on the question of the so-called Northern Territories—the Kurile Islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir, and Iturup—and some sort of return or transfer of them to Japan. We hope, he said, that this problem will be resolved in the course of the forthcoming visits to Japan by Mr. Shevardnadze, and subsequently, by Mr. Gorbachev. Mr. Yokomichi did not point out there the precise fact that Habomai is not one island, but a whole group of islands. Incidentally, the Soviet participants in the discussions on the Kurile Islands are not making the point, either. This creates the illusion that we are dealing with a very small territorial concession by the Soviet Union.

Answering a question from the Japanese correspondents in that context, Professor Fedorov stated that it is out-of-date and not constructive to talk about territorial claims in our age. I would not like to predict in advance the course of the forthcoming visits to Japan by our country's leaders, but nothing will be resolved in this department without Sakhalin Oblast.

Japan's Kaifu on Northern Territories Issue

LD2806175490 Moscow TASS in English 1745 GMT
28 Jun 90

[by TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kopnov]

[Text] Tokyo June 28 TASS—Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu today expressed optimism about the future of Japanese-Soviet relations.

He told a news conference here that bilateral contacts recently have become increasingly brisk and that making them still more frequent will be vital for normalising relations between the two countries.

Many problems remain, including the need to sign a peace treaty and settle the issue of "northern territories." But efforts should still be maintained towards a "balanced expansion" of bilateral relations, Kaifu argued.

He reiterated that he favours gradually lending Japanese-Soviet relations a new, friendly nature and promoting possible business contacts and humanitarian exchanges.

Kaifu said that two fact-finding delegations of Soviet economists have already visited Japan and that dialogue is under way at government level.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze will visit Tokyo in September and "for our part, we are also considering the possibility of sending a Japanese minister to Moscow," Kaifu continued.

He expressed hope that President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan next year will mark a turning point in bilateral relations. "After it, if need be, it would be possible to think seriously at an appropriate time also about my return trip to the USSR," the Japanese premier said.

Asked to comment on the forthcoming Houston summit of leading seven capitalist nations, which is expected to discuss assistance to the Soviet Union, he said: "When the time comes, Japan will be prepared to provide all requisite assistance."

At the moment, however, Japanese-Soviet relations are complicated by the lack of a peace treaty and by the "northern territories" problem. But Japan could still give the USSR "intellectual, humanitarian" assistance even today, Kaifu said.

Near East & South Asia

Kabul Rocket Attack Kills 14, Damages Apartments

LD2806152190 Moscow TASS in English 1517 GMT
28 Jun 90

[Text] Kabul June 28 TASS—Five people were killed and 14 wounded in a rocket attack on the Afghan capital today.

Intractable opposition units fired nine ground-to-ground rockets.

Several apartment buildings were damaged.

CPSU Central Committee Greeted Afghan Congress

PM2806144990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Jun 90 Second Edition p 7

[CPSU Central Committee message: "To the Second People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Congress"]

[Text] We cordially greet delegates to the Second People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Congress.

We believe that the congress resolutions will serve the cause of your party's renewal and give it new strength in the struggle to implement the national reconciliation policy, which accords with the Afghan people's supreme interests.

We wish you success in your work.

[Signed] CPSU Central Committee

Israel Should End 'War of Words', Try Diplomacy

TA2806194490 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress
in Hebrew 1500 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Commentary by Dmitriy Prokofyev]

[Text] Political circles in both the West and East blocs have responded positively to the recent statements made by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Housing and Construction Minister Ari'el Sharon asserting that the new immigrants from the Soviet Union will not be settled in the occupied territories. To prove the sincerity of their intentions, the Israeli leadership has publicized the existing projects for immigrant absorption, which call for their settling in the Galilee, the Negev, and

central Israel—in other words, within the Green Line. This is what our commentator Dmitriy Prokofyev writes on the issue:

My familiarity with the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict has taught me that even words have sometimes played a very destructive role, even if these words were not matched by concrete actions. It is enough to mention the end of May 1967: The provocative speech made by al-Nasir, and the famous stammering of Levi Eshkol. After the war, various documents were published proving that Egypt did not have the power or means to start a war against Israel. Following al-Nasir's speech, however, war was inevitable.

The Yom Kippur War is also worth mentioning in this regard: Who asked Yisrael Koenig to say that new settlements would be set up in the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula. The necessary funds or volunteers could not be found, but the words had already been uttered. We have learned from the diaries of the late Anwar al-Sadat that after Koenig's speech, Cairo decided to launch a preemptive strike against Israel.

The final proof that words are dangerous in the Middle East was Shamir's declaration that a big aliyah needs a big Israel. I personally had no doubt that all the talk of sending Soviet immigrants to the territories was a mere bluff. Israeli law precludes the settling of immigrants in specific areas against their will. The immigrants themselves lack any ideological motivation. Who told you that they would go live in settlements?—especially since new immigrants need work, and there is no employment to be found in the settlements because building industrial plants or large factories there is simply inefficient.

Shamir perhaps simply wanted to scare the Arabs. Al-Nasir was also attempting to scare the Jews in 1967, and look what happened. Incidentally, things now are already almost out of control. Shamir's declaration caused an almost hysterical reaction among the Palestinians, and I can understand their feelings, because even if the possibility of actually implementing the plan to settle the Soviet immigrants in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is only hypothetical and very slim—not even one in a hundred or a thousand—the Palestinians cannot take the risk. Because if they lose Hebron and Nablus—as they lost Nazareth and Bet She'an in the past—it will be forever. And the Palestinians, those refugees who are scattered in all corners of the Arab world, caused their hysterical response to resound throughout the entire region, from Morocco to Iraq. Saddam Husayn is already threatening to use his chemical weapons against Israel. It is good that this time the Israelis exhibited steady nerves—better than those shown by Menachem Begin in 1981, when he ordered the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad, because this time such action could have resulted in a terrible war. A war because of a few words devoid of any real intentions.

Now, after the Israeli clarifications, there is some chance that the situation in the Middle East will improve and

political solutions will be found. Let us pray that the countries in the region move toward peace. I must add, however, that their only hope to reach peace is if both sides, both the Israelis and the Arabs, refrain from making unnecessary statements. There is not much experience in Middle East peacemaking, but the little we have shows that the best results were achieved through quiet diplomacy—if the involved parties do not provoke each other to extreme actions.

Israel's Sharon on Settlement of Soviet Jews

PM2906121790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Jun 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report under general heading "Policy of Annexations Continues"]

[Text] Washington, 25 Jun—Soviet Jews arriving in Israel will not be settled in occupied Arab territories, according to a promise by A. Sharon, the country's minister of construction and housing. As UPI reports from Jerusalem, he said in a speech to the Jewish Agency Board of Directors that not a single immigrant from the USSR will be sent to the West Bank of the River Jordan or the Gaza Strip, because Israel "understands the gravity of the situation."

An ABC-TV anchorman pointed out that A. Sharon's unexpected statement appears aimed at "reducing the USSR's fears in connection with Israel's settlement of Soviet emigrants in the occupied territories."

It is also pointed out that A. Sharon did not make clear what specific measures the Israeli government intends to take in order to prevent an influx of immigrants into these lands. The minister, known for his extremist views, did not propose, in particular, to make any changes to the policy of the cabinet which, as it is well known, gave financial incentives to Israelis intending to settle on the West Bank of the Jordan or in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, he stressed that government policy in relation to the colonization of occupied territories will not be reviewed. Jews have the right to settle in these territories, and the establishment of settlements there will be continued, A. Sharon said.

Trade Union Chief Meets Israeli Delegation

LD2806195290 Moscow TASS in English 1729 GMT
28 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—Gennadiy Yanayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), received a delegation of the General Federation of Labour in Israel (Histadrut) here on June 28. The delegation is led by the Federation's Secretary-General Israel Kessar.

Its members described their humanitarian mission in the Soviet Union and the content of understandings with Belorussian and Ukrainian trade unions on the Histadrut's participation in work to overcome the aftermaths of the Chernobyl disaster.

On behalf of the AUCCTU, Yanayev thanked the Histadrut for humane assistance. An understanding was reached to draft measures for further cooperation.

The sides discussed in detail a Middle East settlement, a just solution of the Palestinian problem and immigration to Israel.

Interior Ministry Sends Firefighters to Iran

LD2806134190 Moscow TASS in English 1300 GMT
28 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—Soviet firefighters were among those who rushed to help Iran after the recent earthquake. A group of rescuers from the Moscow specialised unit of the firefighting service of the Soviet Interior Ministry flew to Iran.

The unit includes 27 rescuers of different specialties, physicians among them. The group boasts effective technological equipment.

Eight such groups of rescuers have been formed at the Soviet Interior Ministry, comprising 150 people in all.

Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovskiy on Middle East

PM2806104790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy by correspondent A. Ostalskiy: "Near East on the Brink. How Can a Catastrophe Be Averted?"—date, place of interview not specified]

[Text] [Ostalskiy] Vladimir Fedorovich, you have just returned from another trip to the Near East. What was its purpose?

[Petrovskiy] In Iraq we had the traditional consultations with President S. Husayn and the other Iraqi leaders and also with PLO Executive Committee Chairman Y. 'Arafat, who was in Baghdad. I told them about the results of the recent Soviet-American summit. Then, on the way back to Moscow, I also visited Amman, where I carried out a similar mission, meeting with King Husayn of Jordan. I want to stress that the leaders of Iraq, the PLO, and Jordan welcomed the fact that the governments of both the United States and the USSR are focusing attention on the Near East problem. It did not go unnoticed in the Arab capitals that the USSR president, when he was in the United States, made a point of raising questions in the U.S. Congress concerning the situation in the region and condemned Israel's actions connected with the settlement of immigrants on occupied Arab territories.

During the Soviet-American summit grave concern was noted in connection with the Near East situation: Indeed, the region would appear to be sliding into an abyss and it could be on the brink already. And this is extremely dangerous, considering how many weapons are crammed into the region.

[Ostalskiy] What can be done, in the Soviet Union's view, to pull the Near East back from the brink?

[Petrovskiy] We are in favor of making maximum use of the UN potential to help find compromise solutions in the region. The convening of an international conference on the Near East, with the participation of all interested parties, including the PLO, and also the permanent members of the Security Council, remains the chief landmark. Possible approaches include consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council and the appointment of a special representative of the UN secretary general for the Near East, and, at a later date, the establishment of a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. From the viewpoint of reducing the danger of war, it would be necessary to place on a practical footing the implementation of Egyptian President H. Mubarak's proposals on turning the Near East into a zone free from mass destruction weapons. One might also think about establishing a regional center to reduce the danger of war. Obviously it is high time there was a serious discussion of such matters as the nonproliferation of missiles and missile technology in the Near East and the reduction of the military potentials of the region's states to the level of reasonable sufficiency. In other words, the time has come for action; moreover, in order to prevent a dangerous exacerbation of the conflict, it is necessary not only to make maximum use of traditional methods, but to seek new ones. The Near East must not remain a blot on a political map of the world that is changing for the better.

Of course, the Iranian-Iraqi settlement issue was also discussed in Baghdad.

[Ostalskiy] In this very connection, there have been reports in the world press about an intensification of the Soviet Union's mediation efforts. What can we do in practical terms to turn the truce on the Iran-Iraq front into a real, secure peace?

[Petrovskiy] The Soviet Union is one of the few countries in the world that has normal, good relations with both Iran and Iraq. This presents us with a real opportunity to offer the sides our good offices. We said in Iraq that we could be of assistance in many ways; in particular, we are prepared to offer our territory for talks, with or without our direct participation, on a bilateral basis—that is for the sides themselves to decide.

[Ostalskiy] How were these USSR efforts greeted in Iran and Iraq?

[Petrovskiy] At least no one rejected our proposals. They have been brought to the notice of both sides and are evidently being studied. In any event, we certainly would not want to hamper the efforts of the UN secretary general and the sides themselves. What is important for us is not so much our actual role as the progress of the Iran-Iraq conflict settlement process, leading as soon as possible to the desired result—lasting peace. The foundation remains the same—the well known UN Security Council Resolution 598.

[Ostalskiy] You said that the principle of reasonable sufficiency in armaments is relevant to the Near East as well. But how does this square with the continuing large-scale supplies of Soviet weapons to the Near East? When working in Baghdad I saw for myself what it is like when extremely destructive missiles made in my own country rain down from the sky. At the same time, modified missiles of the same origin were sowing death and destruction in Tehran. At the moment the USSR is selling weapons—and plenty of them—to both Iran and Iraq....

[Petrovskiy] These supplies are indeed a reality. But they are associated with certain treaty commitments by our country. Nevertheless, we believe this question must be tackled. We have already declared our willingness to participate in an international register of armaments. The intention is that the document will be drawn up by the United Nations and, in order to register, states will supply data on sales of their weapons abroad. The most active "sponsors" of this idea at the moment are Italy and Colombia. But many other countries, including the USSR, actively support the register. It is a pity that some other states, including the United States, are rather cool toward this project. Indeed, for this document to be effective it would have to be universal. This would make it possible to create an atmosphere of glasnost and openness around this acute problem and prevent the unimpeded formation of black markets in weapons. But it must not be forgotten that this is only the first, the smallest step toward a solution of the problem. We must aim to achieve an accord on the nonproliferation not only of nuclear weapons, but of all other types of armaments.

[Ostalskiy] How does the USSR Foreign Ministry view the proposals for the discussion of major arms supply deals in the USSR Supreme Soviet?

[Petrovskiy] Positively! Parliaments must pay attention to and monitor this kind of activity, and this applies also to the Supreme Soviet. In the first place, these questions must be considered in the committees on international affairs and also on defense and state security matters.

Iran's Position in Afghanistan Examined

*NC2906103690 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1700 GMT
28 Jun 90*

[Commentary by Yuriy Andreyev from "The World Today" feature]

[Text] As previously reported, Benon Sevan, the UN Secretary General's representative for the solution of the Afghanistan problem, arrived in Tehran. He held talks with Iran's Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati and discussed a solution to the Afghanistan problem. Our analyst Yuriy Andreyev writes:

Frankly speaking, no detailed report on the talks has been submitted to correspondents. Reports are issued merely in protocol form and do not discuss the nature of talks.

As we know, 'Ali Akbar Velayati has expressed hopes that the current talks between the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, which was recently formed in Iran, and the Peshawar-based mujahidin make it possible to establish the necessary basis for elections in Afghanistan. The UN secretary general's representative, in turn, briefed 'Ali Akbar Velayati on the most recent steps in the international arena for solving the Afghanistan problem. Reports also indicate that Benon Sevan has described Iran's efforts toward a solution of this crisis as perfect.

This is the so-called official side of the current visit. But let us study the issue more deeply to understand behind-the-scene events.

The entire world, especially UN circles, is well aware of the fact that Iran plays one of the key roles in the Afghanistan problem. The outlook of a solution to the Afghanistan problem depends largely on Tehran's stand. But the difficulty is in that Tehran's policy on Afghanistan is not at all uniform or specific. For example, the Islamic government announces that it does not accept the Kabul regime in any way, but it does not hasten to sever diplomatic relations with it. Iran speaks of support for the anti-state movement in Afghanistan, but it does not recognize the opposition government in Peshawar. Tehran claims that it supports an end to the bloodshed and a solution of the Afghanistan problem through political means. Nevertheless, it continues to arm and financially aid the Shiite opposition groups. In short, Tehran is constantly altering masks very much like an expert magician; and no one is surprised if a cautious friendly smile suddenly disappears to be replaced by a grim face that supports one side or another.

I think that Tehran's stand on the Kabul regime is largely contingent on the political situation inside Afghanistan. At first—and especially after the withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces—the Iranian leaders were completely convinced that Najibullah's regime would fall. Iran's overt underestimation of the Afghanistan Government stemmed from this. But it soon became clear that these calculations were immature. The regime stood firm and the mujahidin were unable to score even one big military or political success.

It was then that Tehran reformed its political stand and started to support the formation of a government with broad participation, not ruling out the possibility of talks between the opposition and Najibullah. Moreover, Tehran supported the formation of a regional conference on Afghanistan with the participation of the interested sides; namely, the Soviet Union and Pakistan. At the same time, it seems that the Tehran leaders do not rule out the possibility of a mujahidin victory if they unite. At least, the unity of all the Afghan Shiite groups in Iran and their transformation into the Islamic Unity Party of

Afghanistan, and Iran's mediatory efforts in the talks between this organization and the Peshawar-based alliance show that Tehran has not given up certain hopes.

Existing facts show that during the current negotiations with the UN secretary general's representative, Tehran's policy on the Afghanistan problem was clarified.

East Europe

Troop Pullout From Czechoslovakia Viewed

PM2806132990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Jun 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by special correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Belousov: "Fruitful Dialogues"]

[Text] Central Group of Forces, 26 Jun—The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia is causing many problems, among which the property and financial problem is one of the most complex.

It was to the search for ways of resolving property and financial questions that much attention was devoted at the Central Group Military Council's meeting with members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions who were visiting Czechoslovakia. Colonel General E. Vorobyev, the USSR Government's plenipotentiary for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic] territory and commander of the Central Group of Forces, and Major General N. Plyaskin, first deputy chief of the Central Group of Forces Political Directorate, raised in particular the question of setting up under the USSR Government's plenipotentiary a standing bureau (department) of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations for the sale of the Defense Ministry's property and real estate.

The conversation begun at the Military Council was continued in the Soviet Embassy in Prague, where USSR Ambassador to the CSFR B. Pankin and M. Kuznetsov, embassy minister-counselor, received the Soviet parliamentarians and representatives of the Central Group of Forces command.

Then they held a meeting with representatives of the mass media. Czechoslovak journalists were especially interested in whether the timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops will be changed in view of the difficulties on the Soviet side. USSR People's Deputies V. Ochirov, B. Vare, M. Zokirov, V. Opolinskiy, and B. Podziruk stressed in their replies to the questions that there is no question of a change in the timetable, but the dynamics of financial and economic settlements must be transformed.

On the same day talks were held between Soviet parliamentarians and CSFR Federal Assembly Deputy M. Kocab, Major General S. Nadovic, chief of the administration for supporting the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, Major General V. Poltikovic, his

deputy, and Doctor B. Koteny. This meeting can be called a fruitful one. Earlier Soviet and Czechoslovak experts had already reached a common method of assessing the value of facilities and now new opportunities arose in the solution of financial and economic problems. M. Kocab spoke of his intention to promote the delivery of portable housing to the Soviet Union to accommodate 100,000 members of the families of servicemen leaving Czechoslovakia.

Visit Reveals Many Problems

PM2806143190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 26 Jun 90

[Report by S. Andreyev and V. Lebedev, identified by caption; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Newscaster] A group of USSR people's deputies who are members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Questions is visiting Czechoslovakia to familiarize itself with the process of the Soviet troop withdrawal and problems connected with this operation.

[Correspondent] The problems are many, and the deputies addressed one of the main ones during their meeting with journalists.

Many of the officers' and warrant officers' families will have nowhere to live on their return home. Houses were built for them abroad but not at home. It seems to me that a question which should have been asked has not been asked. Did it not occur to anyone during the more than 20 years of the troops' temporary stay abroad that one day they would have to return home?

There are many things here that seem incomprehensible. This probably explains the tone of the local press coverage of the troop withdrawal, which is neutral at best, but more often than not negative. These are Czechoslovak television pictures. People cannot understand how it is possible to let buildings, including housing, fall into such neglect. [video shows interior of dirty, dilapidated building] How it is possible to leave toys like this in the earth [video shows land mines], even if these mines are just training mines. How it is possible to allow three meter thick strata of petroleum products to accumulate in the earth. [video shows diggers, trench filled with thick black liquid] You could almost start pumping petroleum here. Not just the Army, but our nationwide ecological blindness is probably to blame for this. Perhaps it was not even the Soviet units which created these underground petroleum lakes here. It has emerged that back in 1968, 1969, and 1970 when we leased these facilities, no ecological survey was carried out. A joint scientific commission is now to be set up which will determine the share of responsibility and the damage caused. Compensation will have to be paid. Questions of payment for facilities leased from the Czechoslovak side and installations built by the Soviet side have also yet to be decided.

Recently Czechoslovak television carried a feature on the excellent state of a settlement vacated by a special purpose unit on the border with the FRG. The housing may be turned into a small hotel. [video shows premises in good repair] It appears that it is also possible to leave in a civilized fashion.

Ryzhkov Congratulates Chairman of CSFR

LD2806150290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1443 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow 28 Jun (TASS)—Nikolay Ryzhkov has sent greetings to Marian Calfa, chairman of the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic [CSFR], in which he congratulated Calfa on his appointment as chairman of the CSFR Government.

Nikolay Ryzhkov expressed the certainty that relations between the USSR and Czechoslovakia—based on the principles of good-neighborliness, equal rights, and mutual respect—will undergo further development in the interests of the people of the two countries, and of peace and stability in Europe.

Problems Beset Troop Withdrawal From Hungary

PM2806133590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent F. Lukyanov: "Considering Both Sides' Interests"]

[Text] Budapest—The final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, which began in March, is entering its most strenuous phase. Before the end of this year the bulk of our troops' personnel and arms is to be withdrawn. A group of members of the USSR Supreme Soviet headed by V.N. Ochirov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security, arrived in Hungary recently to familiarize itself with how things are going with regard to the return home of the units of the Southern Group of Forces.

On Hungarian territory there remains the Soviet Army's immovable property assessed at a total of R2.8 million, ultimately paid for by the Soviet taxpayers. It is on this question that the positions of the Soviet and Hungarian sides are so far furthest apart. The thrust of the Hungarian position is, and this has been stated frequently officially, that during their stay on Hungarian territory the Soviet units caused considerable harm to the environment and took a considerable quantity of arable land out of circulation while the buildings left behind by our army, including 363 apartment blocks with 14,000 apartments, schools, and hospitals are not of the slightest value to the Hungarian side. That is why they believe the sides are quits.

This way of putting the question can probably be understood but hardly accepted. Many of the establishments which are being left behind were once constructed

according to Hungarian plans using Hungarian construction materials and it is hardly right to say they are not of the slightest value to the Hungarians. The Soviet side, where necessary and possible, is setting about recultivating the land taken out of circulation and where that is not possible is agreeing to compensation. As for the buildings and installations, serious interest is being displayed by a whole series of firms and enterprises in the establishments left behind. To this must be added that Hungary's mass media sometimes give very one-sided coverage to problems connected with the property disputes which have arisen which, incidentally, has frequently generated protests from the Soviet military command.

The point is that very often the military establishments left behind by our troops are turned within a few days into something unrecognizable, which is then recorded by the local press and submitted as "the work of Soviet soldiers." Thus, the military township around the airfield in Debrecen was attacked by people who like "easy pickings" literally the day after the withdrawal of the Soviet air force regiment.

All these problems which have arisen during the Soviet troops' withdrawal from Hungary were discussed at the meeting of the USSR people's deputies with the command of the Southern Group of Forces headed by Colonel General M.P. Burlakov. The deputies displayed a lively interest in the reasons for the situation which has taken shape. In response, the command cited the insufficient legal elaboration of the articles of the intergovernment agreement on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops regarding property questions, which gives grounds for contradictory interpretations of particular provisions. Obviously it was proposed to resolve property disputes within the working procedure but the Hungarian side's positions proved tougher than had been supposed. Ultimately, as the participants in the meeting in the Southern Group of Forces admitted, there is now a threat to Soviet property, which may remain in Hungary either completely free of charge or else for minimum compensation. I think, however, that the time of generous gifts to anyone has passed. Particularly in a situation when the Soviet Army units returning to the motherland are, when they are redeployed, encountering problems like the lack of housing, schools, and construction materials. Under these conditions compensation for the immovable property left behind in Hungary could be used to purchase the necessary construction materials and equipment here.

Both the deputies and the troops command recognized that the critical situation cannot fail to worry us. To be fair it must be said that recently certain advances have nonetheless been noted here. For instance, a commission of the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical supply was created recently and has begun work with the participation of professional lawyers and economists and will undertake the examination of property problems, thus freeing the military of functions which are not theirs. Quite a few options have also already

emerged for the further use of property, including through joint ventures. I want to hope that the commission which has been created will be able to cope with the solution of the problems which have emerged. The USSR people's deputies have promised to help its work. The deputies have promised to promote the solution of the difficulties emerging in the places where our units are being redeployed.

Of course, much will depend on the constructive approach of the Hungarian authorities. It is clear that the solution to the problem is possible only with an unfailing consideration of the interests of both sides, because a one-sided approach, which threatens to jeopardize the schedule for the Soviet troops' withdrawal, hardly accords with the interests of either side.

Conflict in Polish Solidarity Causes Concern

*LD2806142490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1230 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[Yuriy Ulyanov commentary from Warsaw on conflict within Solidarity]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] This struggle can give no satisfaction to those watching from close by, let alone a sense of gloating, and this is principally why: both the USSR and Poland are engaged in building a new, democratic society. Since then, good-neighborly relations have recently been established between our countries. Our governments have a common language in resolving problems relating to the difficult periods in the history of the USSR and Poland. The so-called blank spots are being sorted out. Yet, judging by the continuing debates the nature of Soviet-Polish relations is not to the liking of some in Poland. Of course, we have respect for Lech Walesa, we value highly his role in the positive changes which have taken place in Poland, and it is for the Poles to decide whether he is to be president of the Republic of Poland. However, we are of course concerned that forces might come to power that could have a negative influence on relations between Poland and the USSR. This is why we Soviet people cannot fail to be worried by what would appear to be an internal conflict within the ranks of Solidarity.

Poland's Deputy Defense Chief Interviewed

*LD2806215490 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1530 GMT 15 Jun 90*

[Interview by station correspondent with Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Polish deputy minister of national defense, place not given—live or recorded; in Polish fading into Russian translation]

[Text] [Correspondent] Why was it this ministry you ended up in?

[Onyszkiewicz] Very simple—it was Premier Mazowiecki's decision. It's not for me to judge why I was the one he chose. All I can say is that I accepted. I have long been interested in military issues, though as an amateur,

of course, and also in foreign policy issues. And I wondered whether it might not be possible to combine the two spheres. That's why I accepted the offer.

[Correspondent] To continue the same question: What are your duties, unless this is state, military or some other kind of secret, of course?

[Onyszkiewicz] No, of course not. It's the international aspects of our ministry's activities that I'm involved with, or to be more precise, the disarmament talks in Vienna and Geneva. Most likely I shall probably also work on our participation—this is what we are hoping—in the conference on collective security in Europe. My duties encompass everything connected with Poland's participation in the Warsaw Pact.

[Correspondent] In that case, could you tell us what kind of relationship now exists between the Wojsko Polskie and the Soviet Army, on a general note without going into detail?

[Onyszkiewicz] Outwardly, nothing has changed, but we would like to see changes in the philosophy of the Warsaw Pact. We would like the organization to be less ideological and military and more of a consultative and political body. We would also like the Warsaw Pact to place clearer emphasis on its coalition nature, especially where appointing commanders is concerned. It seems to us that a provision on rotation of command cadres should be introduced. I'm not talking about the commander in chief, of course; that post should obviously be in the hands of the USSR. But it is worth considering as regards other posts. I think it is time to negotiate changes to the pact in connection with the extraordinarily rapid changes in the political situation. Who could have imagined the likelihood that such an important member of the Warsaw Pact Organization as the GDR Army might disappear in the very near future?

[Correspondent] The last question is one that interests me personally. Can one speak today of political education of the Wojsko Polskie soldiers?

[Onyszkiewicz] Rather than saying political education, I would put it another way. I would prefer to talk of civic education, because we would like the Army to keep out of the political and ideological disputes that have existed and do exist in our country, because Poland was and will be a pluralist country. We would like the Army to be an instrument of the state, an instrument of the people, which should therefore educate citizens and patriots wholeheartedly devoted to the cause of defending the fatherland.

Polish Broadcasting Chief on Media's Evolution

LD2806220590 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1530 GMT 15 Jun 90

[Interview with Andrzej Drawicz, chairman of Polish Radio and Television Committee, place not given—live or recorded, in Russian]

[Text] As you know, life today is interesting but complicated, in whatever area one works. Nor is it easy in radio and television. We always dreamed, I mean the people who are now creating the new Polish Government, the broad front of popular consensus, we dreamed of turning all these mass media into something truly popular and public. Now the time has come, and everything seems to be proceeding smoothly in that direction, but in practice this means tackling many very complex issues.

First of all, issues connected with real pluralism. The precondition here, of course, is that radio and TV in themselves must be non-partisan, and I personally as the director am trying to stick rigorously to this, that it must be non-partisan, objective and produced by people who are good professionals—this is something we are still working towards—and must provide a platform for the expression of all the different views being put forward both in this state or governmental bloc of ours and outside that bloc.

At the same time, it is true, we have to think about our own internal issues, and these are complex ones, too. This organization was set up for completely different purposes, for the purpose of political indoctrination of society, and it has to be rebuilt into something rational and sensible that conforms to its normal tasks in the new democratic Polish society. What we need here is a very radical perestroika—if I can use that good Russian word—and this is something we are also now trying to achieve, this structural perestroika.

We also have to solve a number of issues of a financial and material nature. We have to usher in a new situation in which, so to speak, the airwaves are divided—a new decision has already been drawn up, so that everyone who wants will have the right to set up a private enterprise of this kind. So we have to exist in conditions of genuine competition; we have to be competitive, both within Poland and internationally, because we are now in competition with other information media in Polish coming from the West. First and foremost, we are trying to win back our credibility. And with all these very complex and difficult tasks that we still have to tackle, this is for us the most important thing and we have perhaps already achieved it to some extent. People believe us; people are no longer saying on such a mass scale that television lies. This is something people did say in the past, and to be honest, I thought the same. Even this time last year, the television was public enemy no. 2 for me. I detested it. But now it has turned out that I have to manage it and protect it against attacks from what I think are excessively zealous advocates of excessively rapid and resolute reform. It all has to be done in a sensible way. In any case we shall do our best.

Despite Reforms, Romania Faces Many Crises

PM2806142790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
22 Jun 90 Second Edition p 7

[Report by special correspondent A. Sharyy: "Romania Today: The Flight of the Mayatra"]

[Excerpts] Bucharest-Moscow—[passage omitted] It was four months ago that Romania, having experienced the taste of freedom, rushed headlong toward a new life—not the life it had known before, but one that seemed wonderful. Confidence was easily discernible in the unhurried conversations, and in casual fleeting dialogues, indeed simply in the eyes of passers-by: Now everything will change for the better. Later on, it seems to me, the sober understanding came too: The path to this better future was by no means strewn with flower petals. People who managed to keep a cool head back at the beginning of the December events proved correct in their warning: Habits, traditions, and a way of life developed over the decades cannot be changed overnight.

The intervening six months have given the Romanians the right to speak up and the freedom to express their thoughts, but have not added either to the goods on store shelves or to the confidence in the future. Foreign aid supplies were soon exhausted, the economic crisis is deepening, and the pace of industrial development is slowing down from month to month. On the other hand, feelings of uncertainty are rising. Fear of price increases and fear of job losses change little by little from academic, abstract concepts into real prospects. And this alarming expectation is very plainly visible on the faces of people who were earlier confident that nothing but bright colors would appear on the banners of the revolution.

This is one of the causes of National Salvation Front's success in the elections. "Reforms must be implemented with their social consequences in mind"—so runs the slogan of the country's new President Ion Iliescu—"not charging into the unknown, but working out a social program which could protect people." As for the opposition, its orthodox wing is prepared to agree only with the first three words of this slogan: Changes are unavoidable. As for the rest, there are ample differences here.

The Romanian emigration has woken up from its nostalgic dreams of a "little Paris." Those who were hitherto classed as dissidents are returning to the country, as are the former owners of property that was nationalized in the postwar years in order to size up with a master's eye that which, they think, will soon belong to them once more. Yes, the reform process has begun, privatization has begun, but it would be wrong to think that prescriptions for an "instantaneous" transition to a market economy receive nationwide support. And this, it seems to me, is yet another result of the path the country has traversed in the few months of the "new era." The banners announcing a "blanket abnegation" have faded, and the politicians who banked on them alone were unsuccessful.

The peaceful districts of Romanian cities are increasingly often witness to demonstrations, whose participants put forward not political, but economic demands. It was not so long ago that the highways leading to the capital's Free Press Square were blocked by hundreds of

heavy trucks. The drivers were seeking better labor conditions, uninterrupted supplies of spare parts and fuel to motor vehicle pools, and a change in the overtime payments system. It is obvious that it will be by no means simple for the country's new government, having inherited numerous economic problems from the old regime, to cope with the wave of strikes which is steadily swelling.

It is always the case at crucial moments in history that most people seem to forget political culture, tact, and respect for other people's opinion. Looking back later on, people who were initially carried away by ringing phrases realize with grief that, only too often, their bright ideals had been emasculated by the personal ambitions of political reprobates.

"Trampling on all and sundry, mediocrities force their way to power," the newspaper AZ remarked in this context. It is well known that the most primitive and initially most reliable way of boosting one's authority is to angrily criticize every step made by those currently in power.

The opinion of Valeriu Cristea, a literary critic who is well known in Romania, seemed interesting to me in this respect: "Today it is a not much easier to say what you think than it was yesterday," he wrote in the ROMANIA LITERARE newspaper. "The state's physical terror has been swiftly replaced by psychological terror by real or just imaginary, well-organized, and usually very noisy groups of like-minded individuals. Having had uniformity forced on us for decades on end, we cannot withstand the inertia of monolithic thinking." Cristea is right: Universal eulogy has yielded to universal denigration, and at times it is impossible to discern constructive proposals behind the froth of wholesale criticism. [passage omitted]

Fickle history, having united the people into a single whole while the revolutionary events lasted, when no one had private interests but only common interests, is again dividing people on different sides of the barricades. The worker at his machine tool, the peasant growing grain, the student whiling away his time in the columns of demonstrators, the millionaire returning from emigration they all have a different perception of the meaning of the December events. And this means that the time when calm will return to the districts with the comfortable residential houses with tiled roofs is still far off.

The parliamentary and presidential elections which were held 20 May seem to have summed up the results of the first few months of the country's new development, of the time when a feeling of joy in victory was blended in the hearts of millions with grief and pain: There was blood, there was national dissension, and emotions got the better of reason. But democracy, still unsteady on its feet, like a tightrope walker on a thin cord, tottered once more. The events of 13-15 June, which were so diversely interpreted not only in Romania itself but also throughout the world, offered yet another reminder that

force is far from the best argument in the quest for accord, that the country needs a transition to civilized forms of political dialogue as much as it needs the air that it breathes. The alarm that gripped society in those days was voiced by the publicist M. Coman: "How can we openly look one another in the eyes when people who are trying to force their way to power by all possible means are pitting students and intellectuals against the workers, and the workers against the intelligentsia? In this atmosphere it is difficult to achieve simple peace and quiet, let alone consensus."

There is an ancient Romanian legend which runs as follows. When things become difficult for Romanians, when the enemy stands on the borders, when confusion or natural disaster overtakes the country, the fabled Mayastra bird soars up into the sky, to return people's faith in their own strength, to unite them and bring them success.

The Romanians as yet have no time for fairy tales. But no doubt, if legend were to become reality, now would be the time for the flight of the Mayastra. The revival of national dignity, the awareness of one's own strength that is so important for Romania today, would bring the country to a new historical crossroads. [passage omitted]

Romania's Iliescu Thanks Gorbachev for Greeting

LD2806222990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1554 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Jun (TASS)—It was reported here today that Ion Iliescu, president of Romania, sent a telegram to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, in which he expressed thanks for the greetings and good wishes on the occasion of his election as president of Romania.

Iliescu voiced the confidence that all the prerequisites exist for developing the relations of friendship and cooperation between Romania and the Soviet Union on a healthy and mutually profitable basis in the interests of the two countries and peoples, and peace and security in Europe.

Parliamentary Delegation Ends Talks in Yugoslavia

LD2806141690 Moscow TASS in English 1402 GMT 28 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Dmitriyev]

[Text] During talks in Belgrade, parliamentary delegations of the USSR and Yugoslavia favoured stronger cooperation between the Soviet and Yugoslav parliaments as well as the parliaments of European countries on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

The delegation of the Soviet parliamentary committee on international affairs was led by its chairman Aleksandr Dzasokhov and the delegation of the Yugoslav Committee on Foreign Policy—by A. Simovic.

Lawmakers discussed changes in the USSR and Yugoslavia, the state of and prospects for bilateral relations, including in trade and economic fields, international activities of the two nations and exchanged experience of the two legislatures' work.

The sides examined changes in Europe, German unification, disarmament, talks in Vienna and Geneva, Soviet-American relations, the role of the Non-Aligned Movement in the world, Mediterranean issues and regional conflicts.

At a news conference here, the heads of the two delegations pointed to the fruitful nature of the talks and stated they had similar stands on many international issues.

Dzasokhov noted the active development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations in trade and economic fields. The present difficulties should not interfere with broader cooperation between the two countries.

"Beginning January 1, 1991, our relations in this sphere will be transferred to the system of hard currency settlements and at world prices," he noted.

Dzasokhov said that Yugoslavia, pursuing an active policy in the international arena and taking into account its prestige in the Non-Aligned Movement, can do much for the Non-Aligned Movement to play an important role in world affairs.

This is especially true of stimulating cooperation between the developing countries and other states.

The Soviet delegation was received by President of the Federal Assembly Slobodan Gligorijevic.

The delegation departed for home today.

West Europe

Hijack Attempt to Land Plane in Turkey Foiled

LD2806151490 Moscow TASS in English 1510 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—In another hijack incident today, one of the passengers on board the Tu-154 airliner flying from Krasnodar to Krasnoyarsk demanded that the captain change the course to Turkey.

The airliner with 165 passengers on board was flying above Orenburg when at 3:20 pm the passenger threatened to poison all on board with chemicals.

The captain, V. Aleksandrov, assessed the situation and landed the plane at Orenburg airport.

Thanks to considerate actions by the crew and a special force, two hijackers were seized. One of them was identified as Yu. Kaporushov, 17. The identity of his accomplice is being determined.

A criminal case has been filed. An investigation is under way.

Further on Shevardnadze's Visit to Netherlands

PM2806150190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Soviet-Netherlands Talks"]

[Text] On 27 June USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze held talks with Netherlands Foreign Minister H. van den Broek, who is on a working visit to the Soviet Union.

The talks centered on Europe's problems and the search for new approaches to ensuring its security and stability. The ideas and proposals on ways to further develop the all-European process set forth in E.A. Shevardnadze's message to the foreign ministers of European states, the United States, and Canada were discussed in detail.

There was a thorough exchange of opinions on the problem of external aspects of German unity. E.A. Shevardnadze drew special attention to the need for a joint search for a way to resolve it consonant with the interests of all the sides and serving the cause of forming a European community.

He drew the attention of H. van den Broek to the principles at the basis of the Soviet Union's program approach to German unification submitted at the conference of foreign ministers of "the Six" in Berlin 22 June this year.

In this context he explained the Soviet proposals for forming fundamentally new relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and emphasized the vital importance of close East-West cooperation in creating an all-European security system, of strengthening mutual trust, and of abandoning bloc thinking.

H. van den Broek in turn expounded the Netherlands Government's vision of Europe's future. Here he placed special emphasis on combining the new opportunities afforded by the all-European process with those provided by the traditional Western structures, and the need to include a united Germany in them was stressed.

The mutual conviction was expressed that the 1990 meeting of leaders of the 35 CSCE participant states is called upon to be an important stage on the path of European building. Both sides came out in favor of the meeting ending in results which will give an additional boost to Europe's movement toward a new epoch.

The ministers agreed that the reaching of accords in Vienna on reducing conventional arms and the defining of the mandate for the next stage of the talks will contribute to the success of the all-European summit meeting.

During the discussion of the state of Soviet-Netherlands relations and of their prospects their largely successful development was registered and note was taken of the importance of maintaining a constructive dialogue, including regular contacts at a high level. Voicing satisfaction with the mutually advantageous cooperation

between the two countries, the ministers pointed to the possibility of imparting greater dynamism and depth to it. This concerns, above all, the sphere of economic ties, particularly given the prospect of the USSR economy's transfer to regulated market principles.

In this connection H. van den Broek reported on the discussion within the EC of the proposals to give economic assistance to perestroika in the Soviet Union and gradually integrate the USSR in the world economic complex.

At the end of the talks a contract was signed in the ministers' presence between the Central Design Bureau of the "Rubin" MT [expansion unknown] of the USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry and a Netherlands deep-water operations consortium to jointly carry out the first stages of work on raising the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets, which sank in 1989.

I am very pleased to be in Moscow once again and to hold intensive discussions with E.A. Shevardnadze not only because the "two-plus-four" talks on German reunification are under way but also because we have recently had a meeting in Dublin. This determined the framework of our talks, which were held in a very open and constructive atmosphere. Netherlands Foreign Minister H. van den Broek said this at a news conference in the evening.

We feel, the minister continued, that a united Germany will play an important role in ensuring stability on the continent. I think that we agree that it has the right to self-determination on the basis of the Helsinki agreement and is free to choose itself which alliance or organization it wishes to belong to. However, not without taking into account the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union and its partners. We are convinced that the legitimate rights of both sides can be taken into account and respected.

I hope, the leader of the Netherlands Foreign Ministry emphasized, that, despite the difficulties that remain, there is a real chance of resolving German unification in its various aspects this year. I believe that this will be a decisive point in our common efforts to give Europe a new, peaceful face and the new image which it deserves.

Touching on relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the minister pointed to his readiness to sign a common declaration on these organizations' full cooperation, thereby forming a new peaceful order in Europe on the foundations of the CSCE principles.

In conclusion, the guest reported on the proposal which he made with regard to resolving questions connected with eliminating the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station.

Abalkin Receives Netherlands Foreign Minister

*LD2806162990 Moscow TASS in English 1617 GMT
28 Jun 90*

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—The Soviet leadership is going to energetically and consistently pursue the policy of radically reforming the economy and to work towards the Soviet Union's gradual integration into the world economy, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin told Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek today.

The forthcoming transition to a market economy opens broad possibilities for Western, including Dutch, businessmen on the Soviet market, Abalkin said.

Van den Broek called for Dutch and other Western assistance to the Soviet Union in accelerating the reforms, specifically in developing new economic structures, technologies and advanced economic management methods.

Abalkin and van den Broek spoke about closer cooperation between the Soviet Union and the European Communities, including in power engineering.

It was said at the meeting that the Soviet Union's full membership in various international economic organizations and institutes would meet Soviet and Western interests.

Kohl Plans To Visit Gorbachev in Moscow

*LD2906084390 Moscow TASS in English 0840 GMT
29 Jun 90*

[Text] Moscow June 29 TASS—West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl will visit the Soviet Union on July 15 and 16 at the invitation of President Mikhail Gorbachev, it was announced here today.

Air Force Official Yefimov Ends Visit to Finland

*LD2806201590 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1237 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[TASS correspondent Voytto Leskinen reports:]

[Text] Helsinki, 28 Jun—Air Marshal A.N. Yefimov, USSR commander-in-chief of the Air Force and deputy minister of defense has completed his official visit to Finland. He left for home today.

The Soviet military leader was seen off at Helsinki airport by Major General P. Jokinen, commander-in-chief of the Air Force of the Finnish Defense Forces, and other officials.

Norway Exchanges Correspondence on Fishing

*LD2806120890 Moscow TASS in English 1033 GMT
28 Jun 90*

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Komplektov and Norwegian Ambassador to Moscow Olav Bucher-Johannessen today exchanged notes to extend the Soviet-Norwegian temporary agreement on joint measures to control and regulate fishing in the adjoining areas of the Barents Sea.

Political & Social

Central Committee Holds Plenum on Party Congress

Congress Scheduled To Go Ahead

AU2906122890 Paris AFP in English 1202 GMT
29 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, June 29 (AFP)—A Central Committee plenum Friday decided to go ahead with a scheduled Communist Party congress on Monday, and approved Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's report to be submitted to the meeting, plenum delegates said Friday.

Party radicals had attempted to postpone the congress until the autumn amid a sudden resurgence of conservative forces.

The delegates said that the plenum, in addition to rejecting the postponement call as expected, adopted Mr. Gorbachev's report. But only after some "proposals" were added, and with some votes against adoption.

The plenum wound up after less than four hours.

Revenko Describes Plenum

LD2906134390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1230 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Interview with Grigoriy Ivanovich Revenko, CPSU Central Committee member, delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, and Presidential Council member, by correspondent Andrey Nikiforov at the Georgiyevskiy Hall in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses—live]

[Excerpt] [Nikiforov] I ask you, Grigoriy Ivanovich, first for a few words about how the party Central Committee plenum proceeded.

[Revenko] Essentially, the last meeting took place today of the Central Committee which in 1986 was at the source of all restructuring processes in our country. I will say frankly that submitted for the attention of the Central Committee members were the main conclusions of the Central Committee's report to the 28th CPSU Congress. This will be the Central Committee's political report over the time that has elapsed. It provoked great debates at the plenum itself and essentially approval was expressed with these main conclusions, which will be proposed in a couple of days to all delegates to the congress. The report has been the most important, the most fundamental which has occurred in politics, in the economy, in the whole of our life in the past few years.

Another fundamental thing to be stressed is that a discussion also took place of the party's draft program statement and our party's draft rules. Even more amendments were submitted, even though, as we know, today or tomorrow ends that truly hot debate, which has taken place throughout the entire country among communists and non-party members, concerning what our party is to be like and how the party will be able to further fulfill the

role of leader in the movement along the path of perestroika. It is fundamental to stress also that the members of the Central Committee have agreed that one can go to the congress with such positions. [passage omitted]

Plenum Speakers Noted

LD2906140890 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1346 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Excerpt] Moscow, 29 June (TASS)—A CPSU Central Committee plenum was held today. Matters relating to the coming 28th CPSU Congress had been proposed for its consideration. A report was delivered at the plenum by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The following spoke at the plenum: N.I. Malkov, first secretary of Chita Oblast party committee; V.I. Potapov, first secretary of Irkutsk Oblast party committee; V.I. Melnikov, USSR minister of the forestry industry; V.I. Sitnikov, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the USSR to the Mongolian People's Republic; M.F. Nenashev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting; Ya.P. Ryabov, member of the CPSU Central Committee, a personal pensioner; G.A. Posibeyev, first secretary of Mari Oblast party committee; V.V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs; G.I. Yanayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. [passage omitted]

Gorbachev Delivers Report

LD2906140190 Moscow TASS in English 1358 GMT
29 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 29 TASS—The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, at a plenary meeting here today, discussed the forthcoming 28th party congress. Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivered a report.

Nine people took the floor at the meeting. The plenum approved basic provisions of the report titled "The CPSU Central Committee's Political Report to the 28th CPSU Congress and Party Tasks" and assigned the Politburo work to edit the report in view of the discussion.

The plenum entrusted Gorbachev to deliver the report at the congress.

The plenary meeting approved on the whole the draft programme statement of the 28th CPSU Congress "Towards Humane, Democratic Socialism" and the draft rules of the party, and decided to submit these documents for consideration to the congress.

Gorbachev addressed the plenum with concluding remarks.

The plenary meeting ended its work.

Further Reportage on Run-up to 28th Congress**Revised Draft CPSU Statutes**

PM2806120190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Jun 90 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Reprpt: "Draft CPSU Statutes"]

[Text] The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a sociopolitical organization, a voluntary association of like-minded communists. Built on the creative development of the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and the communist perspective, on the achievements of progressive social thinking, and upholding internationalism and universal human values, it dedicates its activity to the creation of a humane, democratic socialism in the country and the provision of conditions for every individual's free comprehensive development. The CPSU rests on the working class, peasantry, intelligentsia, and other social strata committed to the socialist choice. Expressing and defending their interests, it seeks civic consensus and the multinational Soviet society's consolidation on the platform of its socialist renewal.

The CPSU builds its work on the basis of the program and the observance of statutory norms. The party and all its organizations operate within the framework of the USSR Constitution and the Soviet laws.

I. Party Members, Their Rights and Obligations

1. Any citizen of the USSR who has reached the age of 18, who acknowledges the party program and observes the party statutes, who works in one of its primary organizations, and who supports the party materially may be a member of the CPSU.

2. All party members are equal. A CPSU member is entitled: to put forward and freely discuss questions of the party's domestic and foreign policy and intraparty life, to enjoy the party organization's political support and protection in his public activity, to participate in the formulation of decisions, to elect and be elected to party organs at all levels, to receive information about their work and to appraise such work, to criticize any party organ and any communist regardless of the position he holds, to submit applications and proposals to any party body and receive a reply from it, and to participate in the work of a party organ when his proposal or the question of his activity or behavior is under discussion.

A communist is entitled to participate in the work of social organizations and movements whose activity is based on the USSR Constitution and is not in conflict with the socialist idea. A CPSU member may not belong to other parties.

3. A CPSU member has a duty to master the theory of socialism, to propagandize the communist ideals, to struggle to attain the party's program goals and safeguard the party's vanguard positions in society, consistently to pursue the CPSU's political line in labor collectives and

among the population, to fulfill party decisions, and to set an example of compliance with the rule of law and the norms of public morality.

4. Admission to membership of the CPSU takes place on an individual basis on the applicant member's request. The decision on admission to CPSU membership is made by the primary party organization's meeting. It is final.

Alternative version

A decision by a party organization numbering not more than 15 members is ratified by the party raykom [rayon committee] or gorkom [city committee]. At the primary party organization's discretion, the applicant CPSU member may have to serve a trial period of up to one year and may have to be sponsored by two party members.

A single party card is valid in the CPSU, and the procedure for registering party members is laid down by the CPSU Central Committee.

A communist may be registered either at his place of work or at his place of residence according to his own wish and subject to the primary organization's consent.

A CPSU member who has actively worked in the party for at least 40 years is, by a decision of the primary party organization ratified by the party raykom and gorkom, awarded the honorary title "CPSU Veteran."

5. Membership of the CPSU is terminated by the primary party organization at its own initiative or on a higher party organ's suggestion as a consequence of the expulsion of a party member from the CPSU for actions and conduct incompatible with the requirements of the CPSU Statutes.

Party membership may be terminated on the basis of a party member's application for voluntary withdrawal from the CPSU; said application is examined by the primary party organization.

A decision on admission to membership of the CPSU and on expulsion from the party is considered valid if at least two-thirds of organization members voting, but more than half of those registered with the organization in question, have voted for it.

For violations of party discipline and the norms of public morality, measures of party education and influence may be applied to party members in the form of a declaration of censure or a reprimand.

A person expelled from the party has the right to appeal to party control organs. An appeal is examined within not more than two months of its receipt.

II. Intraparty Democracy

6. The CPSU lives and operates on the basis of ideological community and party comradeship, on the principles of self-management, combining the interests of the

party and individual communists and the power of the party masses with conscious discipline.

Freedom of expression of opinion, the comparison of different views and platforms, and open criticism and self-criticism are guaranteed in the party. Within individual organizations and in the CPSU as a whole, debates and referendums may be held on topical questions of social and party life.

7. All CPSU organizations, beginning with primary organizations, are autonomous. They are autonomous as to the structure of their internal life and activity. Their decisions, provided they are not in conflict with the party's program aims and are adopted within the framework of powers granted by the CPSU Statutes, may not be countermanded by higher organs, with the exception of decisions on personal cases. In the event of differences of opinion, any one of these organs is entitled to address the primary party organizations of the communists directly, or to hold a referendum in order to resolve the disputed question.

8. The work of party organizations and party organs is built on the principles of collectiveness, ruling out subjectivism and autocracy.

The general meeting, conference, or congress are the collective leadership organs in the party. They are legally constituted [pravomochny] provided they are attended by more than one-half of party organization members or elected delegates, or by no less than two-thirds of such members or delegates in the case of report and election meetings. The party leadership organs elect executive organs (bureaus, committees) and control organs (control commission).

Whenever necessary, party organs form standing or ad hoc commissions on the main areas of work, and also use other ways of involving communists and other citizens in their activity on a nonpermanent basis.

9. Party organizations, elected party organs, and their apparatus operate with glasnost, ensuring—in line with party decisions—the openness of party meetings, conferences, congresses, and sittings of executive and control organs, the participation of the party press in them, the publication of draft documents, stenographic reports, adopted resolutions, and other materials. Party committees and primary party organizations systematically inform communists and nonparty people, as well as higher party organs, about their activity. A communist is entitled to attend sittings of the bureau or party committee of his primary party organizations. Members of an elected party organ have free access to sittings of organs that are accountable to them, and also have the right to make use of documents available to the party organ and its apparatus.

10. All leadership, executive, and control organs in the party are elected. They are elected by secret ballot. Any number of candidates may appear on the ballot paper. At election time party members have the unrestricted right

to nominate any candidate, including themselves. Candidates are elected when they have obtained more votes than the other candidates and more than half of the votes of the CPSU members participating in the meeting, conference or congress delegates, or members of other elected organs.

Primary party organizations have the right to propose candidacies for membership of superior party organs, which are then considered by the conference or congress that forms these organs. Party committees and control commissions can also be formed via the direct delegation of representatives by lower organizations.

Delegates to rayon, city, and okrug (without rayons) party conferences are elected in primary organizations. Elections of delegates to city and okrug (with rayons), oblast, and kray conferences, congresses of Union republic communist parties, and the CPSU congress involve the compulsory nomination of candidates by primary party organizations, as a rule by a direct vote by communists. The election procedure is laid down by the relevant party committee on the basis of proposals by primary and local-level party organizations.

11. Members of elected party organs at raykom level and above are elected to the same post for no more than two consecutive terms. Members of executive and control party organs can be individually changed or they can all be replaced [pereizbiratsya] before their term expires. This question is examined if one-third of the organization's members demands it or if individuals or all the members of the elected organs voluntarily resign.

Secretaries of party raykoms, gorkoms, okruzhkoms [okrug committees], obkoms [oblast committees], kraykoms [kray committees], and of Union republic communist party central committees, and control commission chairmen are elected at the relevant conferences and congresses or, at delegates' discretion, at plenums of party committees and control commissions. They can be registered with any party organization with the exception of party apparatus organizations.

12. Party committees are accountable to the party organizations which have formed them. Party committee bureaus annually report to plenums, and party committees and party bureaus report to meetings of primary and shop party organizations. Every member of an elected party organ reports on his work to the party organizations that elected or recommended him.

13. When making decisions, party organizations and their organs are obliged to consider all viewpoints. A decision made by the majority is binding on everyone. The minority has the right to support its own positions at party meetings, conferences, and congresses, at sittings of executive and control organs, or in the party's mass media, to present coreports, to record a minority view in the official record, and to demand a repeat examination of disputes in their organization or place them before superior organs.

In party, committees and control commissions and their bureaus and presidiums, in the event of any disagreement, a draft decision is resubmitted for repeat examination and adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds.

Decisions by congresses, conferences, and party committee plenums are binding on inferior organizations. The latter are entitled to dispute them, by appealing to superior party authorities, without suspending the action of these decisions.

14. The party's elected organs establish for the duration of their term of office a working apparatus which is subordinated to them and provides mainly information, analysis, sociological forecasting, and consultative backup for their activity. The party apparatus is established by the elected organ on the basis of primary party organizations' recommendations. Party apparatus personnel are covered by labor legislation.

15. Party organizations are authorized to publish newspapers, journals, bulletins, propaganda, reference, information and other material out of their own funds or in cooperation with other organizations, and to establish editorial offices and radio and television studios for this purpose. Party committees confirm the leaders of the party's mass media at their plenums.

III. Organizational Structure of the Party

16. The CPSU is built in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism along workplace and territorial lines. The basis of the party is provided by primary organizations which are set up at communists' places of work or residence and are united along territorial lines. The party's structure also includes rayon, city, okrug, oblast, and kray party organizations, united within Union republic communist parties.

When necessary, councils of party organization secretaries, party clubs, theoretical seminars, discussion centers, party veterans' councils, and other forms for uniting communists on the basis of common interests or problems can be organized and operate. Proceeding from the CPSU program directives, they discuss various questions in order to define their positions, and submit proposals and drafts for consideration by party committees at any level.

The creation of factions which have their own internal organization and discipline is not permitted within the CPSU, but this does not limit communists' right to unite around platforms in the course of debates.

Primary Party Organizations

17. Primary party organizations are created if there are at least three CPSU members by a decision of their meeting and are registered by the relevant party raykom or gorkom.

A primary party organization may create party groups and shop organizations within itself. By a decision of the

primary party organization, they may be granted the rights of primary organizations on questions connected with CPSU membership.

In the light of the specific tasks and conditions of their activity, primary party organizations autonomously resolve questions of admission to the party and termination of membership of the CPSU, the definition of their structure, directions and methods of work, regularity of and procedure for holding meetings, political actions, and financial activity, and form mutual relations with soviet and social organizations.

Primary party organizations propagandize and implement the party's decisions, perform the party's ideological, political, and organizational functions in labor collectives and in their territory, exert influence on the resolution of economic and social tasks, and uphold the principles of social justice.

Primary party organizations have the right to elaborate draft documents during the preparation for party congresses and conferences and party committee plenums and to express their attitude on the decision of any party organ, which is obliged to give a substantive answer to it. They can submit proposals to recall communists registered with them from the composition of party organs at all levels.

18. For day to day work, the primary party organization's meeting (conference) elects a party bureau (committee) and its secretary for two to three years and, at communists' discretion, a control (auditing) commission. In party organizations with fewer than 15 communists, the party organization secretary and his deputy—and in party groups, the party group organizer—are elected for a period and in a manner prescribed by the meeting.

Rayon, City, Okrug, Oblast, and Kray Party Organizations [subtitle]

19. Rayon and city party organizations directly uniting primary organizations are the pivotal structural link of the party.

The rayon or city party conference elects the rayon or city party committee for five years and also the control commission. An extraordinary party conference may be convened by decision of the party committee (alternative version: at the proposal of the relevant control commission) or at the demand of at least one-third of the organization's members.

In the light of primary party organizations' opinions, the rayon or city party committee elects the raykom or gorkom bureau at its plenum.

Party raykoms and gorkoms keep a record of communists, coordinate the activity of primary party organizations, join with them in explaining party policy and decisions, organize work on their implementation in labor collectives and citizens' local neighborhoods,

present specific socioeconomic, cultural, and other questions for scrutiny by the public and the organs of power, and help to implement them.

20. Kray, oblast, and okrug party organizations conduct work to implement party policy within the autonomous republic, kray, oblast, or okrug, and ensure the execution of superior party organs' decisions and resolutions adopted by them.

The kray, oblast, or okrug party conference elects the kray, oblast, and okrug party committee and control commission for five-year terms. Extraordinary conferences are convened by decision of the corresponding committee (alternative version: at the proposal of the corresponding control commission) or at the demand of at least one-third of the total number of the organization's members.

Conferences, and also party committee plenums, which are convened as and when necessary, elaborate and propose to organs of state power and the population programs for solving political, ethnic, social, economic, ecological, and cultural-moral problems in the region. They examine questions of intraparty life, cadre work, the party organization's budget, and publishing activity.

Kray and oblast party committees autonomously decide questions concerning the structure of their organization and allow the largest primary party organizations to exercise the rights of party raykoms on questions of CPSU members' records.

Corresponding plenums elect the bureaus of party kraykoms, obkoms, and okruzhkoms.

21. The control commissions of rayon, city, okrug, oblast, and kray party organizations elect bureaus. The control commissions decide questions associated with the observance of party discipline and the norms of public morals by communists, protect the honor and dignity of party members, hear appeals by them, bring to task those guilty of suppression of criticism or abuses, and monitor the implementation of the party budget and the economic activity of party institutions. The control commission is subordinate to the organ which has elected it and operates autonomously and in conformity with regulations ratified by the rayon, city, okrug, oblast, or kray party conference.

Union Republic Communist Parties

22. Union republic communist parties are autonomous. On the basis of the CPSU Program and the CPSU Statutes, they elaborate their own programs and normative documents, in accordance with which they build relations between their leadership organs and party organizations on the republic's territory, decide their own organizational, cadre, publishing, and financial-economic questions, pursue their political line in the sphere of state building and the republics' socioeconomic and cultural development, promote the combination of citizens' national and international interests, and

shape internationalist awareness. Union republic communist parties maintain ties with other parties and social movements, including those abroad.

Fundamental decisions by the CPSU Central Committee Presidium and commissions affecting Union republic communist parties are examined with the participation of their plenipotentiary representatives. In the event of disagreement with a decision that has been made, a Union republic communist party central committee has the right, without complying with such decision, to demand that disputed questions are discussed at a CPSU Central Committee plenum.

23. The procedural rules and time for convening a Union republic communist party congress are laid down by its leadership organs. The congress determines the political line, decides other questions within the communist party's competence, and recommends (alternative version: delegates) candidates from the Union republic communist party for membership of the CPSU's supreme organs.

CPSU Organizations Within the USSR Armed Forces

24. The activity of party organizations within the USSR Armed Forces is built on the basis of the CPSU Statutes and of documents ratified by the CPSU Central Committee.

Leadership of party work within the USSR Armed Forces is effected through party organs and primary party organizations. Party committees and primary party organizations resolve tasks in close collaboration with military councils, commanding officers, and political organs. They exercise their influence on the life and activity of military collectives through Army communists. The supreme party organ of the USSR Armed Forces enjoys the rights of a CPSU Central Committee commission.

Communists in the Armed Forces can elect and be elected to leadership organs of territorial party organizations. Delegates to rayon, city, okrug, oblast, and kray party conferences or Union republic communist party congresses are elected at party meetings and conferences in military units and combined units according to the norms of representation laid down by the corresponding party committees.

The election of delegates from Army and Navy party organizations to CPSU congresses and all-Union party conferences takes place at party conferences in military districts, groups of forces, fleets, combined units, and branches of the Armed Forces.

Note: Party work in KGB Troops, Internal Troops, and Railroad Troops is built along lines analogous to those in the Armed Forces.

Supreme and Central Organs of the CPSU

25. The congress is the supreme organ of the CPSU. Regular congresses are convened by the CPSU Central

Committee at least once every five years. The Central Committee's decision to convene a congress, the agenda, and the representation norms are published no later than three months before the congress. The Central Committee publishes draft documents on the basic questions to be submitted to the congress.

Extraordinary (emergency) CPSU congresses are convened by the Central Committee on its own initiative or at the demand of party organizations uniting at least one-third of the total number of communists. Congresses are convened within two months and are considered legally convened if the majority of Union republic communist parties are represented at them.

In the event of the Central Committee failing to convene an extraordinary (emergency) congress, the organizations demanding that it be held can form an organizational committee exercising the rights of the party Central Committee as regards convening an extraordinary (emergency) congress.

26. The CPSU congress:

- hears accountability reports and reports by the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission, and other organs elected by the congress and adopts resolutions on them;
- adopts, revises, and amends the party program and statutes;
- lays down the party line in the sphere of party building, ideological activity, and the CPSU's domestic and foreign policy;
- elects the CPSU chairman and his deputy, simultaneously electing them members of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Presidium;
- elects the chairman of the CPSU Central Control Commission, simultaneously electing him member of the CPSU Central Control Commission Bureau;

alternative version: The Central Control Commission chairman is elected at its plenum;

- elects the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

27. In the period between congresses the CPSU Central Committee convenes, as and when necessary, all-Union CPSU conferences to discuss pressing questions of the party's policy and practical activity.

A conference has the right to hear reports by the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Control Commission concerning their work, to partially renew their composition (up to one-third in the period between congresses), to adopt other mandatory decisions for the party in the form of CPSU program documents, and to introduce amendments to the party statutes.

28. In the period between congresses the party's activity is led by the CPSU Central Committee.

The CPSU Central Committee:

- organizes the implementation of CPSU congress and conference decisions;
- elaborates and submits to Congresses of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals on the content of domestic and foreign policy;
- directs the activity of CPSU party groups (communist factions) in Union representative organs;
- implements CPSU cadre policy;
- creates party institutions and enterprises and monitors their activity;
- collaborates with sociopolitical organizations in the country and represents the CPSU in relations with foreign parties.

29. In order to decide political and organizational matters in the period between plenums the Central Committee elects a CPSU Central Committee Presidium drawn from among its members. The presidium's members are ratified by the CPSU Congress. The Central Committee Presidium's work is led by the CPSU chairman.

The CPSU Central Committee Presidium sends decision to be carried out by party organizations on its behalf. The presidium submits decisions on the most important political issues for discussion by primary party organizations and subsequent ratification by a CPSU Central Committee plenum.

The Central Committee Presidium annually accounts for its activity to a CPSU Central Committee plenum.

30. Standing commissions are set up within the CPSU Central Committee on the main avenues of its activity. They are formed at a CPSU Central Committee plenum from among Central Committee members and other Communists ratified as advisers. The commissions are headed by CPSU Central Committee secretaries elected by a CPSU Central Committee plenum, and are entitled to make decisions within their purview.

The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, headed by the first secretary of the Central Committee who is elected by a CPSU Central Committee plenum, is formed from the leaders of the commissions. The Secretariat coordinates the activity of Central Committee commissions, organizes the execution in the party of decisions made by the Central Committee, its Presidium, and its commissions, and directs the work of the Central Committee apparatus.

31. The CPSU Central Control Commission is guided in its activity by the CPSU Statutes and by provisions ratified by a party congress. It elects at its plenum its bureau.

32. The CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Control Commission hold at least two plenary sittings a year and, if necessary, joint sittings.

CPSU Central Committee members can participate in the work of CPSU Central Control Commission plenums and members of the Central Control Commission can participate in the work of CPSU Central Committee plenums on a nonvoting basis [s pravom soveshchatelnogo golosa].

A party member cannot be simultaneously a member of both the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Control Commission.

IV. Communists in Soviets, State Organs, and Public Associations [section subtitle]

33. Party organizations and committees do not permit mixing of functions with state and economic organs, and pursue the party's policy line through the communists working in them.

34. The CPSU struggles for political leadership in society through free elections to soviets of people's deputies and other forms whereby Soviet citizens express their will. Party organizations elaborate and publish their election platforms, recommend communists for nomination as candidate people's deputies, and help them to organize their election campaigns.

Party organizations can enter into election agreements with other sociopolitical organizations and formations operating on the basis of and in accordance with the Constitution and can support candidate deputies nominated by them who are not CPSU members.

35. At congresses and sessions of Soviets of People's Deputies, communists can unite in party groups (communist factions) for the term of the soviets in order to coordinate their activity and increase party influence. Communists are not permitted to create in soviets groups or factions independent of party organs but acting on behalf of the CPSU.

Fundamental questions being submitted for discussion at soviets are examined in advance at a meeting of the party group (faction) or at a joint sitting with the party committee, and communists vote on them in accordance with decisions that have been adopted.

Party groups (factions) are autonomous as regards their internal life and current work. When it comes to questions on which a decision has been made by the appropriate party organ, it is mandatory for them to comply with such decisions. In the event of substantial differences of opinion, the party organ must conduct a supplementary examination with representatives of the party group (faction) and make its final decision.

Party groups (factions) can elect a bureau or chairman for the purposes of their current work.

36. The party cooperates with all social forces standing on positions of democracy and social justice, and it is against anticonstitutional forces. It builds its relations with trade union and other social organizations and mass movements on the principles of political collaboration and partnership, of respect for different points of view.

Party groups (factions) analogous to the groups (factions) in soviets are formed and operate at congresses and conferences convened by social organizations.

37. In their work with young people party organs and primary party organizations rely on the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], cooperate with other youth organizations with socialist orientation, give all possible assistance to their activities in educating young people, and involve them in elaborating and implementing the CPSU's youth policy. The relationship between party and Komsomol organizations is founded on ideological commonality, recognition of the Komsomol's organizational autonomy, and mutual respect and trust. The party sees the Komsomol as the immediate reserve for replenishing its ranks.

Communists who are members of youth organizations' elected organs have the right to participate in the examination of youth policy questions at the corresponding party committees.

38. Primary party organizations and party committees recommend communists to specific sectors of state, economic, and social activity. Using political methods, they help them to get elected or appointed to suitable office, give them support, hear communists' accountability reports on their work, and make public any conclusions or recommendations arrived at in this process.

V. The CPSU's Monetary Funds and Other Property

39. The activity of the CPSU and its organizations is carried out using financial, material, and technical resources provided by party income.

The CPSU's monetary funds are built up from party membership dues, revenues from publishing, production, and economic activity, voluntary donations by labor collectives of enterprises and other organizations and individual citizens, and other contributions which are not contrary to current legislation.

Monthly membership dues for party members are as follows:

Incomes of up to 70 rubles [R]—10 kopeks

R71-100—20 kopeks

R101-150—30 kopeks

R151-250—1 percent of income

R251-500—2 percent of income

over R550—2.5 percent of income

Working communist pensioners pay their party membership dues separately on their pension and on their salary.

Amendments to the amounts of membership dues can be introduced by all-Union CPSU conferences.

40. The CPSU's budget, its structure, the amount of contributions to it from local party organizations' revenues and of subsidies to them, and the accountability report on the party budget's implementation are ratified by a party Central Committee plenum and are notified to communists.

Funds for the upkeep of the CPSU Central Control Commission and other control organs are determined at joint plenums of corresponding party committees and control commissions.

Union republic communist parties and kray and oblast party organizations are autonomous in controlling their budgets, resolving all structural, staff, and production-economic matters, and creating, reorganizing, and closing down periodical publications with due consideration for financial potential. Budgets and accountability reports on their implementation are ratified at party committee plenums. Profitable economic activity by party committees, which does not run counter to the interests of political work, is encouraged.

41. The party's property constitutes a partywide asset. Facilities owned by the CPSU include buildings, installations, equipment, stock, property held for cultural, educational, and health care purposes, monetary funds, enterprises, party publishing houses and the periodicals and printing houses under their jurisdiction, and other property necessary for the party's activity.

Party committees exercise efficient management (possession, utilization, disposal) of property held by them. The CPSU Central Committee, Union republic communist party central committees, party kraykom.s obkoms, okruzhkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms, and CPSU enterprises, institutions, and organizations enjoy the rights of legal entities and can delegate these rights to their structural subdivisions. The rights of legal entity can be enjoyed by primary party organizations.

In order to finance their activity, including the maintenance of fulltime party officials, primary party organizations retain up to 50 percent of the total membership dues received.

In order to resolve questions of financing the activity of party organizations and the distribution and redistribution of monetary funds, raykoms, gorkoms, and party committees with the rights of raykoms set up financial commissions whose members include primary party organization secretaries.

Local party committees and control commissions annually inform communists about the state of the party budget and the expenditure of funds.

Appendix:

The following normative documents are elaborated on the basis of the CPSU Statutes and ratified at a CPSU Central Committee plenum:

Instructions on the procedure of elections in the CPSU;

Instructions on CPSU membership records and party statistics;

Instructions on the maintenance of records in party organizations and committees;

Instructions on the maintenance of records of party membership dues and the financial-economic activity of party organizations;

Instructions on the work of party organizations in the USSR Armed Forces;

Regulations on the status of primary party organization secretaries;

Regulations on "CPSU Veterans";

Regulations on the holding of referendums and debates within the party.

Gorbachev, Ligachev on Outlook

PM2806174990 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 29 Jun 90 p 1

[A. Krotkov report: "Faith in Change. Country Looks Forward to 28th CPSU Congress"]

[Excerpts] Where will the party be headed after its 28th congress, scheduled to open in the Kremlin in a few days? Will unity be achieved in party ranks, and, if so, at what price? Will the CPSU, which is increasingly being accused of lagging behind events, work out an action program which will allow it to maintain its vanguard role in society? Finally, what changes will take place in the Central Committee leadership—whose efforts will implement the new program?

Arguments about these questions have reached their apogee in the run-up to the congress. Today party leaders, public figures from the broadest political spectrum, and participants in the recent RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Constituent Congress—Mikhail Gorbachev, Vladimir Kryuchkov, Yegor Ligachev, Vladimir Lysenko, Ivan Polozkov, Anatoliy Sobchak, and others—share their opinions on this score with *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* readers. [passage omitted]

Let us hear first of all what Vladimir Lysenko, representative of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" and lecturer at the MAI [expansion unknown], expects from the congress:

"If events at the 28th congress develop in the same direction as at the Russian communists' constituent congress, all the democratically minded intelligentsia and progressive workers—who are in the majority—will

leave the CPSU. And that should sober up Gorbachev and the conservatives who surround him. Mikhail Sergeyevich will have to choose at the congress whether he is moving toward a civilized society or returning to an authoritarian regime."

You see how amusing it is? Representatives of both wings are firmly convinced of mutually contradictory things—which casts doubt on the ability of at least one of them, if not both, to soberly assess the situation. As for the majority, of which both Volkov and Lysenko consider themselves members, the statistics are implacable. According to figures from the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences' Sociological Research Center, more than half of the communists who were polled supported the CPSU Central Committee draft platform rather than them. They supported it despite the "murderous" political labels which are lavishly showered on it. (Admittedly, the "old" one, rather than the one published three days ago).

By using ever more scathing labels, both left- and right-wingers, it seems, are not averse to casting themselves in the role of martyrs who are still purportedly being "persecuted by state security organs for openly criticizing the party leadership." Such hints are constantly dropped.

In this connection I would cite statements by Vladimir Kryuchkov, member of the President Council and chairman of the USSR KGB, who also took part in the Russian party congress:

"With the abolition of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, our committee has come under the control of the corresponding state organs. I expect the 28th congress to produce new steps down the road of democratizing society. As for whether we do or don't monitor the activities of various parties, factions, and platforms, I can reply that we do so only when they engage in unconstitutional activity. Anything else is none of our business."

And yet, if it is inevitable that certain groups will be leaving the party, what attitude should be taken to them and what should be done to ensure that principled and consistent party members do not leave the CPSU on the spur of the moment under the influence of a dubious example?

Let's hear what Ivan Polozkov, first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, thinks about this.

"Of course," he said in conversation with me, "it would be annoying if certain groups split off at the congress. Unity is our strength. But party history has featured both splits and unification, people leaving the party and people coming back. That is why we won't panic. The main thing is to create at the congress a democratic atmosphere in which delegates can get things off their chest, so to speak, and arrive as a result at real unity, rather than having the presidium make proclamations,

cutting off debates in midstream, thereby giving grounds for offense to those delegates who weren't able to speak. Rushing things in this area could be harmful to consolidation. On the other hand, we should not imagine the coming forum as some kind of ringside clash of opinions with sparks flying from all sides. I will be glad if the Kremlin discussions are restrained—which was unfortunately not always the case at the Russian constituent congress."

Here is the opinion of Anatoliy Sobchak, chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet:

"If the same atmosphere reigns at the 28th CPSU Congress as prevailed at the Russian constituent congress, the party's future seems unpredictable to me. Yet the forthcoming congress will be decisive in its destiny. Either the party will be renewed and will really embark on the path of renewal, or it will be forced to leave the political arena. Observe: Among all the East European communist parties only the Bulgarian Communist Party—which had enough resolve to bring its program and statutes into line with the demands of life—held on to power as a result of democratic elections. It by no means needed to abandon its socialist ideals. After all, our people have been brought up on them. We associate them with our idea of a just social system capable of protecting the weak."

Well, these are sensible ideas, even if they are not currently esteemed in certain circles. [passage omitted]

Well, what does the general secretary expect out of the congress? In a short interview with RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Mikhail Gorbachev said:

"I hope that the 28th congress will answer the questions of concern to our party and to society as a whole. After all, it is being held at a time when we should think about everything one more time, assess what has been accomplished, make amendments, and clarify all our guidelines. I think that this will be a congress which consolidates our society. It will consolidate it on the path of perestroika."

...Each time when discussion turned to the prospects for the congress, the delegates turned again and again to possible changes to the party Central Committee and Politburo: Who will be leaving, who will remain, and in what capacity? This discussion naturally focused above all on such well-known figures as M. Gorbachev, Ye. Ligachev, A. Yakovlev, and B. Yeltsin... Since the speakers made no secret of their statements and did not consider it seditious to raise such questions I will share some of their most typical statements with readers.

Most of the argument was about whether the country's president would remain in the post of general secretary or in the party at all.

Vladimir Lysenko was very clear on this score:

"If Gorbachev left the party altogether, it would be a signal that the captain was leaving a sinking ship. And it would be true."

Ivan Polozkov thinks differently:

"It would be immoral to abandon your political convictions when elected to a top state post. It is absurd even to raise the question."

A similar view is held by miner Vasilii Kondratyuk. But Anatoliy Sobchak thinks somewhat differently:

"There is nothing unnatural in the leaders of state organs remaining members of various parties. In general I find it hard to imagine a nonparty president with no political stance within the framework of existing parties. It is another matter whether or not soviet leaders or even the president should continue to be leaders of party organs now that the painful process of differentiating between state and party power is under way."

You will agree that there is logic in these arguments. But what about Gorbachev's prestige among the party masses? Would it really be right to disregard that? Many people spoke about this at the Kremlin.

The overall opinion was clearly formulated by Yegor Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee:

"I am absolutely confident about Gorbachev's prestige and his influence!"

We quote his statement because there are rumors in society about virtual political antagonism between Gorbachev and Ligachev. Yegor Kuzmich categorically rejects such rumors, saying the following:

"I, like Gorbachev, came in in April 1985. I came in to create a new, genuinely democratic system in the country. As for how democratic I am personally, I would draw your attention to the following fact: So much has been written about me that is quite beyond the pale, yet when have I silenced anyone or used the power available to me?... And on the threshold of the 28th congress I'm not thinking about my own fate, but of the fate of the party and the state." [passage omitted]

Medvedev on Party Ideology

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29 Jun 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with V.A. Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by unnamed correspondent, under the rubric "Speaking Out Before the 28th CPSU Congress": "Ideology and Truth"—no place or date of interview given]

[Text] [PRAVDA] Vadim Andreyevich! The starting point of many discussions is the assessment of the current state of society. There are voices on various sides talking about a crisis...

[Medvedev] Yes, I also believe that it is of key importance to assess the situation correctly. A country with a great history and people, unique natural wealth, and immense production potential, a country which played a decisive role in saving mankind from fascist slavery and made an indisputable contribution to world civilization, finds itself in a state of profound socioeconomic and political crisis. It is lagging further and further behind the developed countries and is failing to ensure living conditions worthy of our time for its citizens.

But I disagree with those who see the roots of the crisis only in the present, or worse—only in the perestroika policy. Unfortunately, people tend to bad-mouth today what they were praising yesterday. And with a passion which justifies them in their own eyes. But that is not the way things are: We are facing not so much a "superficial" crisis in the economy, interethnic relations, the utilization of nature, and so forth, as a crisis whose roots go deep in the very model of socialism.

And it has not emerged out of the blue. The kind of "barrack-room" social system, for which we have the Stalinist period to thank, restricted the country's potential for development in the past as well. And in the second half of the 20th century, when there has been a major turnabout in the lives of all mankind—a change linked with the scientific and technical revolution—the historic bankruptcy of the authoritarian-bureaucratic system has become obvious. It was a crisis affecting the root system—the "shoots" still looked quite decent. However, its resolution was impeded by a power structure divorced from the people.

Perestroika is, if you like, a revolution in internal formations being carried out by democratic means. It is designed to rid the country of the shackles of social forms and ideological dogmas that had held it back for decades, and, like any revolution, it is objectively bound to bring some difficulties in its wake. In this sense I still see the current situation not only as a crisis of the past but also as a time of development, a breakthrough which the socialist system itself is experiencing.

If the deep-seated causes of the crisis go back into history, its manifestations were exacerbated—and this must be bluntly admitted—by the inconsistency and half-hearted nature of the measures that were developed, if not by downright mistakes during perestroika. There has been an excessive delay in creating a legal basis for political and economic transformations, and control over the money supply and the market situation has been lost. We cannot fail to accept the fairness of the criticism of the negative consequences of the anti-alcohol campaign, the distortions in the organization of the cooperative movement, the methods of implementing conversion, and the lagging of democratization in the party itself.

There is also a general formula for these difficulties—the gulf between the dismantling of the old and the creation of the new. And I, as a member of the current party

leadership, am not shirking my personal responsibility for this. It is indeed hard and painful to look people in the eye these days. They were expecting quick results—above all in the socioeconomic sphere—and these have not been forthcoming. How can we now tell them that there will be no “quick” results? How can we divert the temptation to seek out “enemies” and “witches”—especially given our Russian history? How can we strengthen people in consensus and cooperation, cooperation based on the most essential thing—labor?

These are the problems that worry me most of all—as they no doubt worry every honest person.

[PRAVDA] There are probably no communists who are not alarmed about the ideological situation in the country. How do you assess the state of affairs?

[Medvedev] Perestroika indisputably started with the spiritual sphere. As soon as rigid ideological diktat and authoritarian-edict methods of running the mass media were eradicated, an entirely new moral and psychological atmosphere started emerging. We started overcoming ideological and theoretical clichés. This marked the start of the emergence of a new-quality ideology centered on people, their lives, rights, and freedoms. Without this, political or socioeconomic perestroika would be impossible.

At its initial stage which, in my view, lasted until the 19th all-Union party conference, glasnost allowed us to critically interpret the past and party history, to debunk myths created during the period of Stalin's despotism and the stagnation years, and to map out the main vectors of perestroika. But even then a number of alarming phenomena and processes emerged. Critical enthusiasm often got the better of objectivity, and work was sometimes sacrificed to phrases and scathing words. Against a backdrop of exacerbating crisis phenomena, the ideological situation was to deteriorate. The growth of the people's political activeness under the conditions of slow and half-hearted reforms and economic muddles led to a drop in the prestige of power, and people's dissatisfaction increasingly spilled over into the streets and squares. Public discontent often took on nationalistic and anarchic forms.

The ideological situation now is confused and tense. One can observe humanization, hardening of positions, outbursts of activeness, apathy, outbursts of legal awareness, legal nihilism, and even extremism. Everything is mixed up. That is why people often talk about disorder and instability. But I am convinced that the most important point in the period we are living through is to seek the essential. And this, you will agree, is not always the same.

[PRAVDA] You have been in charge of—or as used to be said, you have been running—ideology on the Politburo for 21 months now. Where do you see the main results of your work?

[Medvedev] Success in this area, as well as failure, should not be associated with one person—including

those who, following our previous and, frankly, not ideal traditions, were called “chief ideologists.” This is a component of the efforts not only of the Central Committee Politburo but of all party organizations, including, of course, primary party organizations, ideological institutions, and sociologists.

I say this not out of any desire to disparage the bureaucracy, much less out of any desire to off-load part of the burden onto someone else. I simply want to make people realize that perestroika has opened up opportunities for all party organizations, which previously simply followed the directives from Staraya Square, to show initiative. New people have arrived at ideological institutions and started working without looking over their shoulder to the authorities or checking against the many ideological postulates which existed in the past. The party Central Committee has stopped being an “ideology ministry.”

We have become more truthful. We have learned to listen as well as talk. The party's former “thick-skinned” attitude has gone—it is more acutely sensitive to the people's suffering and needs. We are not looking everywhere for the “enemies surrounding us”—both within the country and outside it. These are fundamental changes which are plus marks for ideological renewal. Or do you think that our current ideology had nothing to do with it?

[PRAVDA] Not a single social process can make do without it, of course.

[Medvedev] I could, of course, “reel off” a list of sittings, conferences, lectures, and political information seminars. This is not the point—it is the real change in public awareness in support of perestroika that matters.

Ideologically, society has already changed fundamentally. It has turned from a pseudo-unanimous unit into a thinking society—and a society that thinks clearly, passionately, and intensely. The bulk of communists—from primary party organizations to the Politburo—have been involved in discussing and creating party policy.

The concept of ideology itself is changing. Whereas before—there is no point denying it—its task was to influence awareness in a direction advantageous to the ruling elite, today ideology and truth are far closer to each other than ever before in the history of socialism. Truth is not at the service of ideology, it is ideology at the service of truth. This is all the more important because our people have an enthusiasm for the truth in their blood. Not for nothing are we called a truth-seeking people.

[PRAVDA] There were a lot of complaints at the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Constituent Congress about ideology workers, yourself included. What is your attitude to the criticism?

[Medvedev] The 28th CPSU Congress will have to assess ideological work. I would propose holding section sittings at it where the state of ideology could be discussed professionally. I am prepared to give an account of my work and answer any complaints, including the charge of presiding over the "collapse of ideology."

I try to accept any criticism without offense and realize what lies behind it. But I have to share one specific observation on the constituent congress. Criticism often conceals different views. On the one hand, people are criticized for "appeasement," "capitulation," or "ideological disarmament." This criticism comes generally from conservative positions. At the same time, there has been a swelling wave of charges of "dogmatism," "toughness," "adherence to administrative methods," and "reluctance to restructure." All this, forgive me, is not criticism. There is another term for it—political polemics. Despite this criticism I do not plan to change my views or my attitude to perestroika.

I would not want to hurt anyone, but I equally cannot fail to say that I sometimes encounter a deliberate lack of objectivity in people's assessments. For instance, one of the speakers at the Russian congress called me the "chief ideologist of party deideologization." There is no way I can accept this exalted title. It absolutely does not accord with my convictions and the things I have repeatedly said and written. The deideologization of society, much less of the party, is impossible and essentially absurd. We cannot make do without scientific ideology either now or in the future—all the more so as it takes in a large swathe of human values. I am talking about the need to renew our ideology and purge it of everything that hampers progress.

There are great difficulties associated with the fact that people sometimes make complaints about ideological workers on the basis of past ideas, when the system of direct party intervention in all processes flourished. This is the main contradiction. The Central Committee's functions have changed, we have abandoned direct control—it is impossible these days—yet some communists and part of society continue to demand from us actions which they themselves have condemned. They think that the Central Committee or I personally should "prevent" things which displease us. The times of ideological pressure are over. This means that there cannot be any ideological coziness any more either. The ruling party's situation is altogether uncomfortable—and not only in this country. But it is indisputable that unacceptable concepts and views should be rejected in a more purposeful, aggressive, and professional manner.

Healthy forces in the party dared five years ago to start the resolute struggle to return the country to the bosom of the world humanist tradition, and ensure the triumph of common sense, freedom, and democracy. Birth pangs should not be confused with death throes.

[PRAVDA] But have there, in your view, been any shortcomings in ideological work during the perestroika period?

[Medvedev] Yes. And major shortcomings. I would list our chronic sluggishness among them. The forms, methods, and style of the Ideological Department's activity have been restructured only slowly. Both centrally and locally there is passivity and confusion among many ideology workers who do not want to come out of their trenches and, by waiting for directives, let opposing forces seize the initiative.

The party's theoretical work is still inadequate, there is no really effective communications systems between social science and political practice. To a certain extent the blame for that lies with the delay in restructuring the system of party scientific and educational establishments. There have also been delays in creating new regulators in the sphere of information and glasnost, which no civilized society can do without.

I would list among the major shortcomings ideology's excessive optimism in the initial stage of perestroika—this gave people unrealistic expectations and a confidence that all social problems would be solved easily. They ignored the maxim "Do great things but don't promise great things." We are now paying for the revolution in expectations with an increased loss of confidence and political instability.

But I would like to take issue with those who pin everything negative in society on shortcomings in ideological work. If the housing situation is tight—ideologists are to blame. If the shelves are empty or inflation runs rampant—it is an ideological shortcoming again. Strange is not the word for such logic. It does no harm to remember the basic theory about life, which is determined by consciousness, and to conclude on that basis that ideology at any rate is not all-powerful—although, of course, we should not underestimate its active role in shaping social awareness.

[PRAVDA] You have often referred to the new model of the party's ideological work. What do you mean by that?

[Medvedev] Above all, it is largely the antithesis of the past, based on ideas of an ideological, moral, and political monolith—the party as the ultimate repository of truth. The party was directly in charge of all ideological institutions and the sphere of science, education, and culture. Ideological work was to all intents and purposes conducted in hothouse conditions, without opponents, and in an atmosphere of semi-official, deliberately contrived unanimity and approval.

But today there is already a quite different model in operation, even though its formation is proceeding slowly. In this area, we also need to consistently differentiate between the functions of party and state organs. I see the central task as being always to reject ideas of state ideology or belligerent intolerance of dissidence, which was akin to medieval church fanaticism. We must

reject all-pervasive monitoring of "purity of ideas" in all spheres of people's social, collective, and personal lives. We must reject unthinking campaigns in organizing ideological work.

Abandoning the old, we must move to an ideology that asserts the dignity of each individual. If we are talking about specific directions for ideological work, I would mention the following three.

First, theoretical backup for the perestroika policy and the elaboration of the theory of scientific socialism in the context of the development of world social thinking and the historical experience of the 20th century. People are rightly saying that nothing is more efficient than good theory. Well-founded socioeconomic and political programs can only be developed on a firm conceptual basis.

Second, the specific work of forecasting and analysis, studying the tactics of political actions, and so on. Politics is a highly complex science and dilettantism is inadmissible there.

Third, what is traditionally described as propaganda work. It must obviously take different forms. It is no easy matter to make people believe in something that does not actually exist and is not backed up by their life's experience. Ideological work must stand on a very firm foundation—the foundation of objectivity.

In free competition with other social forces, the party will propagandize its aims and policy, attract people to the CPSU's ranks, and provide ideological backup for election and other political campaigns.

[PRAVDA] It is no secret that the CPSU Central Committee previously exercised total control over the mass media. Unhappy readers are still appealing to the PRAVDA editorial office and the Central Committee, demanding that various journalists be called to account. How do you respond to such appeals?

[Medvedev] Disparate, sometimes diametrically opposed views of the press and television are currently being voiced—ranging from total hostility to delighted approval. Having sharply raised its level of glasnost, the press does not indeed always stand the test of freedom of information.

The adoption of the Law on the Press and the establishment of a multiparty system are creating fundamentally new relations between the CPSU and the mass media.

There can be no question of total Central Committee control over the mass media.

Of late we have taken a number of steps to regulate the party press system and make it more competitive. We have set up a Central Committee newspaper geared to a worker readership, as dictated by the decline of party influence in this milieu, the increase in the worker movement and workers' self-awareness. The party press has become more open—this can also be seen from PRAVDA—journalists' wages have risen, and editorial

offices' economic and entrepreneurial autonomy has been expanded. The economic base of glasnost is being reinforced. In granting party journalists a completely new degree of freedom in their creative work, the party is entitled to expect them to show a new degree of understanding of our common tasks and more professionalism.

Owing to the separation of party and state organs in the mass media, we are faced with the problem of regulating their subordination. Party committees must, of course, have their own publications. But a number of legal, organizational, and financial problems have arisen, particularly with regard to the rayon press. We can, for instance, take the step of setting up party interrayon newspapers as CPSU obkom [oblast committee] and kraykom [kray committee] organs. The development of economically accountable regional party press concerns based on oblast, kray, and republic newspapers and publishing houses is a promising avenue.

I favor publications that work for perestroika and work to consolidate society, and I am categorically opposed to press articles that preach anti-Sovietism, nationalism, extremism, and misanthropy, and try to wipe out everything of value linking different generations of Soviet people.

The time demands that we learn to influence the press not by force of command but by force of prestige. Relations based on subordination and strict hierarchy must give way to relations based on partnership and cooperation.

[PRAVDA] Political documents play an important role in the work of the party. Which specific documents have you personally been involved in drawing up?

[Medvedev] If you take the last few years, it is easier to name the documents and concepts in which I have not been involved. I was entrusted with taking charge of the working group to finalize the draft CPSU Central Committee platform, which is now being transformed into the 28th CPSU Congress program statement. It has been published in the press. The draft has, I believe, been improved as a result of extensive pre-congress discussion and in view of the proposals made by representatives of party organizations and alternative platforms, and may serve as the foundation for consolidating communists and society, and as a specific action program.

It is quite difficult, and even awkward, to talk specifically about coauthorship with regard to various party documents, much less the concept. More often than not, they are the result of collective work involving party officials, rank-and-file communists, journalists and so on.

[PRAVDA] There is an opinion that the term "humane democratic socialism" is wrong.

[Medvedev] I disagree. Of course, ideally socialism cannot mean anything but a humane and democratic

society. But some people would hardly stomach relating these definitions to the social system that existed in our country prior to perestroika. There was a great gulf between the greatness of the socialist idea and the banality of its incarnation.

To take a theoretical view of the problem, we are bound to remember the "Communist Party Manifesto" in which Marxist classical scholars named a number of varieties of socialism—"barrack-room," "Prussian," and so on. The arguments that socialism can only take one form are unfounded. This is certainly borne out by 20th century world experience.

As for my understanding of humane, democratic socialism, it was reflected well enough in the draft 28th CPSU Congress program statement.

[PRAVDA] Many communists have noticed that the draft CPSU Central Committee platform made no reference to communist ideals...

[Medvedev] During the debate of the draft platform, I did not hide the fact that I thought this was one of its slipups. The document planned for adoption at the 28th congress includes a clause on the communist perspective as the natural historic direction for the development of human civilization. For many generations of Soviet communists, this represents not only a theoretical concept, but also a moral value.

[PRAVDA] Ideological workers and the party leadership are being blamed for not opposing the attacks on Lenin and the October Revolution or the denigration of the country's historical past.

[Medvedev] I find it hard to agree totally with such accusations, because both M.S. Gorbachev and other members of the country's leadership have repeatedly said that the ideals of Lenin and the October Revolution are of abiding significance.

In past years, of course, Lenin was transformed from a unique individual into a symbol of ideologized orthodoxy. But today it is going to the other extreme: Lenin's icon-like image is being replaced by dilettantish petty carping and even direct falsifications. Taking facts and quotations out of their historical and logical context is an admittedly widespread but nevertheless patently unscientific and unworthy occupation. Even so, I believe that Lenin needs no "special pleading," because the greatness of his thoughts and deeds is recognized even by his ideological opponents. The question is different: What should we take from Lenin's "treasury" to elaborate modern ideas about socialism and ways of social progress.

[PRAVDA] You often appear in the press and on television but nevertheless readers ask about your position in the political spectrum. What can you tell us about that?

[Medvedev] My position is that of left-centrist reformism [reformatorstvo]. But not for the sake of

reformism as such and not even "for the sake of an idea"—strange though this may sound coming from the mouth of an "ideologist"—but for the sake of helping our society out of the crisis and for the sake of improving people's lives.

I do not go along with those who see the ideal form of social organization in the past, regard perestroika as an "undermining of the foundations," and oppose renewal. But nor will I ever agree with those who would "dig the grave" of socialism or the agitators for a "bright capitalist future." I support the political line of an all-embracing socialist renewal. For me this is an inner conviction. In this sense, too, I disagree with the criticism of M.S. Gorbachev in the form and direction that it took at the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress.

[PRAVDA] Incidentally, readers ask about your attitude toward the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress and "I.K. Polozkov's party."

[Medvedev] I welcome the creation of the RSFSR Communist Party. I think that the results of the congress, despite some claims, do not provide grounds for confrontation within the party. The creation of the RSFSR Communist Party, I hope, will aid the solution of many socioeconomic and political problems facing Russia, the strengthening of the CPSU, and the integrity of the whole Union.

At the same time, it must be noted that, in a number of speeches at the congress itself, a critical tone clearly prevailed over the creative one. I hope that at the second stage of the congress this shortcoming will be rectified. But the way the question is formulated—about "Polozkov's party"—contains not so much irony as an old-regime approach, if you will forgive me for putting it that way. A remnant of the personality cult mentality. Times have changed now. Without diminishing the office or authority of the first secretary, one should not identify the whole party mass with him. There are examples—more than one—in which a "leftwinger" or "rightwinger," when elected to a responsible post, objectively begins to feel the need for consolidation.

Incidentally, I.K. Polozkov made a clear statement about the desire for consolidation and dialogue after his election. His desire, I think, must be supported. It reflects the mood in the party.

The point of party renewal is to ensure that this process is determined not by one man, even the most important man, but by collective reason.

I have faith in Russia's communists and their common sense.

[PRAVDA] In conclusion: What do you expect from the 28th CPSU Congress?

[Medvedev] First, resolute measures to democratize the party. The whole pyramid should be inverted, the democratic procedures of elections, referendums, and so

forth should be used to create a mechanism enabling each communist to exert real influence on the decision-making process and make the apparatus serve the party and its elected organs.

Second, I still hope that it will be possible, if not to fully consolidate the CPSU, then at least to find a rational compromise. The danger of a split is great but the common interests of the cause must be higher than internecine conflicts and personal ambitions.

Last but by no means least, I expect that the congress will elaborate a program of social development whose implementation will help to overcome the crisis and improve people's lives. After all, this is the point of our party's activity.

Report on Medvedev Press Conference

PM2806153390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Jun 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Meeting With Journalists"]

[Text] Great interest in the upcoming 28th CPSU Congress not only in our country but also in the world was demonstrated at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center 27 June. Many representatives of foreign mass media accredited in Moscow came here along with Soviet journalists to meet with V.A. Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. A discussion of the results of the preconference debate was on the agenda.

In his speech to the gathering the Central Committee secretary said that these results were reflected in the published draft program statement for the 28th CPSU Congress. This was the result of work by a working group of the commission to prepare for the congress. It was pointed out that the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee Platform took place in the party in a thorough, interested, heated manner. Many opinions, viewpoints, and judgments were expressed. The working group, which the speaker was entrusted with heading, had a wealth of material to hand. It was emphasized that during the work on it account was taken of suggestions which came not only from supporters of the Central Committee Platform but also from people who adhered to the positions of alternative documents, particularly the Democratic Platform. Incidentally, their adherents participated in the group's work.

A comparative analysis of the platform and the present program statement shows that a version of a document has been prepared that differs in many respects from the draft platform, V.A. Medvedev continued. First, it has been shortened and will be easier to understand. There are real differences in content. The statement includes a detailed assessment of the situation in the country and makes a characterization and analysis of the crisis of society. The new elements also include a characterization of the distribution of sociopolitical forces in the country.

The inclusion in the text of a point on the communist prospect was an important aspect. This is viewed as the sole historical trend of development and as the political and moral value needed to unite the various generations of Soviet people on a broad sociopolitical basis.

The section concerning the party's action program and emergency measures to get the country out of the crisis was singled out.

The final section, which speaks of the CPSU's functions in a civil society, in a rule-of-law state, has been substantially reworked.

The Central Committee secretary especially pointed out that the group's work was not a literary but a political process in the course of which there was interaction with alternative programs. Many wordings are the result of a consensus reached at sessions of the working group. In addition, its composition was expanded considerably, compared with the original makeup, by means of delegates to the 28th party congress.

V.A. Medvedev answered journalists' questions. One of the first questions concerned the date for holding the congress. Will it be postponed? Such a suggestion was made in speeches by a number of delegates to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party Congress. In this connection, the Central Committee secretary explained, the CPSU leadership deemed it necessary to consult with the leaders of the republic communist parties and of kray and oblast party committees. The overwhelming majority favored holding the congress on the planned dates. This is now the predominant opinion. The Central Committee's preconference plenum will have the last word. The speaker himself advocated opening the congress 2 July, as planned, believing that its postponement might elicit a negative reaction from many people.

Answering a question about combining the posts of USSR president and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in one person, V.A. Medvedev said that the separation of these posts evidently is not ruled out in the future. But the situation now is such that it is extremely necessary for M.S. Gorbachev, the head of state, to retain his role as leader of the CPSU. This is dictated by the interests of extricating the country most speedily from the crisis and is a substantial guarantee of progress along the path of perestroika.

There had to be a question on the possibility of a split in the CPSU. Everything must be done to prevent this, V.A. Medvedev said. And I believe that this can be done. By broadening the party's ideological-theoretical platform as much as possible, by means of a compromise with all forces, but on condition of overall loyalty to the socialist choice.

There were also questions on the Central Committee secretary's attitude toward the elimination of party organizations in labor collectives. This was the reply: This question must be examined in the overall context of

human rights and the development of democracy. To eliminate party organizations in enterprises is to limit human rights.

Another question: Is the post of CPSU chairman needed? I am more in favor, the Politburo member replied, of having the Central Committee headed by a chairman, only not as a figurehead but as the party's real leader.

Answers were also given to other questions put by representatives of the mass media of the Soviet Union, the United States, various European countries, and the Arab East.

Participating in the news conference with V.A. Medvedev and answering questions were members of the working group headed by him—V.A. Lyakishev, secretary of the party committee of the "Avtopribor" Scientific Research Institute; V.S. Stepin, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Philosophy Institute; A.Ye. Fedotov, deputy chief of the scientific-engineering center of Moscow's Vladimir Ilich Electromechanical Plant; and O.I. Ozherelyev, deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department.

Lukyanov Interviewed on Congress

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24 Jun 90 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed interview with A.I. Lukyanov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, under the rubric "Word Before the 28th CPSU Congress"; place, date not given: "There Is No Other Choice"]

[Text] [PRAVDA] Anatoliy Ivanovich, after the 27th CPSU Congress you had occasion to work as secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and now you are chairman of the Supreme Soviet and have been a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo for almost two years. What, in your view, have you succeeded in doing and failed to implement while a member of the country's top party leadership?

[Lukyanov] In very general terms I could say that this has been a time of difficult and strenuous work. There has been a reappraisal of values, the first paths of perestroika have been laid, and variants of the processes of the renewal of various aspects of the life of society have been drawn up. For some reason we now return rarely to either the 27th congress or the 19th party conference. And yet they changed a great deal, essentially led the country out onto the path of democratization, and elaborated key approaches to radical reforms, including the profound reform of the political system. It was in precisely this sector that my work was mainly concentrated, on the Politburo's instructions. Of course, I did not tackle these problems on my own. All the principal decisions were elaborated collectively, in polemics, with an careful comparison of opinions.

This combination of words—reform of the political system—is now perceived calmly in general. But at that time it caused an acute allergy in many people. Nothing was attained easily. This was the case when preparing the documents connected with changing the constitution, forming a new electoral system, improving the work of law-enforcement organs, and enhancing the efficiency of various state and political institutions. Close attention had to be given to problems of delimiting the functions of party and state organs on the basis of Lenin's theses on the party as the working people's political vanguard and on the Soviet state as the organization of the people's sovereignty. As is known, for a long time these positions were pretty deformed. And even today we have not quite broken with the past. Many people feel this.

Nevertheless, I believe that it is already possible to see now certain outlines of our renewed political system. True, progress here is more noticeable at the level of the country and of individual republics. This is felt to a lesser extent at the middle and grassroots levels. At present the existing political institutions there are being adapted to the tasks of perestroika both slowly and noncomprehensively. This is why I am quite critical of what has been done. It cannot fail to be seen that many renewal processes simply have not become strong yet. They are frequently prevented from strengthening both from the left and from the right. Moreover, we are being snowed under by a mound of very diverse problems. Sometimes we really are pinned to the wall by a squall of questions whose existence no one even suspected two or three years ago. All this is hard going. We have to assimilate a great deal as we go along, suffer scratches and bumps, and learn from our own mistakes.

Looking back, you vexedly catch yourself thinking that a great deal could have been done better and more thoroughly. It is easy to proclaim the need for political and juridical principles which would rule out any possibility of a repetition of deformations and assert the supremacy of the law in all spheres of our life. But it is a far more complex task to "manufacture" mechanisms which would set these principles in motion and make them work. And if we do not resolve it, we will mark time or roll back—which is inadmissible. Consequently, we are faced with doing much, much more in the sphere of carrying out laws, strengthening discipline, stopping crime, surmounting legal nihilism, and enhancing the population's legal culture. Both the state leadership and the party leadership bears a considerable share of the blame for what has not been done and not been seen through to the end, as I do too.

Of course, my work is not confined just to problems of a political-legal nature. The questions which I tackle as a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo commission for the additional study of materials connected with the repression during the period of the thirties and forties and the early fifties demand a lot of attention. The commission has done great work and secured the quashing of extrajudicial sentences and the rehabilitation of hundreds of thousands of people.

My work on the Federation Council and the Presidential Council and on various commissions both under the USSR Supreme Soviet and along party lines has recently been increasing more and more. I endeavor to meet regularly with labor collectives in Moscow and other cities. I recently visited several rayons of my native Smolensk Oblast. Not to mention the now daily "obligatory program" of contacts with people's deputies and work with citizens' letters and appeals.

Finally, the Supreme Soviet chairman has many concerns of an international nature. During the past year alone I have had no fewer than 100 meetings and talks with foreign parliamentary and other delegations and with plenipotentiary representatives of a number of states.

To some extent such a "spread" of affairs is inevitable. But all the time you must endeavor not to drown in everyday current business, to vanquish "whirling about in vacuous action," and not to lose sight of the pivotal, chief questions. This is not always achieved. But it must be achieved.

[PRAVDA] Do you believe that under conditions of the upcoming multiparty system the top state leaders should also be in the party leadership?

[Lukyanov] I understand both the overt meaning and the concealed meaning of the question. It is entirely pertinent. But candor deserves candor: I did not and do not believe in the existence of "nonparty," so to speak, exemplarily neutral and sterilely impartial statesmen. So I do not see any fated need to impose a "taboo" on the election or appointment of someone who belongs to a certain political party or trend. And this would be, if you like, a violation of citizens' equal rights enshrined in our constitution and in many international documents.

The CPSU Central Committee has outlined, albeit somewhat belatedly, a policy of dialogue and cooperation with all healthy forces in mass movements. The pursuit of this line not only does not hinder me but, on the contrary, helps me, including at meetings with representatives of a whole number of "fronts," politicized associations, and various groups. Such an approach is needed still more now in the USSR Supreme Soviet. Here it is necessary to be able to rise not just above political partialities but sometimes also above purely human sympathies and antipathies. Therefore we must keep ourselves in hand. Particularly now that we are really approaching a multiparty system, we must seek to ensure that the maximum use is made in our parliament of the positive charge which political pluralism holds within itself and that the scope for tension, which it causes when the matter switches from a clash of minds to a clash of foreheads, is reduced as far as possible.

[PRAVDA] During the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee's pre-congress platform, opinions were expressed on the parliamentary type of party. What is your viewpoint on this?

[Lukyanov] I have no doubt that the CPSU must master the ABC's of parliamentarianism and will do so. Any party seeks to pursue its own line in parliament, for otherwise it is not worth a penny. And for this it is necessary to prepare for parliamentary battles, know the distribution of forces and the arguments of political opponents, not tire of seeking supporters, and display readiness for compromises. And, of course, competently champion your own party's positions. In other words, it is necessary to make a serious study of parliamentary conduct and the parliamentary struggle. Improvisations will not help here.

At the same time, to speak of the CPSU only as a parliamentary party would, in my view, mean reducing it to the role of some political dwarf. With such an approach it would turn from a Leninist party into a puny tree torn from its roots among the people and deprived of social juices. So, reducing everything to the party's parliamentary functions would mean distorting its historical appearance and abandoning its chief goal of expressing and defending the interests of the working class and of all working people.

The experience of certain East European ruling parties shows where such a path leads. As soon as parties have become a parliamentary club, they have gone off on an "autonomous" voyage and frequently suffered defeat. In parliament in general it is possible to "go round in circles" in factional and group battles and in the struggle "for a place in the sun" in such a way that real socioeconomic life will pass you by, and sooner or later this is punished. However, I could spend a long time talking about all this. As far as I understand it, the pre-congress debate is throwing up more and more supporters of the approach in which the renewed CPSU must operate actively both inside and outside parliament, with the masses and among the masses, winning their trust through its policies and its actions.

[PRAVDA] Democratization is the goal and means of perestroika. The formation of a rule-of-law state is a condition of the process of renewal. We talk a lot about this. But what has been done specifically, and how much progress have we made?

[Lukyanov] Here, in my opinion, it is necessary to clearly understand the following. The formation of a rule-of-law state is not just a goal, some distant horizon receding from us all the time. It is a very important means—I would say, the working instrument of perestroika. Moreover, today it is also an instrument for overcoming all sorts of extremes, a means with whose help it is possible and necessary to introduce democratic transformations into a civilized channel.

What has been done? The entire structure of representative organs of state power has been formed. The first steps have been taken toward creating a new system of legislation. The responsibility of executive and administrative organs and control over them on the part of

legislative organs have been enshrined in the constitution. The institution of constitutional oversight has emerged. The introduction of the state post of USSR president for the first time in the history of our statehood was a radical step toward a rule-of-law state. He is a symbol of public concord. His integrating function is to rally for constructive, creative purposes all the political forces that operate in our country.

A rule-of-law state is inconceivable without very strict supervision of the fulfillment of laws and other normative acts. Some progress has been made here too, but so far it has been very, very small.

In this connection I consider the problem of strengthening law and order and organizing a resolute war on crime to be one of the most acute nationwide problems—if not the most acute one. We must ensure the radical restructuring of the work of law-enforcement organs and of all institutions called upon to strengthen legality and law and order in the country.

And again. It is exceptionally important to revive Soviet people's confidence in the law on the way to a rule-of-law state. Until recently it was customary for us to emphasize just one aspect—citizens' responsibility. Their rights and freedoms were treated merely as a kind of "gift" from the state. We must get away from that distortion. And there must be two-way movement here: The state answers to citizens and ensures their protection against any tyranny, while citizens in turn bear responsibility before the state and defend its interests that are common to all.

In short, only the first steps have been taken in the direction of a rule-of-law state. But without them there will be no subsequent steps. The chief thing now, in my opinion, is to consolidate the positions already won and not surrender them. We must advance, freeing ourselves from dogmatism and retrogradation and from ossified views and habits, and at the same time call ourselves and others strictly to account for blunders and shortcomings.

[PRAVDA] The Supreme Soviet is now working on the creation of new laws. Quite a few have already been adopted. But people are complaining that some do not work. And yet, in order to travel further along the road of the renewal of society, a reliable mechanism for the fulfillment of laws is needed. What is holding things up today?

[Lukyanov] Indeed, 60 new laws have been adopted at the past Congresses of USSR People's Deputies and at USSR Supreme Soviet sessions. They embrace practically all spheres of state building, the most important spheres of the economy and social life, citizens' rights and freedoms, and questions of interethnic relations. However this work may be assessed and by whom, one thing is clear: The legal foundations of perestroika are coming into being before our eyes.

It is clear, however, that society needs not only a certain sum of laws. We need a reform of the state and legal system with the ultimate goal of the law's real supremacy.

This is a comprehensive task. It presupposes the fundamental tuning of the work of the entire system of executive-administrative organs, the improvement of Soviet justice, the enhancement of the role and responsibility of the prosecutor's office and the legal profession, and the strengthening of juridical services and state arbitration organs everywhere. It is also necessary to resolutely suppress the practice whereby statewide decisions are reshaped at departmental and local levels. This is inadmissible from the legal viewpoint and, I will add, very harmful economically and socially.

We now need at least four things. It is necessary to improve the quality of the laws themselves. It is necessary to sharply enhance the responsibility of executive organs. It is necessary to activate the work of law-enforcement organs in all areas. Finally, it is necessary to create a reliable mechanism of parliamentary control over the implementation of laws. We have recently been speaking of this increasingly frequently in the USSR Supreme Soviet. These problems are also of concern to the Central Committee Politburo. I believe that the next session of the union parliament will be held under the sign of more actively engaging the monitoring powers of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet, its committees and commissions, and the entire corps of deputies.

[PRAVDA] Society has given an ambivalent reception to the government concept of a switch to a regulated market economy. I have heard it said in this connection that our only hope is the Supreme Soviet, which is obliged to protect people's interests. Are expectations of this kind justified?

[Lukyanov] The attitude toward a market economy is far from unequivocal in the Supreme Soviet, as in society. As the recent examination of the concept submitted by the USSR Council of Ministers showed, we do not have a simple and easy way out of the crisis situation. Whoever simplifies or softens the problem is doing society a disservice, if not to put it more harshly. We must not "obfuscate" here, for people must know what awaits them. And this was said in parliament. The Supreme Soviet sees it as its task—and this is probably the deputies' common opinion—to ensure that the switch to the new economic model is attended by the least possible costs, particularly for poorly-off categories of citizens.

As is known, the Supreme Soviet not only criticized the government program but also supported it. And, in my opinion, it acted correctly. This is what I will say here. Our press sometimes airs the idea that parliament should be a bit tougher with the government and call it and every minister more strictly to account. A fair comment. The government must be called to account, and control is needed. However, it is just as necessary to give it an opportunity to work creatively and to fulfill its difficult duties responsibly. As regards the preparation of laws concerning key problems of the country's economic and social development, everyday businesslike cooperation with the USSR Council of Ministers is needed here.

Certain basic legislative acts—on ownership, land, leases, enterprises, taxes—have already been adopted. Some things in them will, of course, be made more precise, but these documents will undoubtedly retain their significance during the period of the direct switch to a regulated market. Incidentally, a discussion of a new package of draft laws directly connected with the upcoming reform will have begun by September, when the Supreme Soviet session embarks on its work after the vacations. I hope that this area will continue to enjoy a certain priority.

At the same time parliament will have to devote far more attention to reorienting the economy toward meeting people's social needs. What has already been outlined with regard to improving the provision of pensions for citizens and servicemen and resolving the question of leave and certain problems concerning women, the family, childhood, as well as state youth policy, affects the interests of millions upon millions of people. Questions of this kind will be and cannot fail to be priority questions, however hard things may be for our state now.

[PRAVDA] Elections have been held in the country, and the formation of local and republic soviets is being completed. How do you assess the relations taking shape locally between soviets and party organs, and how do you picture this model in the future?

[Lukyanov] I agree with the diagnosis which has become quite widespread in our society, namely: The party is no longer governing, while the soviets of people's deputies are not yet ruling as they should. Of course, things are not precisely like this everywhere. But on the whole such a situation can be encountered quite frequently.

Today the soviets are undoubtedly increasingly becoming an arena of businesslike partnership and of the elaboration and adoption of topical decisions. They have mainly been joined by active, committed people who value the voters' trust and want to work. At the same time it has to be seen that in some places there are attempts to turn organs of power into something like political clubs and not working corporations. This will pass, of course. Life will make people get down to work. The soviets now have the necessary material base for this. They are being endowed with communal property and reliable budget sources, being given the right to build up the local economy, and acquiring serious economic levers to develop it. There are also fundamental legislative acts, above all the law on the general principles of local self-management and local economy in the USSR. This enables the soviets to act not only as the people's representative organs but also as the basic components of self-management.

However, this process is proceeding with difficulty. Many delegates to the constituent congress of the Russian Communist Party told me how relations between the local soviets' new presidiums and the executive committees are shaping up in a complex manner. With regard to the increasing experience here it is possible that something will have to be changed in time. But the

overall policy of delimiting the powers of representative and executive organs is correct. It enhances the role of the deputy and increases the responsibility of the executive apparatus. Without this we can resolve nothing. And the soviets must persistently master all the levers of power and make masterful use of them.

As regards party committees, through communist deputies they are called upon to help in every possible way to ensure that soviet organs become as quickly as possible not only representative but also fully ruling organs. And this will determine relations in tandem: the soviets-the CPSU. And there is something here for the party staff to think about, particularly with regard to introducing new accents into the theory and practice of strengthening people's power.

[PRAVDA] What do you expect from the 28th CPSU Congress?

[Lukyanov] It was Lenin who said that no one will ever be able to discredit our ideals unless communists do so themselves. Yes, the party must drain the whole bitter cup of repentance. But no one must be permitted to crucify it and paint its entire historical path solid black.

The upcoming congress will not be easy. It will be the same as our party itself under the difficult, painful conditions of perestroika. Here we see attempts to drag it along the well-worn track of parliamentary social democracy, temporizing, and very strong rejection of the inevitability of new approaches and phenomena. At the same time perestroika simply will not happen without the party, without its unity, without its profound democratism and innovativeness.

I am sure that the CPSU will have sufficient strength, courage, and wisdom to resolve these problems, to renew all spheres of its life, and to make its link with the masses more alive and permanent. After the 28th congress the people must see and feel that the communists' party has learned serious lessons and that it places its main stake on practical work. In short, the people must know that the party, accepting criticism, honing its strategy and tactics, and clearly conscious of its place in society, is not turning from the course of renewal. For it has no other choice, however hard it may be.

Razumovskiy Interviewed on Issues

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26 Jun 90 Second Edition pp 3-4

[Unattributed interview with G.P. Razumovskiy, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; date and place of interview not stated: "Requirement of the Times"]

[Text] [Interviewer] Georgiy Petrovich! The party building and cadre work department which you lead emerged, as is well known, as a result of the reorganization of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus in the fall of 1988. It used to be called the organizational-party work department and you headed that too. So perhaps

you are the best person to judge how the new department differs from the old. After all, it is not a simple change of label?

[Razumovskiy] I would say it is also a change of label. As Hegel once noted, the essence shows through the phenomena, including insignificant phenomena. So the phenomenon you cited—the change of label—is connected with the profound changes now taking place in the CPSU Central Committee. Although, of course, they cannot be reduced to that.

The transformation of the former organizational-party work department into the party Building and Cadre Work Department should be seen in the context of the reorganization of the entire CPSU Central Committee apparatus and, more broadly, of the perestroika of all party structures and forms and methods of the party's activity. After all, the package of measures adopted in the fall of 1988, including the elimination of sectorial subdivisions in the party apparatus, was in fact a specific expression of the party leadership's desire to strengthen the **political principle** in the activity not only of the Central Committee but also of party committees of all levels, to free the party as much as possible from the rudiments of administrative-edict functions, to retain it as an organized force, and to create new opportunities for effective actions and flexible maneuvering in a fundamentally altered political situation.

To develop your question I should like to add that at the same time as the former organizational-party work department was reorganized, the CPSU Central Committee commission for party building and cadre policy, of which I was elected chairman, was created and began its work. This is not something thought up in an office, not one more extension to existing institutions, but a real mechanism for ensuring the supremacy of the party's elected organs over their apparatus. A supremacy based on active, independent, systematic work by members of the elected organs to form and implement their political line. Without boosting the combat capability of the elected party *aktiv*, without providing its activity with precisely operating apparatus subdivisions, which we nevertheless cannot completely renounce, however much we would like to, all our verdicts against the phenomena of increased bureaucracy in the work of the party committees and so forth will remain on paper only.

I should also like to draw your attention to the fact that the tasks of the Central Committee commission and department are different. The CPSU Central Committee commission has addressed itself to problems of the party's **cadre policy** and has come out with initiatives in this field. Your newspaper has already reported them, which I should like to note. The Central Committee department, on the other hand, is in constant contact with local party committees and focuses its attention and efforts to a decisive degree on the practical implementation of this policy, on the elaboration and implementation of an organizational system of measures, on the verification of their execution, and on cadre work under

the corresponding control of the Secretariat and Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

Structural regroupings, changes in the numerical strength and composition of sectors, and intradepartmental reforms are something secondary with regard to the main change. Indeed, I saw and continue to see my key task in sustaining precisely this political premise in the practice of the work of both the commission and the department of the Central Committee.

In addition to what I have said, I should like to anticipate possible questions and say that the opinion which exists in some places that a department worker has to be a person of conservative views and a fierce champion of a style involving pressure—in brief an inveterate *apparatchik*—does not accord with reality. Among my colleagues there are many highly educated people who consider in depth the processes and phenomena in society and who are invested with the best human qualities, people who give their lives and ability to the cause of the party. And you must realize that now, when things are difficult for the party, they cannot help being difficult for them too. And, of course, they are not spared from particular failures, blunders, and incorrect assessments. Our friends and opponents point this out to us. And we can see these errors for ourselves and strive to overcome them.

[Interviewer] In the well-known memorandum "on the question of the reorganization of the party apparatus" (24 August 1988) M.S. Gorbachev stressed that "its duties must include not only work with party and soviet cadres but also the elaboration of fundamental questions of cadre policy. Everyone can understand that is no easy task. How are you succeeding in resolving it?"

[Razumovskiy] It seems to me that our talk has already turned to the plan you have touched on. Only I should make the point of departure for answering your question the Central Committee January (1987) Plenum where for the first time the question of cadre policy was raised with the utmost acuteness and clarity. Then it is worth talking of the package of documents of the 19th all-Union party conference and above all the resolution "on certain urgent measures for the practical implementation of the reform of the country's political system," which strongly cranked up the mechanism of cadre renewal, opened up opportunities for initiative in this field, and essentially for the first time showed so broadly the political—I emphasize, the political and not the stock-taking and distribution—yardstick for the cadre problem.

It was then that a correct diagnosis was made of an ailment which has to some extent affected our work since Stalin's times. It was recognized that the formal nomenclature approach toward the selection and placement of cadres, the practice of direct appointment, the poor use of the principles of appointment by election and accountability in cadre work—all these were phenomena which should be resolutely eliminated. The document

you mentioned summed up in analytic form what had been done in this field, outlined new approaches, and provided certain practical impetuses.

Life has demanded that the main method of the party committees' work in the cadre sphere should be the organization of the training and retraining of cadres and their organization with a consideration for possible recommendations in accordance with democratic procedures. Powers to adopt cadre decisions in the organs of state power and management and public organizations belong to these organizations themselves while in the party these powers are transferred from higher-ranking bodies to party organizations and all communists.

I am firmly convinced that the renewal of cadre work should be linked organically with the destatization of sociopolitical life and the broad development of the entire spectrum of forms of self-management. And, of course, with the all-around expansion of the broad working masses' direct participation in the elaboration and implementation of the decisions of public and state organs and of their provision with information on the state of affairs in various spheres of society's life and with the intensification of daily monitoring of the management organs' activity.

The ideological-political soil on which the cadre problem today can consequently alone be resolved is a new political culture with all its attributes: glasnost, full power for the soviets, and the boosting of public initiative including in its political forms. I think that it is on these avenues that the quest connected with the elaboration of fundamental questions of cadre work can be successful.

[Interviewer] Is the field of the party's cadre work not being narrowed? Formerly the selection and education of economic leaders of various ranks and other workers occupied a prominent place in this work. Now, as you have already noted, the so-called nomenklatura approach is being eliminated. But what is to take its place?

[Razumovskiy] First of all we must decide what we understand by the field of the party's cadre work. I would venture to define it as follows: **The field of the party's cadre work is the sphere of the cadre problem of perestroika.**

Do we fully realize the enormous demand made on people with the new outlook by this crisis situation which has taken shape in our society? Naturally, I should like to be understood correctly. I have in mind the social demand on a generation or rather on generations of people who are businesslike in the good sense, selfless people alien to any dogmatic narrow vision who would be prepared to give all their efforts and energy to avert misfortunes and disasters, to prevent the slide toward catastrophe in some places, and to strengthen and urgently develop healthy trends in the economy, the

social field, and the sphere of culture and the people's morality. And thereby help our people to really take heart.

Consolidation is a fine word. Perhaps the key word in today's political lexicon. But we must obviously remember that today the opportunities for consolidation on a verbal basis have been almost completely used; today the country, the state, the fatherland, and the people need consolidation on the basis of deeds. Deeds which, even if they are only small, sometimes unnoticed, but specific deeds connected with the solution of some vital question, are deeds from which a cause may take shape. The cause of social and national resurrection. The cause of the people's spiritual recovery. The cause of economic success. The cause of confident entry into the family of civilized peoples who are opening up for themselves the expanses of the 21st century.

I have perhaps digressed somewhat from the problem you set specifically and I have expanded its framework, but I have done so deliberately. To resolve the specific task of our party's cadre work (if we really want to convince all those who imagine this work as the mechanical shuffling of application forms and as a nomenklatura "kitchen" that this work is changing fundamentally and radically) we must as it were crystallize in the present amorphous social solution the salt which in the Bible is called the salt of the earth. In my view perhaps the main blunder in our work with people and the reason why it is of little effect is that we display extraordinarily little concern and thought for simple, seemingly elementary, things.

Sometimes, for instance, when I read in publications the opinions of the defenders and opponents of general human values, I am surprised at our ability to obscure the essence of simple things. For instance, if we are talking of giving people access to these values in the family, then is the thrust of the matter here not that the family should be built on honest labor, on the mutual respect and love of its members, that the father should be a father, the mother a mother, the children children, and the elderly the elderly? That each person should be himself—a person who will have no other life. That is the simplest philosophy of moral concepts and values, a philosophy accessible to everyone. It is, of course, a global social problem. But if we embark on it in a practical way, if we make headway in resolving it, then we shall lay a reliable foundation for expanding the cadre potential and cadre opportunities of society as it undergoes renewal.

Is the sphere of cadre work being narrowed? Yes, in the obsolete theoretical sense of the word it is being narrowed. But in the political and social sense it is being infinitely expanded.

The party, like each of its members, is faced with a very complex task which one of the greatest minds of mankind formulated thus: achieving the point where the

transformation of circumstances coincides with self-change or, with regard to our realities, the coincidence of perestroika and self-ennoblement. This is perhaps—or rather probably—the **underlying point of the party's cadre work in the form in which it is needed today.**

After all, the most important thing the party can do in encapsulating public opinion and relying on the people's wisdom is to make way for, to give a free passage to, to allow the development of, honest, decent, and professional people. If we see cadre work from this angle, it will be easier for us to decide for ourselves how to treat previous experience of cadre activity, how to determine what in it has not gone rusty even today under the new conditions. Yes, this question does indeed perturb many people. Communists are sometimes confused: So was everything in the past incorrect?

I think we should be more thoughtful today when we engage in sorting out what is suitable or unsuitable in our previous party experience and other experience. And in particular we should not forget that there is also the very important political quality of **historical tact.**

For instance, take the traditional formula for the party's cadre policy: the assessment of cadres according to their professional, political, and moral qualities. What is incorrect or false in it today? Surely professional qualities are not contraindicated for today's leaders, or is success in their work guaranteed by apolitical attitudes or immorality? Of course not. Of itself the formula, like much else from the ideological-theoretical weaponry bequeathed to us from Lenin, is "not guilty" of self-desecration, not guilty of being turned into a dogma completely cut off from its true content.

In actual fact, why protectionism, servility, life tenure of leading posts, the incompetence of high-ranking managers, and so forth able quite recently to take cover behind this formula? Only because a question which imparts real political meaning to this formula had not been resolved or to be more precise had been resolved absolutely incorrectly. **Who** promotes cadres and who assesses them? A narrow range of people or the party mass, the working people themselves? And if we resolve this question in a different way from before, in a different, democratic, way, then I personally regard the formula for selecting and assessing cadres according to their professional, political, and moral qualities as absolutely up to date.

Or take the cliché, painfully familiar to us all, of an attentive attitude toward cadres. Why do you feel an inner irritation when you hear these words, which contain nothing incorrect. Would it be better to display indifference or worse toward the cadres of the new generation, who think in an innovative manner, who take risks, who assume the burden of responsibility, who give themselves undividedly to the cause in the era of perestroika? Of course not, these people themselves will not allow it. It seems to me that here there is what I

would call the effect of the long-term action of stagnation: We all remember that the formula of an attentive attitude toward cadres served as cover for the personal devotion of the lower-ranking to the higher-ranking in exchange for a certain freedom of action and connivance with the lower-ranking.

I think that during the profound changes taking place today in social awareness we will have to return their true meaning and true weight to many concepts which were distorted and sullied in the past. In ridding ourselves of everything antihuman we must if you like not only renew but also in some lofty sense resurrect—return its dignity and place to all that is good. Of course, here it is not a case of the old rubbish, of those long obsolete provisions which in a slightly touched up form have come to us from the past and which have wrongly been called Leninist. Actually, in preparing the draft of the new CPSU Statutes the desire was manifested to make things add up, as they say, to cut away everything dead, to carefully preserve everything living and fertile.

[Interviewer] I should like you to continue this theme, Georgiy Petrovich, and to say a few words about the main ideas included in the draft of the new CPSU Statutes.

[Razumovskiy] Perhaps the main idea—at any rate the most precious to me—is the idea of ensuring the power of the party masses and the communists' decisive voice in all questions of the party's life.

I think it is not hard to understand these demands. For many years communists were in fact kept from adopting or taking part in the elaboration of serious political decisions. The mere "right to approve" cannot satisfy party members. That is why the question of the power of the party masses has arisen in all its magnitude. This question is complex. Many of its aspects are now realized in the draft of the new CPSU Statutes. Work on it has been proceeding continuously for several months now in close liaison with the party organizations and delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and with their active participation.

I should like to note a few innovations in the draft of the Statutes which have been reflected in it although they may be changed with respect to formulations. First of all the communist becomes an active figure in the elaboration of policy and its implementation. His right to his own opinion is now defended by the Statutes. His direct participation in the election of delegates to all party forums, the right to express his views in platforms, and participation in referendums also guarantee him new opportunities. The role of the primary organizations and their independence are equally enhanced: Decisions taken by them within the framework of the Statutes cannot be repealed by higher ranking organs. In brief, everything has been done to remove excessive organization and prohibitiveness and to create as many conditions as possible for party members' independent creativity, for new political thinking, and bold,

extraordinary actions. And all these phenomena can already be encountered in the party organizations' activity.

[Interviewer] The democratization of party life... It would seem that much has been done in this direction since the 19th all-Union party conference, yet the communists are voicing dissatisfaction. During the pre-congress reports and elections the leitmotif of many speeches has been the demand to delegate more rights to the primary party organizations.

[Razumovskiy] If we assess objectively what has been done to democratize party life during and since the 19th all-Union party conference, it may be said without exaggeration that innovations have changed the party, have altered its identity, and set in motion the millions-strong masses of communists. At the same time the process of democratization—and this should be particularly noted—has been developing and is developing in a complex way, not without collisions, and is connected with serious contradictions. Some of these collisions and contradictions arise from within party life and others are as it were projected into it from outside.

You talk of the demands heard at the reports and elections to delegate more rights to the primary party organizations. That is a correct demand. At the same time there is a question: What and who today is restricting, for instance, the freedom of party organizations to express their will on key problems of the party's activity? There is a problem here. And we in the Central Committee, in the commission, and in the department are thinking a lot about how not only to stipulate particular rights for party organizations but also to ensure their practical implementation.

[Interviewer] Communists' letters and the recent party conferences and congresses often contained a warning against obsession with "internal party passions" in isolation from general concerns and cares. The following expression even appeared: "the structural and organizational questions syndrome." What could you say on this score?

[Razumovskiy] I believe that there is an element of truth in this statement, but only an element. Indeed, in the party milieu the opinion has crystallized that we are spending too long marking time over questions which have already been resolved in practice in the life of the party organizations and that we are not relying boldly enough on the experience which has been accumulated. And, most important, that immersion in internal problems is to some extent fettering the communists' creative energy so necessary for resolving urgent tasks of practical importance in life. But, as I have already said, that is only an element of the truth. Another element consists in the fact that the process of the party's transformation has not been completed. Moreover, as the results of the reports and elections and republican communist party congresses show, we have perhaps entered the culminating and I would say critical period of the party's

internal transformations. This period should be resolved and completed at the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress, from which the party must emerge having resolved its internal problems but charged with the energy of perestroika.

[Interviewer] I should like to ask you a question prompted by life itself. A note of alarm has been heard in the press and in letters: The working class is being "eroded" from the deputies' corps and there are far fewer of its representatives among the delegates to the conferences and congresses. The most diverse explanations are given, and they include ascribing this phenomenon to democratization. But what is your opinion?

[Razumovskiy] Indeed, the number of workers and peasants in the corps of delegates and deputies has declined considerably compared with previous years. Figures are hardly necessary here, in general they are known.

This is a complex phenomenon and I think there are quite a few reasons for it. I shall try to cite just a few and I shall not claim my assessments are without errors.

First of all it seems to me that "stagnation" had a particularly powerful effect on the working people's real rather than apparent political and public activeness. And it is hard to overcome the consequences of this. After all, it is not only that few workers and peasants are elected but also that they themselves are sometimes not very unanimous in voting for their brothers in labor.

As for the election of delegates to the 28th congress, I am not sure that elections to party districts always favor workers and peasants. And it is not a case here of the latest "machinations by the apparatus," as some critics try to present it, but of certain features of the new election system which we have not completely ascertained. For instance, when many party organizations unite into a district, then as a rule people vote for the individuals best known to that district. Very often these are the party, soviet, or economic leaders.

[Interviewer] An urgent concern of the CPSU is to step up its influence in the soviets. The party groups could do much here—after all, there are quite a lot of communists in the soviets. But are they all displaying initiative? To all appearances a substantial proportion of CPSU members are shunning participation in these groups. How to explain this?

[Razumovskiy] I absolutely agree that the party is now faced with the urgent task of stepping up its influence in the soviets, but not only its influence. It is essential also to find new forms of work and to use old forms (for instance, those party groups in the soviets), transforming them in accordance with the requirements of the times. The main thing is to correctly recognize conditions which have changed in every respect. And these changes are proceeding in the direction of intensifying political pluralism and the emergence of a multiparty system. The

complex process of the transfer of power to the soviets is underway and it cannot proceed mechanically, in the form of a one-off act.

The basis for emerging from the "erosion" of the positions of the communist deputies consists in clear-cut positions for the party itself and its policy and tactical instructions which—let us hope—will be substantially assisted by the 28th CPSU Congress. Our aim is to exclude petty interference in the activity of deputies who are party members, especially interference whereby their duties to voters are violated. At the same time we must proceed toward the concerted action of the communist deputies, laying this foundation even at the election struggle stage. The party organization wholly supports its candidate deputy at the elections and it has the right to demand that he stand on party positions on principled questions.

Democratic Platform Gives Briefing

*LD2806163790 Moscow World Service in Russian
1500 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[Text] Members of the Coordinating Council of the Communist Party's Democratic Platform gave a briefing in Moscow to explain their position concerning the results of the first stage of the constituent congress of the Russian Federation's Communist Party held recently in the capital.

They described the congress as an obvious victory of the conservative forces, and they see no prospect for the 28th national congress to be different. They read an appeal by the Moscow regional council of the party's Democratic Platform to reject and boycott the congress' decisions, to suspend paying party dues, and to begin forming alternative party structures.

According to one of the Democratic Platform's leaders, Vladimir Lysenko, all chances for compromise, Mikhail Gorbachev's chief tactical weapon since the beginning of restructuring, have been exhausted. The political center is fast moving its base and in these conditions Mikhail Gorbachev will have to make a resolute choice.

Armed Forces Delegates Meet

*LD2806183890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1800 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[Text] A meeting of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from party organizations of the country's armed forces took place in Moscow today. Candidates from the Army and Navy to the working bodies of the CPSU Central Committee and the council of representatives of the delegations to the congress were discussed. A draft resolution on the main guidelines of the CPSU's military policy for the present day was drawn up. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, took part in the work of the meeting.

'Political Dialogues' Viewed

LD2806174190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1400 GMT on 28 June carries a 97-minute phone-in program entitled "Political Dialogues—Toward the 28th CPSU Congress."

Mediator Viktor Lyubovtsev announces telephone numbers to dial and introduces participants in the discussion: N.Ye. Kislova, first secretary of Sverdlovskiy rayon committee, Moscow, congress delegate; V.S. Smirnov, Soviet Army colonel, Aktyubinsk, congress delegate; Zh.T. Toshchenko, director of sociological research center of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee; Professor O.I. Ozherelyev, deputy head of ideology department of CPSU Central Committee, member of the working group to prepare the congress program documents; Ye.V. Yakovlev, chief editor of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, USSR people's deputy, congress delegate; and F.M. Burlatskiy, chief editor of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, USSR people's deputy. Lyubovtsev reads out viewers' questions. The first question asks whether the CPSU should disband. The panel expresses individual views on the issue. They say they do not think that the questioner's view is typical and they look forward to the party's revival at the congress. Reorganization is better than disbandment, the panel stresses.

The next question Lyubovtsev reads out is: What sort of socialism does the CPSU back, and can socialism be renewed? Kislova equates the socialist choice with the law-governed state. Toshchenko stresses the importance of serving the interests of people. Burlatskiy says the time for ideological disputes is past. Yakovlev takes issue with vague terminology. Ozherelyev speaks of the importance of renewing society.

Lyubovtsev reads the question: Will the panellists stay in the party or join another? Each member expresses his view in turn, then they discuss the issue among themselves.

Lyubovtsev reads: Why does the party have to be a leading force, as that should be the job of the government and parliament? The panelists note that a multiparty, parliamentary system is in the embryonic stage. Loss of prestige is affecting both the party and other centers of power, they say.

Lyubovtsev reads: Why was the Russian Communist Party (RCP) set up in such a hurry, and what must it do to extricate the republic from economic crisis? The panelists exchange views on the procedure by which the RCP was established. They discuss whether CPSU members will also want to join the republic party.

Lyubovtsev reads a series of questions about the party's future attitude toward the Army and its own role in it. Smirnov says the Army should serve the state and

people, not a particular party, and speaks of the advantages of a professional army. Ozherelyev takes issue with his view of the role of political bodies in the Army.

The next question Lyubovtsev reads is: Whose fault is the party's current plight—its own or its leaders'? Toshchenko says the corrupt section of the leadership and nationalist sections within it have been at fault. Others blame conservatives for failing to take heed of others' opinions.

Lyubovtsev reads the question: What unites the program's panelists? Burlatskiy replies: "We represent the center and the left and not the right. There are no representatives of the right wing, the conservative wing, here. We are all in favor of uniting the left wing with the center and of supporting the reformists who are now headed, as has taken place historically, by Gorbachev."

He goes on: "When I read with interest the various platforms of the representatives of the center and the left I do not see any major differences of principle. There are tactical and organizational ones. Now everyone is talking about a multiparty system. They said previously that the center was afraid of a multiparty system. Now the center does not fear a multiparty system. The center was previously afraid of the market. The center was previously afraid of a treaty between the republics which the left spoke of. Now the center is now afraid of this."

Look at the major changes which have taken place over a very short period. I think that there are the foundations for a bloc and not only here, but what is much more important, at the 28th congress."

Lyubovtsev says that a viewer says a split in the party is the best way toward a multiparty system. Burlatskiy praises the two-party system existing in the United States and the FRG. "I think that we are moving in that direction. The whole question is not to skip any stages. This is a natural process. One can hypothetically imagine that, say, the right wing will leave and call itself the Marxist-Leninist Party. That has happened in various countries. We have seen that in some communist parties. What remains will be the left-center part which stands on the platform of humane democratic socialism. One can imagine this hypothesis."

Burlatskiy continues: "If this happens, I do not see this as a tragedy. But it is important that this should mature within the mass of the party membership. For this is not a matter of a struggle only between leaders or individual groupings at the congress. This should be the result of the maturity of the political culture within the party and beyond it."

Lyubovtsev reads a question as to whether the party can accommodate differing views and ideas. Burlatskiy replies: "I am always amused by people who discuss things abstractly and do not look at realities at all. There is Gorbachev and that is one tendency. There is Yeltsin—he is a member of the Central Committee and

not just a member of the party—and that is one tendency. There is Polozkov and that is a tendency. That is the reality. How can one avoid seeing this—just by closing one's eyes and pretending that they are absolutely united in all their major positions? This is not so."

Burlatskiy continues: "So, it is necessary to find ways, either for all to live together without giving up their positions, competing in some way, or else to split up. Whether you call this factions, tendencies, or platforms, it will continue to exist. Therefore, one should not fear the words. They were afraid of this word when, as is well known, the 10th congress adopted the resolution on the unity of the party. They banned factions and legitimized one faction, Stalin's faction, which shot the representatives of all other factions. It seemed that they had taken a correct decision, renounced factions, but look at the result. So, there is no need to fear that various tendencies are being formed and that there will be a certain amount of struggle. It is necessary to find ways for the democratic resolutions of conflict situations and for cooperation in spite of competition."

Burlatskiy moves to the subject of Gorbachev's combining of the two posts of president and party leader, saying: "This is a really emotive question from the point of view of the development of our country. As far as the principle is concerned, the combining of the posts of president and leader of the party—which is such a vast organization with 20,000,000 members—requires a vast investment of strength. This is, in principle, something we do not need. It is too great a luxury to expend one man in this way. It is necessary to find some other person."

Burlatskiy says: "The question here is not one of principle but of the actual moment. I remember that when Khrushchev, in October 1964—this happened before my eyes in the same hall in which the Russian congress took place—was released from his post. Everyone was delighted. But the real question in politics is not who is leaving but who is coming in. That is the real question. Who is to be put forward in his place? No one was frightened by the Russian Communist Party Congress until the elections took place and the right wing forces put forward their man. If, say, Lobov, a centrist, had won, then in general everyone would have thought that everything had ended normally."

Burlatskiy goes on: "So the question at this congress is this—if there is pressure from the right wingers, if they are going to fight for their own candidate, if they seem to have the chance that their candidate will get through, then it seems to me that the center and the left should fight to ensure that Gorbachev should remain chairman of the party. If the inter- relation of forces turns out differently and Gorbachev himself also comes to the conclusion that there is someone who will cooperate with him to promote and help the cause of perestroika, then the question can be decided in that way. That is a

political question about how the interrelation of forces turns out. The important thing is, let me stress again, who will come in."

Ozherelyev reads out a question about the need to postpone the congress. The party needs to renew itself radically and it should be done as soon as possible, he says, Burlatskiy says it would be better to postpone the congress.

Lyubovtsev says a questioner calls the Democratic Platform anticommunist. Smirnov disagrees.

Next Yakovlev replies to a question about whether a personality cult is growing up around Yeltsin. He says no. He answers other questions about his personal views.

Kislova replies to criticism of the Moscow delegation and proceedings at the congress of the RCP. He says the mass media has not been instructed to attack the leadership of the Russian Communist Party.

Finally, Ozherelyev responds to the question: Will there be a purge in the party? Ozherelyev thinks not.

Combining Posts, 'Purity' Viewed

PM2906102590

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 June 1990 Second Edition devotes the whole of page 4 to a selection of readers' letters under the general headline "Reflections Before the Congress." Two of the letters raise the question of Gorbachev's dual posts as president and party general secretary. A letter headlined "Nagging Questions" from serviceman V. Levenkov reads:

"Why is the party's prestige declining? Because rhetorical declarations, ill-considered decisions, and party monopolism and pressure are either turning people against us, or giving rise to a wave of new jokes. A strong party has no fear of opposition, and forcible 'unity' only wrecks it.

"Lately people have been ascribing any miscalculation by our government and the failures of any programs to the party's (!) inability to extricate the country from the crisis. They say that the CPSU is leading the state toward disintegration. Why? In my view, the principle of combining party and state posts also makes a contribution to this. The whole party will pay the price in its own prestige for poor leadership by any minister (even a nonparty person). Yes, there is no more authoritative and respected figure in the party today than Mikhail Sergeyevich, and today he is incontestably the party's leader. However, since in the state there is no person worthier and more capable of being president, I think that the party should take into account the most important factor—the people's choice—and allow the president to concentrate fully on the country's complex problems.

"Who then will head the CPSU? I think it will be difficult to find a candidate today. So maybe at the

present complex stage we should not define this post as being so significant (as is our customary practice) but rely more on collective work by the Central Committee and the Politburo?

"As a communist in the Armed Forces there is an urgent issue I have to mention. The draft CPSU Central Committee Platform states: 'A rule-of-law state presupposes effective political leadership of the defense sphere...' How is this to be understood in conditions of a real multiparty system? Today we are the ruling party, but tomorrow we may be in opposition. And another party will begin to exert 'effective political influence.' We will wreck the Army if we do that! The majority in the Army now understand that it must be subordinate to the president and uphold the common ideals of our system. The fact that we still do not know where we are heading is a different matter—we have lived under barracks socialism and developed socialism, and now we are moving toward humane, democratic socialism. So what exactly is socialism?"

The letter from A. Litvinov of Belgorod, carried under the headline "Regarding the Combining of Posts," takes a different line on this issue:

"There are now a great many arguments over whether we should retain the combining of state and party posts in the upper echelon of power. I too have given this matter some thought. I don't know how matters stand from the viewpoint of the 'theory of democracy,' but the realities of our life, in my view, demand that this combination be retained. Just imagine what would happen in the opposite case. Which post should Gorbachev renounce? The presidency? But he was elected to that by the Congress of People's Deputies, who are vested in turn with the people's trust. In that case the president would disappoint the people's hopes and expectations. Should he quit the post of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee? But surely it is clear that if he were left without his party's support in conditions of a real political struggle, he might also lose support in the organs of state power? That is axiomatic. Now is not the time to engage in experiments, I think. All too much is at stake, the price of perestroika is all too high."

Another correspondent argues the need for an exchange of party cards. Prof. V. Ustinov, chief of the Department of the History of Political Parties and Movements at the Moscow Historical Archives Institute, writes in his letter headlined "Regarding Purification" [ochishcheniye]:

"If I were to address the 28th CPSU Congress I would devote my speech to questions of the party's purity, of filling the party with the best representatives of all strata of the working population. But I would particularly focus attention on freeing party ranks from people unworthy of the title of communist. To this end I would propose carrying out the reregistration of all members and candidate members of the CPSU. In my view, there is nothing shameful, still less insulting, about reregistration for an honest communist.

"It should also be borne in mind that it is almost 16 years since the last exchange of party cards. Basically these were years of stagnation, of corrupt relationships, of a flourishing 'shadow' economy, and of the organization of various mafias. All this could not fail to affect the qualitative composition of the CPSU. The party was unable to cleanse itself in the ordinary way of people who had discredited the title of communist. Therefore in present conditions it is advisable to heed V.I. Lenin's advice about cleansing the party of 'self-seekers,' 'adventurists,' and 'sham party members' to ensure that only honest working people join the party.

"The party reregistration should be carried out with the active participation of nonparty people at open party meetings, which should not be allowed to be turned into an arena for demagogic discrediting of the party by anticommunist, antiparty elements. Of course, the procedure for carrying out the reregistration should be carefully worked out so as not to hit honest people."

Five Minutes of Silence Held as Protest Action

'Murder' of Culture Lamented

LD2906000690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1530 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] [Announcer] The time in Moscow is half past seven in the evening. This is the time scheduled for a protest action in defense of culture. All shows, concerts, and performances are being interrupted for five minutes. Here is Aleksandr Prokhanov, the editor-in-chief of the journal SOVETSKAYA LITERATURA, to say a few words in defense of culture:

[Begin Prokhanov recording] I think that events taking place in the cultural world at the moment can only be described as the murder of culture. The imposition of vulgar financial autonomy on culture has led to a situation in which commercial considerations have driven all other considerations—ideological, spiritual, religious—out of the minds of publishers. As a result, book publishers are now catering to the lowest, most trivial and brutal levels of human awareness. Books dealing in pornography, sex, transient political interests, and kitchen gossip have now flooded the book market and ousted serious literature.

For the moment at least, there is virtually no place left on the book market for the serious writer. At all times in the past, in all countries—feudal, bourgeois, imperialist, or monarchical—culture was subsidized. It was nurtured, either by patrons of the arts or by the government. These days writers, who are burdened by monstrous, draconian taxation, are deprived of the means to survive. The overwhelming majority of them will be forced to abandon their desks, and to put aside their unfinished manuscripts, in order to find jobs as teachers, clerks, record keepers, or maybe even publishers.

We are used to the cultural circles, the micro-associations of writers that have flourished in various

places, in small towns, and even villages. These not only encouraged the creation of literary works, but also provided a kind of spiritual center, the atmosphere which could have led to a revival of old Russian culture, given the right conditions. But these centers are being ruined before our very eyes.

Furthermore, the writers union—one of the creative unions that may also be ruined now—will cease to provide a social guarantee for its members. It will no longer provide its members with subsidies, benefits, and stipends, awarding prizes to the writers of the most talented works, or arranging places at resorts or health centers for sick writers. In other words, the writers' own association is disintegrating.

Writers are now being thrown on the market, left at the mercy of this savage, elemental bourgeois whirlwind, against which they are helpless. They are helpless to resist it. This is a different psychology with different reference points, a different social experience. For this reason I foresee in the near future the savage dictatorship of a savage, spiritually unenlightened market idea, which will sweep away the fragile and delicate shoots of culture that formed during the years of stagnation. Once again we will find ourselves naked and defenseless against this century's fierce radiation. [end recording]

Culture Protest Held

LD2806180790 Moscow TASS in English 1732 GMT
28 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Galina Vinitskaya]

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—All theatrical productions, concerts and shows were interrupted for five minutes this evening in the Soviet Union. This is how intellectuals decided to call the country's attention to the plight of culture in the USSR.

Rallies and meetings in defence of culture were held at creative unions, publishing houses, museums, libraries, clubs and parks during the day.

Activists were collecting signatures under a recent address by Soviet men of culture to the Soviet president and the supreme soviets of the USSR, union and autonomous republics, expressing the hope that priority will be given to the development of national culture.

Soviet Minister of Culture Nikolay Gubenko participated in "the five minutes of silence" together with Bolshoy Theatre artists who performed the "Giselle" ballet today.

KGB's Kalugin Interviewed on Career

PM2706182090 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 25, 1-8 Jul 90 p 13

[Interview with former KGB General Oleg Kalugin by Natalya Gevorkyan; date place not specified: "It's Possible To Be Frank Only When One's Behind a Closed

Door. KGB General Speaks His Mind About the KGB"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] This interview with the KGB Maj-Gen. Oleg Kalugin which I obtained a fortnight ago, will not be a sensation; the sensation was his speech at the Second All-Union Conference of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU recently. That first public speech by General Kalugin was listened to with equal amazement both by Soviet and foreign journalists. Soviet and foreign mass media have given a more or less detailed coverage of the event.

I'm well aware that neither Kalugin's speech nor his interview with MN could have happened even a year ago when he was in the KGB active service. Everyone was taken aback by the sincerity of the general, because all of us grew up in the belief that whatever happens in the KGB headquarters on Lubyanka Street is beyond our concern. Kalugin worked there for over 30 years.

Oleg Kalugin was born in 1934 in Leningrad. After graduation from university in 1958 he volunteered for the KGB. In 1959 he was sent to Columbia University on the first student-exchange programme between the USSR and the USA. At the age of 25 he was already a New York correspondent of Soviet Radio. In 1965-70, he was second and later first secretary of the USSR Embassy in Washington. Upon his return from the USA two years later, he became deputy head of the chief of the external intelligence department. At the age of 40, he got the rank of general. In 1980, Andropov appointed Kalugin first deputy KGB chief of Leningrad. In 1987, after his relations soured with the Leningrad top authorities when they blocked the investigation of certain bribe cases, Kalugin was transferred to Moscow in the KGB reserve. In the same year, he wrote Mikhail Gorbachev a letter with concrete proposals for radical changes in the state security agency. According to Kalugin, the KGB must be depoliticized, and removed from CPSU control; the system of political spying, including the practice of infiltration of political organizations, must be abolished; the KGB staff must be cut by half; the general structure must be changed, and certain functions must be delegated to other agencies; intelligence must be removed from the KGB and subordinated to the president; the KGB must be put under the strict control of the parliament and the press. In 1989 Kalugin was 55 and he was asked to retire.

[Gevorkyan] Five years ago new political forces began to govern the country. This circumstances has had its effect on all structure of the state, including the KGB.

[Kalugin] "That's right. Any sharp social change inevitably has an impact on the agencies which protect state order. Following the February 1917 revolution, for example, the new government dismissed the tsar's secret police and abolished the system of political spying by March of that year. After his coming to power, Khrushchev initiated changes in many organizations including the KGB: the staff was considerably reduced, and many

of its former functions were abolished. There have been certain changes in recent time, and they have been given much publicity. However, the KGB has been the least affected organization compared with the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Procurator's Office. The KGB has retained its structure and the might, which used to be the Soviet dictators' major support for decades, practically intact. Now, with perestroika in its sixth year, the KGB remains a state within the state, an agency with formidable power, which is potentially capable of crushing any kind of government. The KGB manages governmental liaison, the physical protection of members of government, guarding the state border, and intelligence and security service, including Armed Forces security service. It has its own investigation teams, lots of technical services, and a small army composed of military engineers, border-guard troops and governmental liaison troops. The KGB head remains a member of the Politbureau, which means that the CPSU elite remains the main and sometimes exclusive consumer of information supplied by the KGB even after the abolition of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution declaring the leading role of the Communist Party."

[Gevorkyan] What we call "the committee" is composed of individual people who live in a society which is experiencing democratization and dismantling of old stereotypes.

[Kalugin] "As a result, quite a few radically-thinking officers proposing reforms have formed a stratum within the KGB. But the KGB is an organization with stringent military discipline and subordination. Any attempts (there has been a few of them) on the part of KGB officers to speak openly in the press on some innocent subject result in expulsion from the organization. Here's a typical example: a KGB officer wrote in the Communist magazine about the need for the reassessment of the secrecy classification to meet the present conditions, and was forced into retirement, notwithstanding the fact that he was due to be promoted to the rank of colonel in a few months."

[Gevorkyan] Does that mean that the core of the committee is rather conservative?

[Kalugin] "They are, and it's only logical. Five years ago Gorbachev declared the priority of human values and renounced the old stereotypes and ideas. However, the vast mass of the KGB officers follow the old stereotypes which had been instilled by the party. The CPSU said 'international imperialism', and the KGB translated it as foreign secret services, hostile, emigre organizations, centres of ideological subversion, international Zionism, the Vatican, Radio Liberty. Entire substructures of the committee worked in this. It was clear who the enemy was. But now we have human values. What's to be done with the Vatican or Radio Liberty? What should the people do when they witness the crumbling of the stereotypes which they have grown accustomed to? This situation brings about either a demoralization or a resistance to change. The latter inevitably grows into a

certain political philosophy—a conservative philosophy. Do you want an example? Recently, the party activists of one subunit of the KGB ran down, to thunderous applause, Rybakov, Shatrov and Granin and called them renegades who praise traitors and the ‘creeping counter-revolution’.”

[Gevorkyan] I hope we will not be forever repressing writers for what they write. The ill-famed ideological Fifth Department doesn't exist any more.

[Kalugin] “You know, in connection with the activation of strikes, the top officials of the committee demanded that we turn our attention to the working class movement and infiltrate it. I must say that the experience of the tsarist secret police in work inside political organizations, including the system of agents, didn't sink into oblivion. I wouldn't be surprised to find out that the present-day unofficial organizations are infiltrated by the KGB. That was the task of the former Fifth Department. But I don't believe that the committee could completely scrap this function—it could be relegated to another department.”

[Gevorkyan] But the former head of the Department for the Protection of the Constitution wrote in MN [MOSCOW NEWS] quite recently that they do not concern themselves with any informal organizations.

[Kalugin] “Chairman of the Government Security Department Plekhanov quite recently said, in a television interview, that the corps of guards of the government leaders in this country is quantitatively inferior to that in many other countries of the world. In fact, the entire Soviet state security system, from guards to political detectives, is several dozen times stronger numerically than that of any Western country, including the USA. In our department, the guard section (which is one of several sections) can be over a thousand-men strong. In the USA, in 1963, the increase in the guards corps (which numbered about 500) by a couple of hundred men, after the murder of President Kennedy, could be done only by a special congressional decision. That number includes the guards of the White House and special agents providing the security for the President and his family as well as former U.S. presidents and their families.”

[Gevorkyan] Suppose we common people can be fed any, even distorted, information: we will consume it because we have no way to prove it. But has the committee always supplied true information to its main client (at least until recently)—the country's top authorities?

[Kalugin] “At any rate I don't know about cases of intentional misinformation of the top echelon by the KGB. But the distorted interpretation of information is possible, as well as the suppression of information in the KGB. Here is an example from my own experience. It's an open secret that the KGB played an important role when many decisions concerning foreign political affairs were taken. This also applies to the 1968 event in Czechoslovakia. The committee whipped up the fear

among the country's leadership that Czechoslovakia could fall victim to NATO aggression or a coup unless certain actions are undertaken quickly. About the same time I reported, from Washington, that the CIA was not involved in the Prague Spring developments. But my unbiased report simply didn't tally with the KGB's concept of the development of events in Czechoslovakia and therefore never got beyond the KGB, and my information was wasted.”

[Gevorkyan] What about the information about home events?

[Kalugin] “This matter isn't simple either. In 1983, when I was deputy chief of Leningrad's KGB, there was a small strike at one of the city's factories, an extraordinary event, according to the then standards, liable for immediate report to the committee HQ in Moscow. I prepared the telegram. Then there was an unexpected telephone call from Leningrad Regional CPSU Committee First Secretary Romanov: “What was that that you reported to the HQ?” I read out the telegram. Romanov: ‘Withdraw the telegram from the cipherer right away. Write down the new text which I'm going to dictate now.’ I obeyed, though Romanov's text only slightly corresponded to reality. Incidentally, secretaries of regional CPSU committees in the country and Soviet ambassadors abroad usually try to make their information fall in line with the information sent through KGB channels, in order to avoid the centre worrying about the cause of the failure to find a common language.”

[Gevorkyan] I have a feeling that the existing system can in no way guarantee the veracity of the reports.

[Kalugin] “You are right: the very system invites lies. Therefore I insist that the information service should be made compact and absolutely free from any political pressure and strife. This system must be concerned with reporting facts no matter whether they are to the liking of the top authorities or not. After all, the decisions of state importance depend on this.

“Today, certain things which happened in the past seem funny. My sexagenarian Leningrad chief deleted, from my report about the public reaction to the 26th CPSU Congress, the passage mentioning people's concern about the advanced age of the country's leaders.”

[Gevorkyan] What was your impression when you got concerned with the country's internal affairs, after 20 years of external service?

[Kalugin] “My former experience was quite handy. I could understand a lot of things perfectly. For example, the KGB is not authorized to keep compromising materials about officials of sufficiently high level. For local KGB organizations, it is the level of the regional CPSU committee. For example, as soon as Zaykov became first secretary of the Leningrad Regional CPSU Committee, the city's KGB chief had all the materials concerning Zaykov immediately withdrawn from the files, so that Zaykov's name wouldn't even be mentioned there.

"I was perfectly aware that in the USA tapping of a person's telephone could be done only on the authority of the procurator or court. Otherwise, it is a punishable offence. But in this country, the matter is as easy as it can be. Being first deputy of the chief of the KGB in Leningrad I could tap anyone's telephone, barring telephones of officials at a certain level. But that doesn't mean that we cannot eavesdrop on the regional CPSU committee officials. It is up to the top party officials to authorize the eavesdropping in this case."

[Gevorkyan] I often think about the reason for the idolization of Andropov, who played his own sinister role in the war against dissent.

[Kalugin] "Andropov was a controversial figure. Indeed, with his arrival at the KGB the struggle against political dissent was stepped up and kept increasing. The system of political detection escalated under Andropov's chairmanship of the KGB. Andropov was an experienced party functionary. He knew how to manoeuvre between the needs of society and the whims of Brezhnev and Suslov. I remember a conference in August 1979 attended by heads of the KGB and military intelligence. The subject of discussion was events in Iran and Afghanistan. I remember that when possible Soviet military intervention with the aim of helping Afghanistan was being discussed, the then head of the Soviet intelligence Kryuchkov said: "Andropov's is against our military involvement." But the chief of the military intelligence Ivashutin insisted on intervention. We know that later Andropov became party to the final decision to intervene. He couldn't say no to Brezhnev and his friend Ustinov. At the same time Andropov was against political assassinations. He always insisted on other means."

[Gevorkyan] Our opinion about the work of the intelligence agency is romantic, due to books and films. But it's difficult to imagine that the Brezhnev epoch could pass without influencing this sphere of KGB activity.

[Kalugin] "The epoch had a pernicious effect for the intelligence agency. Here, just as everywhere else, professionals were being ousted by the apparat functionaries and favouritism thrived, as well as the practice of protectionism. We are reaping this harvest even today. For the last 10-11 years the number of betrayals in the form of detections or recruitment for foreign intelligence at home was twice as much as during the entire period of Soviet intelligence from 1920. At the same time, cases of betrayals in the CIA (for example cases of CIA agents double-crossing for the Soviet Union) can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Why? I think this is the result of disillusionment and a reflection of the process of revaluation of values. Besides, we have a lot of weak human material who got their posts in the intelligence due to protectionism and nepotism. Here's a story which was largely responsible for my expulsion from Leningrad.

"We decided to send a young graduate of our school to a quiet Nordic country, for the start. The boy was a

protegee of Tsinev, who had the reputation of Brezhnev's watch-dog in the KGB. Tsinev, the then first deputy chairman of the KGB, phoned me and said: the boy wants to be posted to a major European capital. It was in the late '70s, and the situation in the country was complicated. Over a hundred Soviet officials had been recently expelled. I agreed to Tsinev's proposal but played a trick: I offered to send the boy on an independent mission, to head an export office, with the office's finances at his disposal and on his responsibility. I thought that if the boy had wits he would pull through, otherwise, he would quickly fail. The latter proved to be the case. He spent about a year there. He literally plundered the office: even the door handles of an old mansion were removed. Everything was dispatched to Moscow with his luggage. His reports were a pack of lies. In a year we had to recall him, despite the high protection."

[Gevorkyan] Is this dishonesty in private life common?

[Kalugin] "Unfortunately, it is not a rare occurrence. I know about intelligence officers misappropriating funds, since a certain percentage of finances is not accounted for."

[Gevorkyan] You were inside this system for 30 years, and now you suggest that it should be destroyed. Why?

[Kalugin] "You know, McLean, an important KGB agent and former department head of the British F.O., said once during a meeting with Kryuchkov, the then head of the KGB intelligence: 'The people who daily read Pravda are invincible.' You must agree that his words contain bitter irony. When people are compelled to look only one way, when they are deprived of information and the possibility to compare things, they stop thinking. Well-informed people, ones who have access to versatile information, inevitably begin to think. That's one reason. Here's another: I was hurt by the murder of the 'Prague Spring.' I came to Dobrynin and said: 'Tomorrow a landing party will be sent to Prague.' We both were shaken by the decision and didn't try to conceal our reaction... only behind closed doors. At that time I concluded for myself that any attempts to change anything were unrealistic. Perestroika has given me hope. Incidentally, that was when I was offered retirement."

Vorkuta, West Ukraine Miners Plan 11 Jul Strike

*LD2806135190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1245 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Alarming reports are arriving from our mining regions. Vorkuta and west Ukrainian miners are intent on holding a political strike on 11 July. Their demand is the resignation of the government. Thus Boris Yeltsin's request that the strikes be postponed for 500 days will be rejected, by all accounts.

Dashichev Discusses Crisis of Perestroika

AU2506152390 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German
23-24 Jun 90 p 10

[Interview with Vyacheslav Dashichev, "head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and foreign policy adviser of the Moscow leadership," by Cathrin Kahlweit; place and date not given: "The USSR Is Not Threatened by a Revolution But by a Putsch"]

[Text] [Kahlweit] What chances of survival does the USSR have in its current form?

[Dashichev] Its chances of survival depend on the extent to which it is possible to establish a new contractual basis for the coexistence of all republics. This contractual basis must contain the right of all peoples of the Soviet Union to sovereignty and to free economic and cultural development. Only if a voluntary union is formed, it will survive like the Commonwealth does—but more closely linked, because all republics are located on the same territory. The geographical facts are of great importance. Second, the Union will survive if it is possible to introduce the free market economy everywhere in the USSR. Only this can unite the peoples and keep them together.

[Kahlweit] Is the Union treaty, which Gorbachev has proposed, a realistic proposal for a solution—and what should it be like, in your view?

[Dashichev] The details of this treaty can be changed in line with the wishes of individual republics. Unfortunately, this proposal was made very late; it should have been presented three years ago. Now compromises have to be found—also for the Baltic states. The declaration of sovereignty of the Russian Republic [RSFSR] certainly also contributed to solving the problem of sovereignty also for other republics. Therefore, I consider the decision of the RSFSR a trail-blazer for similar processes elsewhere. Many republics are interested in continuing to cooperate with the Russian Federation. We are linked not only by economic but also by cultural relations; in the past they were based on administrative methods, now they have to adopt a market economy character. This will solve many problems.

[Kahlweit] What is this sovereignty to look like? Is independent foreign policy and an independent legislation of the republics to be possible?

[Dashichev] Sovereignty will include foreign policy. The RSFSR declaration envisages this, too—with the exception of defense and environmental protection; these issues can be voluntarily transferred to the community.

[Kahlweit] How do you estimate the chances that this Union treaty could be implemented?

[Dashichev] If the center acts in a flexible and tolerant way and does not tackle problems with blockades and dictates, then this treaty can be implemented.

[Kahlweit] Did Gorbachev foresee the crumbling of the Union, when he proclaimed the peoples' right to self-determination, did he accept it or did he even include it in his plans?

[Dashichev] Of course, like many others, too, he did not foresee it. The differences between the republics were not predictable, either. Now he has to solve the problems which are caused by them.

[Kahlweit] In a somewhat polemical way one could say he is reacting more to what is happening instead of having a plan, a strategy, or tactics?

[Dashichev] Of course, he has to react, and that he has to do quickly. He himself said: Those who come too late will be punished by life. For instance, with much delay he has started tackling the economic reform, the introduction of the market economy. This has to be paid for, because he is losing the people's support for perestroika. And this is dangerous.

[Kahlweit] After all, policy does not only mean reacting prudently, but it also means planning prudently. What about political planning?

[Dashichev] The goals of perestroika are very good: establishment of a state based on the rule of law, introduction of the market economy, democratization of society, and the multiparty system. But there will be a long political struggle before we arrive at a multiparty system. These difficulties, in particular old ideas that the state has to be guided and administered in a unified way, must be overcome. If we achieve a multiparty system, the idea of perestroika will win.

[Kahlweit] Once again back to the state of the Union: Has there been any winner in the conflict involving the Baltic states so far, can there be any winner at all?

[Dashichev] There must not be either winner or loser; one has to come to an understanding. In the end, the Baltic republics will be granted full sovereignty. But not as the effect of the blockade and the refusal to negotiate; these methods do not contribute to solving the problem. Both the Baltic states and the center must come to a compromise. I do not see anything evil in the independence of the Baltic republics. There will still remain links, because the Baltic states need the federation as we need the Baltic states. The borders will probably remain open, economic cooperation will continue.

[Kahlweit] Gorbachev has reacted very rigidly. Would you advise the Baltic republics to be patient in view of Gorbachev's promise to draw up a Union treaty? Or should they try to continue acting urgently?

[Dashichev] This speed, which has been forced by the Lithuanians, is not very sensible. The process of seceding from the union is linked with so many problems; they

cannot be solved from today to tomorrow. But in the meantime, they have expressed readiness for compromise.

[Kahlweit] One could, of course, say that it was precisely the pressure that lead to accelerating the discussion about laws for secession and about the union treaty. After all, the republics cannot rely on Gorbachev letting them go voluntarily—and the union treaty has been offered not least as a result of the RSFSR declaration of sovereignty.

[Dashichev] I get the impression that the Lithuanians are hurrying so much because they do not believe in the success of perestroika; because they are not confident that Gorbachev will remain in power. They are afraid that the conservatives will assume power, that they will proceed from the standpoint of Greater Russian chauvinism, and that they will stop the process of liberation. This is one of the reasons that they are hurrying so much—and that also the Hungarians, the Czechoslovaks, and the Germans are hurrying so much. They all are afraid of the return of the conservatives to power, afraid that the former policy of the use of force will be repeated, that these neo-Stalinist trends in foreign policy will gain the upper hand again. But I do not believe this.

[Kahlweit] You certainly are optimistic! Many observers fear that the mood among the population is so bad that there might be an uprising, even a revolution; or that a putsch by the conservatives with the support of the military is imminent. Do you consider this so unlikely?

[Dashichev] Uprisings would occur only if the people were not to get anything to eat anymore, if the supply situation were really tragic. This is the result of omissions in reforming agriculture. However, the situation in the area of supplies will not become so tragic. I rather fear the results of the political struggle at the top. The polarization of the forces has assumed a wide scope; not only at the top of the leadership but also at the grassroots level. If such conflicts occur, there can, of course, be negative phenomena. I do not rule out these processes.

[Kahlweit] You are speaking in very cryptic terms. Does this mean that you see the danger of assumption of power by the conservatives?

[Dashichev] Yes. This cannot be ruled out. The CPSU will probably split apart, because I do not see any possibilities of cooperation between the radicals and the conservatives; there have already been open accusations by the conservatives leveled at Gorbachev....

[Kahlweit] Over the past few days at the RSFSR party congress.

[Dashichev] Yes. The representatives of the democratic platform have almost 40 percent of the votes of the grassroots, but at the current party congress and the congress at the beginning of July they are very weak. If the conservative line gains ground at the party congress, then a split is inevitable. In the end, this is not a tragedy.

We are developing toward a multiparty system anyway; thus one has to accept this tolerantly, one must not take up arms, but one has to advocate this development out of the awareness that the competition of the parties for power is necessary. Now we can give up the old slogan "Unity of the party." This slogan has already been overtaken by events, and the monopoly of the party has become an obstacle to implementing perestroika. We do not need unity with the opponents of perestroika, unity with conservatives of the type of Ligachev and the generals and marshals.

[Kahlweit] There are two opponents who are struggling against each other not only in the party but also by mobilizing the population—namely Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Would you still consider both as the advocates of the same concern?

[Dashichev] They are not opponents, because Yeltsin pursues the goals of perestroika, only in a more radical way than Gorbachev. I have always considered Ligachev as the true opponent and I have asked myself why Gorbachev removed Yeltsin from the Politburo while he should have removed Ligachev.

[Kahlweit] Why did he do this?

[Dashichev] I cannot explain this. However, for me it was clear from the very beginning that the representatives of the apparatus constitute a danger to perestroika and that Gorbachev should have relied on the democratic, radical platform—but he did not do this. Actually, he has no base among the masses. The center has not formed. There is a polarization between the conservatives and the radicals.

[Kahlweit] Did he misjudge the mood, the development?

[Dashichev] This is his secret. The same goes for the question why the agricultural reform has been delayed so much, why the peasants, kolkhozes and cooperatives have not been granted freedom, why even the compulsory deliveries have not been abolished. Even during the New Economic Policy under Lenin compulsory deliveries were abolished, but Gorbachev has not done anything. This is one of the biggest mistakes.

[Kahlweit] Perhaps he did not have enough power for this?

[Dashichev] I do not think so; it has been within his powers. Perhaps he was not convinced that it is necessary. He himself was once responsible for agriculture in the Politburo. Perhaps he hesitated because of old convictions and stereotypes. But this has led to this difficult supply situation, has caused discontent among the population, and has greatly weakened Gorbachev's position.

[Kahlweit] A delegate at the RSFSR party congress has accused Gorbachev of accumulation of offices, abuse of power, and cultivation of a personality cult.

[Dashichev] By nature, Gorbachev is not a dictator or a follower of a personality cult. But nevertheless: It is good that over the past months and years new politicians have entered the political stage. In the past all initiatives always emanated from the respective political leaders, but now we have a variety of minds. Thus the people can learn to judge who proposes a better path and who proposes a worse one.

[Kahlweit] However, this political pluralism also leads to the increase of radical movements. In particular anti-Semitic and ultrarightist groups have many followers. How do you explain this popularity? [Dashichev] In a democratic society such phenomena are a common thing. But anti-Semitism and even fascism in the circles of Pamyat should not be overestimated. At the latest elections to the Supreme Soviet these groups received only six to eight percent of the votes; they did not even enter parliament. They have no prospects, they are just making a noise. And they are causing concern among the Jewish population. But these people are the scum of society and are of no importance.

[Kahlweit] They have contributed to having the process of coming to terms with the past in the Soviet Union start, for instance, by making Stalin's tyranny a topic. Do you think that this has led to uncertainty among the population, that now they say: Do not make our past so bad! Have perestroika and glasnost led to minority complexes and to an attitude of rejection of new things?

[Dashichev] There is evidence of the mood among the population as regards the coming to terms with the past: In the past one could see pictures of Stalin in the cars; they have now disappeared. It is to the greatest credit of perestroika that Stalinism in our country is dead. It cannot be revived, either. The crimes of the past have been revealed. The people did not know how destructive this Stalinist system was for our development today. Nevertheless, I am surprised about the reactions to some facts: About 50 million people were killed during the purges and the collectivization. And there are still people who justify this and say: This was necessary for socialism. Over the past years the secrets of the Stalin-Hitler Pact, of the additional protocol, and of Katyn have been revealed; all this had been kept secret. And there are still many secrets, which have to be revealed. Everything which has been done so far to come to terms with the past guarantees the irreversibility of perestroika.

[Kahlweit] Thus, you think, that Gorbachev and perestroika have a chance of survival?

[Dashichev] Well, at least I do not see any other figure on the political horizon at the moment who would be able to enforce perestroika in the way Gorbachev does. He remains our hope; at least we intellectuals count on him, even though like the other people, we are impatient and dissatisfied with the slow speed of reforms in the introduction of the market economy. We are dissatisfied

with the indecision and with the half-hearted measures. More political will to enforce these goals is necessary.

Perestroika Information Center Established

LD2806122990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0900 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] An international association of experts and specialists in different fields of activity, whose aim is to support restructuring and to carry out appropriate international coordination, plans to circulate specific and accessible information about the process of perestroika in the USSR and changes in the international arena connected with it.

It was set up in Moscow today following an international symposium on restructuring and on the global problems of mankind. The association will be working in close cooperation with the Geneva-based worldwide information center for global problems. The association will publish a monthly bulletin of news in a number of languages.

New Consortium of Newspaper Publishers Viewed

LD2806194990 Moscow World Service in English
1500 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] The Soviet Government has decided to set up a consortium of newspaper publishers, the Business World sponsored by some official organizations, large industrial associations, and commercial banks. The aim is to publish a daily entitled THE BUSINESS WORLD, an independent paper with a number of side publications to encourage public opinion in the country in favor of a regulated market economy. The initial circulation is expected to be 5000—copies to grow subsequently to 1,500,000.

Economic

Ryzhkov Chairs Talks on Market Economy Transition

LD2806173390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1645 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, 28 Jun (TASS)—The USSR Council of Ministers Presidium met on 26 and 28 June, along with heads and representatives of the union republican governments and central economic departments. Practical issues concerning switching to regulated market relations were examined. Those who spoke were unanimously in favor of shaping a market economy. Both the polemics and the constructive proposals centered primarily around ways of creating a single all-Union market and organizing optimal relationships between vertical and horizontal links in the country's national economy.

There was a particularly thorough discussion of issues which are causing the greatest concern, both in the center

and in the republics—a material equilibrium of production, foreign economic relations, agricultural production, and social protection for the population in a period of movement toward a market economy.

The debate demonstrated the growing role played by the union republics in tackling economic and social tasks. It was recognized that a developed and effective all-Union market can only be created through the joint efforts of all the republics.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium meetings were chaired by N.I. Ryzhkov.

Abalkin Deplores Supreme Soviet Action

904A0443A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 19 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Academician L. Abalkin: "A Market Is Governed by Laws Rather Than Emotions"]

[Text] How can we assess the current situation in our country in just a few words? Perhaps it will not be a mistake to say that our society is tired, tired of words, of unfulfilled promises, and unrealized hopes. Dissatisfaction and irritation mount. Our society needs "an enemy image" and a redeeming sacrifice in order to calm down.

It is not very difficult at all to predict the turn of events if public accord and civil peace are not attained in our society. However, how is this accord to be ensured? It would be nice to improve the economic situation in our country rapidly and painlessly, and fill the shelves of our stores with merchandise. One wants to believe in a miracle, in the availability of magic techniques which make it possible to go to bed sick and wake up healthy in the morning.

However, believing the myths means being cheated again. The honesty of evaluations and programs and the whole truth should be the basis of accord and public action. Among other things, the truth is that there is no easy way to overcome the economic and sociopolitical crisis. Difficult and at times fatiguing work is in store for us; it will call for revising economic structures profoundly, changing the stereotypes which exist, overcoming the attitudes of leveling and dependency, renewing motivation for labor involvement, and developing entrepreneurship.

A Choice Has Been Made

Switching to a market is the only way to not just break out of the perilous grip of the crisis but to also bring our society to invigoration and subsequent prosperity. We may argue about our tactics, deadlines, and the sequence of implementing these measures. However, there is indeed no alternative to the market from the point of view of strategy. Both the experience of the world and scientific conclusions show this.

Of course, at issue is a modern, if you will, civilized market which also includes powerful social regulators and protective social mechanisms which are no less reliable.

As is known, opinions are heard to the effect that it is possible to do without the market and make sure that things are fine in some other manner. However, these are opinions from the past. They do not want to heed either the bitter lessons of our history or the trends of the world. The prescriptions of "antimarketters" are based on dogmas refuted by experience. As they say, we have been down that road before.

The recent discussion of the government concept of a transition to a regulated market economy caused a storm of emotions. Criticism came from both the left and the right. It was rebuked for both the gradual nature of the plans proposed and procrastination. As is usually the case, exaggeration and disinformation were involved.

However, the resulting conclusion at which the Supreme Soviet arrived was unambiguous: Our transition to market relations is to be considered the main content of a radical economic reform. Strictly speaking, the choice made in its time by the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the country was ratified once again. The parliament of Russia, in essence, approved the government concept of the transition to the market by electing a new head of government, I.S. Silayev, on the basis of voting for alternative programs.

To be sure, this concept which incorporates the tremendous potential of ideas and proposals is far from being perfect. It needs to be added to and developed. It is quite normal and natural. However, the main point is that its discussion and adoption amount to a very important milestone.

At present, the specific, constructive development of practical steps is on the agenda. Many such steps will have to be taken. Organizational and legal foundations for the operation of markets should be created within an extremely short period of time. Legislative acts should be adopted on the creation of joint-stock companies, operation of small enterprises, circulation of securities, restructuring of banking, and antimonopoly regulations. It is no less important to adopt and enact ahead of time legislation on employment and on the social protection of the populace, especially its low-income strata.

We will have to create an extensive market infrastructure, such as commodity exchanges, information and commerce centers, various banking establishments, and put in order the circulation of currency and securities. We should keep in mind the need to train economic cadres for operating in a new environment, as well as for extensive explanatory work among the populace. After all, soon we will have to live and work in an environment completely different from the one we are used to.

One who has read these lines may get the impression that everything is progressing normally: A choice has been

made, and practical steps are known. However, it is not all that simple. Many things give rise to not only concern but also alarm. Our society—in this instance, I am addressing the readers of *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*—should know the whole truth.

On a Short Leash

I will begin by giving an example in order to explain one of the reasons for concern. Let us imagine that they "assigned" a new director (regardless of whether by means of an appointment or election) to a plant which is falling behind and hitting a deep slump. His task is to take the enterprise out of this calamitous situation.

The history of our industry, as well as that of other sectors, contains many vivid pages describing solutions to such, as they sometimes call them, standard problems. However, what will the result of the efforts of this director be if he is deprived of the right to make decisions on his own, is forced to coordinate his every step with those who have appointed or elected him, if every two or three months he has to report on the work done and on his accomplishments on the road he has chosen for bringing the enterprise out of the slump, and if, on top of a traditional scolding, he is admonished after every such report: "If you do not cope with it within the next few months we will fire you?"

One does not have to be a rocket scientist in order to anticipate the sorry consequences of such actions. A manager cannot be kept on a short leash while he is expected to succeed. It is obvious that such expectations would be nonsensical. The model of behavior is also obvious: to listen to a contender for the post of a leader, review and adopt his program (or the program of another contender), and give him a free hand in implementing it, with him reporting later, in a year or two.

This is what the usual logic of behavior is, what common sense is. However, does it always determine our behavior? Only the simpletons believe that there is no one superior to the government. Actually, it has many "bosses"—they include the Supreme Soviet and the Politburo which was recently replaced with the Presidential Council. All of them may give instructions, demand reports, interfere with the sovereign—under the law!—rights of executive power, and issue repeated warnings: "We'll fire you!" or, in modern parlance "get you retired."

A serious radical reform cannot be implemented in this manner. All we can do is waste time. We should delineate strictly and consistently the functions of legislative and executive power, and create all the necessary conditions for the government, be it old or new, to perform its executive and administrative functions, and finally give it the freedom of action within the framework of the constitution and the laws in effect.

This is a minimum of what is required now.

Authors and Co-Authors

A search for the authors of individual concepts, proposals, and programs is characteristic of a society which is critically interpreting its past and present. The exclamation "Give us the author!" does not mean an invitation to a curtain call from a grateful audience but rather a search for the defendant in a court of public opinion.

Any attempt to avoid acknowledging one's authorship is immoral provided the norms of copyright apply, and not a single comma may be changed without the author's permission.

Let us imagine for a moment an artist who draws the sketch of a portrait and invites his colleagues to discuss it. They begin to give advice, and subsequently, getting impatient, take their brushes and begin to paint themselves based on their personal concepts and their affiliation with particular artistic schools. Will the so-called consensus be achieved as a result, or will an expressionless botched work deprived of a unified concept be produced? When the picture is exhibited, whose signature should appear on it?

The loss of artistic significance is not the point. The main point is that the integrity of conception is lost. This is particularly dangerous in cases which involve the most complex mutual connections of socioeconomic life where everything is interconnected and intertwined.

The recently adopted Law on the Taxation of Enterprises which still has not been enacted may be used to point out the consequences which this collective co-authorship entails. It was submitted, as they say now, as part of a package, and had many functions: to provide incentives for scientific-technical progress and social investments, to create sources of financing for all-state programs, and to contain inflation.

In the process of collective authorship, its initial concept was watered down substantially. Who is going to be responsible if the law "does not work?"

What is specifically at issue? In the course of the discussion, the scope of payments classified as the cost of production or, in simple terms, self-cost of products was broadened. This gives an impetus to the growth of prices. At the same time, the stopper tax provided for in the law and envisaging the confiscation of windfall profits was deleted from the final text of the law. This is one more inflationary factor. Restrictions will have to be placed on the freedom of price setting with a view to preventing inflation from spiraling upward. This would not be necessary given the stricter tax regulation of windfall profits.

As for the rates of taxation, the issue of reducing them was resolved by the Supreme Soviet within 10 minutes by means of pushing buttons in the voting hall, without any calculations and substantiation. Apparently it is considered legitimate to demand them from the government only. In keeping with this logic, the authors of

parliamentary proposals should not bother to prove their points. Could it be that this is considered the apex of democracy? As it were, the opportunity to finance the most significant national-economic programs was called into question.

At present, it is fashionable to argue that supposedly you cannot kill the goose laying golden eggs. This sounds nice, but what if this voracious goose itself is going to devour the eggs it lays leaving nothing for the owners?

The need is imminent to radically change the entire mechanism and procedure of adopting laws; they should be considered and adopted together rather than in a piecemeal manner, with their unity, mutually complementary character, and integrity of concept strictly protected, all the more so because even now many of the laws adopted contradict each other, and frequently run counter to the strategy of our transition to a market economy.

Social consensus is what the reform needs the most at present. It is doomed to failure otherwise, and our society is doomed to experience new difficulties and hardship without recovery prospects. Will those whose voices are heard and whose words are believed have enough wisdom and good will?

I mean by this popular public figures and, primarily, economic scientists. Their words command respect. After all, they are spoken in the name of science. For example, when Yu.D. Chernichenko says that he does not know what a regulated market is, that there is no such thing, he may be forgiven for that. He is not a professional, not an economist, and he may not know that a free, unregulated market does not exist at present in a single country of the world.

However, it is hardly that innocuous when a scientist makes similar statements. In conjunction with this, I would like to address a recent article in IZVESTIYA by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences P.G. Bunich in which he dispenses with the government program trenchantly but without sufficient substantiation.

In this article, he contrasts state property with leasing. However, it is known that leasing not involving a buyout does not change the nature of ownership (and such leasing is what most managers of leasing collectives are leaning toward at present). Pavel Grigoryevich either does not know it or deliberately misleads the readers. I would not venture an opinion on what is better.

Besides, he does not say a word about the program of joint-stock conversion of state enterprises which indeed changes the relations of ownership, and which is found in the state concept. Incidentally, it is exactly joint-stock companies rather than leased enterprises that dominate in the West which many reformers frequently refer to. Could it be that this fact does not fit "the point of view" of the propagandists of leasing? However, in this case they should say so plainly and honestly.

At present, powerful forces are at work in our society which are interested in destabilizing the situation. As far as they are concerned, an improvement in the state of affairs spells the ruin of their political ambitions. They may carry out their intentions only in the environment of chaos and declining confidence in the government. However, nobody should be allowed to play with the fate of millions of people.

The success of a radical economic reform is inconceivable in the absence of consolidation, in the absence of pooling the efforts of those to whom the interests of the people are dear and those who subscribe to the ideals of renewal and democracy. We should give up ambitions before it is too late, and look for and find the best solutions together. We should put our shoulders to the wheel in order to pull the country out of the protracted crisis.

'Vremya' Summarizes Current Economic Developments

PM2806154790 Moscow Television Service in Russian
0830 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] I would now like to draw your attention to our "Reporters' Teletype" feature, a roundup of brief positive information—something that is also in short supply these days—which may help some people to resolve their problems.

Construction of a refrigerator plant, a Soviet-Italian joint venture, has started in Lipetsk. Taking part on the Soviet side is the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine, and on the Italian side the Merloni and SYSCO companies. The main installation work is to be carried out by construction workers from Yugoslavia. Under the contract the plant is to produce its first output in 1992.

In Kirovograd it has been decided to eliminate the waiting list for the installation of domestic telephones. On the initiative of people's deputies, the assistance of major industrial enterprises has been enlisted. Work is proceeding ahead of schedule. Installation of equipment is drawing to a close at this exchange. Four such exchanges have been built to date.

At the Shevchenko plastics plant a substitute for polystyrene, one of the main raw materials in the production of disposable syringes, has been developed. This substitute has received the stamp of approval of the U.S. (A.L.) company, which produces pharmaceutical equipment. With the assistance of this company a plant for the annual production of 50 million disposable syringes will be built.

At the "Ural" association's Orenburg footwear factory production has started on modern machinery supplied mainly by Italian firms and using their production techniques. The Italian production line for the manufacture of luxury fashion footwear is designed for the production of 250,000 pairs of shoes per year.

Production of new models of color television sets is being started up at the Kishinev "Agfa" plant. The sets are suitable for use in conjunction with video recorders. It is planned to produce 70,000 of these new sets this year.

Advance Toward Joint Stock Bodies Viewed

PM2806131390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by I. Zhagel: "Important Action by the USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The USSR Government has ratified the statute on joint stock corporations and securities.

The transformation of state enterprises into joint-stock ones is one of the most realistic and promising ways of privatizing ownership. In any event, it will cause the least upheaval in a society still infected with the resilient virus of wage leveling.

However, despite the fact that shares in labor collectives worth R600 million and shares in enterprises worth R400 million have now been issued in the country, talk of progress is premature. The shares that have been issued are essentially not shares. Primarily because they do not enable the shareholders to manage their enterprises. And the dividends paid on them, as a rule, are not dependent on the results of work but are fixed. In fact they are not shares but bonds.

Nevertheless, more and more collectives are trying to switch to a joint-stock basis because they see no other possibility of achieving real autonomy. But these will remain nothing more than attempts until the USSR Supreme Soviet adopts a law on joint-stock corporations to regulate mutual relations between such enterprises and state and local organs and the procedure for issuing and placing [rasprostraneniye] shares.

The aforementioned draft law is part of a single package of economic documents now being prepared by the government. And even though this package will soon be submitted to the scrutiny of the public and deputies, it is not due to be adopted, let alone enacted, until next year.

Nevertheless, is it possible to accelerate the process of enterprises' destatization by turning them into joint-stock corporations? The government believes it is! In any event, it is now taking a series of extra steps.

G. Melikyan, deputy chief of a consolidated department [svodnyy otdel] of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Economic Reform, told me about two recently ratified government acts—the statute on joint-stock corporations and limited-liability corporations and the statute on securities. These documents have been enacted to facilitate the enterprises' switch to new economic organizational forms of work before the adoption of the laws.

On the whole the new documents are undoubtedly progressive in character. For example, they state that it is not just enterprises and organizations and members of the labor collective of a given joint-stock corporations who may be shareholders, other citizens may be shareholders, too. All this fully tallies with the existing Law on Ownership.

It is very important that the procedure for creating joint-stock corporations is registrational in character. In other words, no one has the right to prevent their formation so long as no laws are broken, of course.

The entire procedure for making the most important decisions in joint-stock corporations is explained in detail in the government statutes. They specify how the rights of shareholders are to be observed, how the supreme organ—the shareholders' meeting—elects the leaders of enterprises and a supervisory council, which directly oversees the administration's activity.

Types of securities, their characteristics, and the procedure for issuing and trading [dvizheniye] in them have also been defined. Incidentally, it is stated that private individuals will be able to obtain shares registered in their name only [imennyye aktsii], which to some extent will prevent dealers in the shadow economy from hoarding vast quantities.

There is a special section devoted to the transformation of state enterprises into joint-stock corporations. The basis for this will be a joint decision by the labor collective and the organ authorized to manage state property.

Of course, the question here is: What are the authorized organs in our country? Ministries, of course. But will they allow enterprises under their jurisdiction to become joint-stock corporations? After all, that is tantamount to a decision on self-liquidation.

Nevertheless, the main danger, in my view, lies elsewhere. Many ministries may accept the creation of joint-stock corporations. However, they will retain the controlling stake [kontrolnyy paket aktsiy] which will shackle labor collectives even more than before. After all, whereas the Law on the Enterprise grants them considerable freedom, if they become joint-stock corporations they will be forced to subordinate themselves unquestioningly to the main shareholder, who will determine the product range and will distribute not only plan output but also above-plan output. It will select the administration and the supervisory council. By the way, G. Melikyan confirmed that some ministries themselves have put forward proposals to switch all their enterprises to a joint-stock basis with the "sector headquarters" retaining the controlling stake.

Admittedly, when it comes to base sectors, the state must retain control of them, at least at the initial stage. And therefore, it is necessary to provide the kind of mechanisms which would keep the wielders of "absolute power" within certain bounds and force them to pursue

an effective technical, economic, and cadre policy. Perhaps, G. Melikyan said, the solution for us is to be found in the experience of France, which has the so-called rule of triple representation on the administrative council of those enterprises where the state is the majority shareholder. That is, one-third of the members represent the government, another third represent enterprise workers, and the final third are eminent scientists, economists, and public figures.

But in our conditions, I think, the ministries may retain their influence even without owning the controlling stake. Here is how. Private individuals are hardly going to be in a position to buy up a considerable proportion of the securities in the near future. The majority of them will be acquired by other enterprises, as a rule mixed enterprises related to the same ministries. Thus the apparatus will be able to pursue its policy if not directly then indirectly.

The placement of shares in this way poses the danger of the formation of monopolistic associations. In present conditions there will be nothing to prevent that. Anti-monopoly laws have not been adopted yet—they are being prepared in the package of economic normative acts.

Possibly, in the process of transforming state enterprises into joint-stock ones, it will be possible to avoid all the traps and pitfalls that I have mentioned. But that will only happen if someone seriously takes charge of this work and serves as an independent arbiter between ministries and enterprises.

Incidentally, in its resolution on the enactment of the Law on Property, the Supreme Soviet instructed the government to present proposals on the creation of an organ empowered to administer property under all-Union ownership. Perhaps it should also work on questions of the destatization of enterprises.

But for the time being, the Council of Ministers State Commission on the Economic Reform is taking care of several large enterprises: The Kama Truck Plant and the Gorkiy Truck Plant, for example, which want to become joint-stock corporations. But let us not fool ourselves: This creates the semblance of progress but does not yet ensure the large-scale transition to a joint-stock basis. Thus the question remains open.

New Hard Currency Trade System Deplored

PM2806103590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jun 90 p 1

[POSTFAKTUM report followed by S. Bobrovskiy commentary under the "Prediction" rubric: "Ruble, Forgive Us"]

[Text] Moscow, POSTFAKTUM—"A resolution 'On Improving Retail Trade For Foreign Currency on USSR Territory' has been drawn up in the USSR Council of

Ministers. Under the new USSR Government resolution, prepared in the light of observations and proposals from the Union republic councils of ministers, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the KGB, and the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the Union republic councils of ministers receive the right to independently carry out foreign currency trade.

"The resolution envisages the creation on the basis of the all-Union 'Vneshposyltorg' association of a 'Torgovyy Dom' [Trading House] foreign economic all-Union economically accountable association which will incorporate analogous republic associations.

"Goods will be sold to Soviet and foreign citizens for freely convertible currency in the 'Torgovyy Dom' system in both cash and cashless transactions.

"The USSR Government resolution instructs the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity to accept freely convertible currency for hard currency current accounts from Soviet and foreign citizens, and also people without citizenship residing in the USSR, without restriction and without declaration of sources.

"According to the drafters of the resolution, the new rules for hard currency trade will make it possible to eliminate the existing 'black' currency market...." [POSTFAKTUM report ends]

The POSTFAKTUM News Agency has acquired the reputation of supplier of sensational reports. How nice it would be to believe that at least this time the sensation will turn out to be false. However, the government policy of "unpopular measures" has already taught us to believe even the most alarming rumors.

The closure of "Berezkas" [foreign currency stores] in its time aroused the disapproval of both economists and customers with hard currency. But does this mean that the opening of new centers for trade with foreigners will be greeted with cheers? Can you jump into the same river twice?

According to economists' estimates, there are up to 1 billion "black" dollars circulating in the country today. By legalizing them and "laundering" them to reveal their original green shine, the Council of Ministers is evidently hoping to cover its hard currency needs at least partially. But to get hold of dollars (pounds, yen, dinars) from the population, you have to offer in exchange imported goods which there is... insufficient hard currency to buy.

The benefit of the planned operation is highly dubious. What are the drawbacks?

According to the POSTFAKTUM correspondent, the drafters of the resolution are hoping to eliminate the "black" currency market. This only means that we have even more naive officials than good resolutions. After all, the new rules make no mention of the most important point: the buying and selling of hard currency. How will the "market" react? Quite simply—by raising the

price of the dollars. And by a fall in the ruble. Today, when a "greenback" is equal to 20 of "our" banknotes, the volume of hard currency (in ruble equivalent) totals up to 20 percent of all the cash in circulation. A rise in the dollar exchange rate will be tantamount to significant growth in this money supply while the amount of goods remains the same. And there will be another round of inflation, shortages, and flight from money.

According to the POSTFAKTUM report, "Torgovyy Dom" will sell not just imported goods, but also domestic "scarce goods." At first these will probably be color televisions, but later?...

During the years of the New Economic Policy, the gold chervonets quickly squeezed puny paper money out of circulation. This was a victory. Today the half-dead ruble is being increasingly actively squeezed by the dollar. Certain joint ventures are now giving their workers hard currency incentives to keep up their enthusiasm for work. Now you need hard currency to buy not just a computer, but dinner in a cooperative restaurant or a house in the nearby Moscow suburbs. Read advertisements: Every other advertisement indicates that the ruble is at death's door. Tomorrow we will be offered scarce goods in the crazy "Torgovyy Dom." And the day after tomorrow, if we have to pay for salt and matches in dollars, I would at least like to stand in the same waiting line as those who are responsible for the improvement of finances today.

Poor old ruble! Once again you have been knocked down.... What have you done to deserve it?

Development of Automated Control System Blocked
PM2806144790 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1400 GMT 26 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by Yevgeniy Orlov]

[Text] [Announcer] A few years ago Yevgeniy Orlov's report on what is described as the commissioning of an automated control system for the Volga-Don Ship Canal would have been greeted with fanfares and triumphant speeches. Now, having read this report, I thought: Why are we always late with everything?

[Orlov] This huge screen shows the whole length of the canal—more than 160 km—with its 13 locks. Special digital symbols designate the ships currently passing through the canal. Computers have placed canal traffic control on a scientific footing. It is now possible to foresee accidents and thus to enhance the safety of the canal and to reduce the time taken to pass through the canal by eliminating unjustified holdups of ships at the locks, thereby saving fuel and enhancing the traffic capacity of the canal. At the same time traffic control staff has been reduced.

According to experts' estimates, the introduction of this modern equipment will make it possible to earn an

additional R2.5 million annually. Naturally, the conclusion suggests itself: It might not be a bad thing if such a system were introduced also at all the other ship canals in the country. But....

[N.L. Kuptsova, chief of the Automated Control System Service, identified by caption] Although the system includes a number of original features which are quite unique both in the Soviet Union and in the world as a whole, I believe that this system has no future. This is because the Ministry of the River Fleet has so far failed to allocate funds for the development of this system and we are unable to extend these technological solutions to other canals in the European part of the USSR. Furthermore, the team of design and development workers has now, as a result of this attitude of the ministry, been placed in a position where some of the elements of the system are having to be dismantled. And in general, I must say, that the future of the system is very doubtful.

[Correspondent] While the ministry is maintaining its stance, the automated control system on the Volga-Don Canal is having to be introduced on the quiet, you might say. The money that has been spent on it has been taken from the capital repairs fund. Naturally, this cannot go on for long.

Meanwhile computers control ship traffic on all the world's largest canals, such as the Suez and Panama Canals, the St. Lawrence Seaway, and the Great Lakes of Canada and the United States. But that is what "they" in the West are doing, and as is known, "we do not take our cue" from what is done over there in the West. We are even prepared to curb our own enthusiastic innovators so that they do not poke up their heads too soon. Deputy Minister Vladimir Afanasyevich Fialkov is displaying particular zeal in this respect. It will be interesting to see how much longer this can go on.

[Newscaster] This is departmental diktat, the administrative-edict system in all its glory, so to speak. I am sure that there will be authoritative opinions and doubts about the expediency of introducing this system, and so on and so forth. Meanwhile, nothing much will change. Nonetheless we are hoping for action rather than a formal reply from Comrade Fialkov's ministry.

Vladivostok Freight Jam Causes Acute Shortages
LD2706133890 Moscow Television Service in Russian
0830 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Now, unfortunately, we have a disturbing report in our program. There is an acute shortage of petrol and diesel fuel in the country at harvest time. The Ministry of the Chemicals and Petroleum Industry report, nevertheless, that the plan for fuel production is being overfulfilled; but at the USSR Gosnab [State Committee For Material and Technical Supply] they explain that the plan is being overfulfilled, but it has been reduced. At Gosnab, they suggest looking for the solution at gas

[gazovyy] filling stations. There is no less disturbing news from the Far East Railroad; and our office has been receiving reportages similar to the one you are about to see continually of late. [video report, showing rail freight yard full of loaded wagons] This is just a small area at Kazanskiy Most in Vladivostok, but there are areas like this, chock full of trains, at every marshalling yard and freight station in Maritime Kray alone. The picture is similar in the ports of the Far East, the cargo ports and fishing ports, with things piled up in the docks. Sailors of the transport fleet are sounding the alarm. The railwaymen are trying to regulate the uncontrolled stream of freight, but, as they say: The wagon is there to this day.

[Begin video interview with V.T.Tarabarov, head of Vladivostok section of Far East Railroad] [Correspondent] what goods and how many wagons have built up on the Far East lines?

[Tarabarov] Thousands of wagons have built up from Vladivostok and Nakhodka almost to the Urals, carrying goods, mostly for export, and transit freight. This is of various kinds—metal, steel, iron, coal, meat and other national economic goods, and it has built up in the ports of Far East waiting to be handled.

[Correspondent] But why has it built up here?

[Tarabarov] There are several reasons, but two main ones. First of all, with enterprises entering the foreign market, they now can do this, but they have not learnt how to trade, and as a result, the goods have arrived and remained. The warehousing areas at ports are jammed. I repeat, the line of wagons awaiting unloading goes from the city to the Urals.

[Correspondent] But who is specifically to blame for this?

[Tarabarov] First of all it is goods for the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and its subdivisions, and also those for independent organizations, such as (Smetka) such as Inter-Ural, and others. We have appealed together with the Far East shipping line to the USSR Council of Ministers, to the USSR Gosplan, to the USSR Gosstrib, to the Russian Government and the USSR Supreme Soviet asking them to resolve the matter of these goods. Either send them back, or market them on the spot, or have them continue on their way, but so far there is no decision. And while there is no decision, the Far East transport conveyor will choke if these matters are not settled. [end interview]

[Announcer] To give you full information, we received horrifying figures yesterday evening from the Ministry of Railways' head of the freight handling department. In the country as whole, 28,559 wagons remain unloaded. Of these, over 19,000 are in Russia. Around Moscow, on the Moscow railroad, there are more than 3,000 carrying grain, produce, and import and export goods which we look for in the shops in vain, and that is not all. Among those failing to carry out unloading are the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, the Ministry of Metallurgy, the

Ministry of Trade, the Gosagroprom [State Agro-Industrial Committee] and the Ministry of Grain Products. The railwaymen are looking for a magic wand in the shape of the powers of the local soviets, but so far without result there, either.

Tankers Leave Nakhodka for Far North

*LD2806220890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1530 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[Summary] A convoy of tankers has just left Nakhodka for the Far North. During the navigation season of the Arctic summer ships based at Nakhodka will have to supply the ports along the Arctic coastline, including Egvekinot, Pevek, and Mys Shmidt, with tens of thousands of tonnes of fuel and other commodities. Ships involved in carrying supplies to the Arctic include the lighter carriers Aleksey Kosygin and Sevmorput.

Agricultural

Farms Receive Radioactive Fertilizer From Syria

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[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by V. Chistyakov and Yu. Oplyants, identified by caption]

[Text] [Announcer] Now about something else. Life is full of hazards. There are all kind of signs to caution us against them. For instance: "Caution: High voltage!" or "Danger!" But nowhere will you find a sign reading: "Caution: Irresponsibility!" although we could well do with such a sign. This is illustrated by the following report about phosphate fertilizer delivered to our country from Syria.

[Correspondent] Fertilizer containing uranium-238 began to arrive in April. There is some 800 tonnes of it now. Approximately one-third was applied to the soil back in April and early May. It would have been much more had not the Kostroma Oblast branch of the State Committee for Environmental Protection intervened.

What is the radiation level here?

[D.K. Gareyev, specialist of the State Committee for Environmental Protection, identified by caption] It is slightly higher than normal background radiation, by some 30 microroentgens per hour. On the heap over there it was 70 microroentgens per hour.

[Correspondent] Tell me, what will happen if this fertilizer is ingested?

[Gareyev] Ingestion of uranium leads to internal irradiation, which is very dangerous.

[Correspondent] I have a document here signed by Prof. Ramzayev, director of the Leningrad Radiation Hygiene Scientific Research Institute. According to this document, if you are prepared to believe it, it is possible to

utilize the phosphate fertilizer from Syria provided that certain precautions are observed. You must avoid inhaling the dust.

Another interesting feature of the Leningrad Institute's reply is that it is not based on an analysis of the Kostroma phosphate fertilizer, but was supplied at the request of the Kaliningrad Oblast chief physician, who also expressed doubts, though much earlier, about the safety of imported fertilizer.

Yevgeniy Nikolayevich, tell me: How did this fertilizer get to your [Buyskiy] rayon?

[Ye.N. Shikhalev, chairman of the rayon "Agro-promkhiymiya" association, identified by caption] As usual, we were allocated the fertilizer by the oblast "Selkhozkhimiya" association.

[Correspondent] Should there be any accompanying documents?

[Shikhalev] All fertilizers should be accompanied by a certificate.

[Correspondent] Did you receive it?

[Shikhalev] No, we did not.

[Correspondent] The Buyskiy rayon "Agro-promkhiymiya" association did not receive the certificate for a very simple reason. There is no such certificate at the oblast association. Nor has such a document been received from the dispatch address—Isma'iliya.

[Announcer] It would be interesting to hear the opinion of the Rosselkhozkhimiya [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Science and Production Association for Agrochemical Services to Agriculture] on this account. Or do they eat only organically grown produce?

Stroyev Cited on Agro-Industrial Complex Reform
PM2906083190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Jun 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed interview with CPSU Central Committee Secretary Ye.S. Stroyev under the rubric "Speaking Before the 28th CPSU Congress"; place, date of interview not specified: "Not Diktat, but Dialogue"]

[Text] [PRAVDA] According to articles in PRAVDA and other publications, Yegor Semenovich, your opinion regarding the state of and the means of developing the agro-industrial complex is quite well known. But time is passing, new questions are cropping up. In letters to the editorial office and to you personally, readers ask for an answer.

[Stroyev] I have indeed just received a letter from P. Shishlov in Novosibirsk. In response to my interview with PRAVDA on 22 May this year, he says of himself that he is a firm supporter of the idea that "we live as we work." He tries to demonstrate this by the fact that our

fathers and grandfathers "worked conscientiously, faultlessly for next to nothing, seeing this as a matter of honor, dignity, and decency." But he acknowledges straightaway that people in the countryside were materially "eight or 10 times worse off than they are now."

Having lost the chance to dispose of their labor and its results and having become day laborers, the peasants began to shun social production and to work anyhow, while the more energetic and capable people went off to the city. If a human quality is given no encouragement it gradually dies. Hence the conclusion: "We work as we live." But that is incidental.

[PRAVDA] What, in your opinion, are the main reasons for the "faltering" in the work of the agro-industrial complex? The weak material-technical base, lack of a clear concept for its development, or something else?

[Stroyev] The whole trouble is that we have spent decades trying to resolve rural problems using just one factor: Be it the enlargement of kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms], the reorganization of machine-tractor stations, the corn campaign, specialization, "nonregulated work," "unpromising villages," and so on. People have calculated that our agriculture has already experienced approximately 30 attempts at reorganization on both a large and small scale.

None of these ideas can be said to have been unreasonable. Their untenability lay elsewhere. They were either not backed up with resources or, since one thing was superimposed on another, they disoriented production, preventing the job that was launched from being carried through. The main point is that they failed to consider the interests of people living on the land and conflicted with the actual style of rural life.

The peasant is by nature a person of great stability. He mistrusts any reorganization. Even though the ideologists behind the changes foist a kind of stereotyped thinking on us with regard to the rural worker. He is said to be hardened and modest in our country. The main point is to create a labor front for him. The rest—work, living, recreational, training, and medical conditions—comes later.

The investment process that bore little relation to people's needs and aspirations and engendered a sense of deadlock and futility was based on this philosophy.

The recent USSR Peasants Union Congress and its delegates' speeches showed the far-reaching effect of the process of destroying not only productive forces in the countryside but also the age-old style of peasant life and the abnormal nature of the economic relations that have developed with other economic sectors. It is no coincidence that, in his speech during his meeting with leaseholders, M.S. Gorbachev noted the need to equalize relations between town and country and strive to ensure that they are always maintained.

Throughout this time agriculture has indeed acted as an investment donor for the development of other sectors. Scientists' calculations based on the theory of labor costs shows that if you raise the amount of remuneration and profit reserved for kolkhozes and sovkhozes on a par with average economic indicators, an additional R19.5 billion must be built into procurement prices for agricultural produce. If this amount is raised to the level of industry, the increase should total R27.7 billion.

Given these distortions, any economy will begin to "falter," as confirmed in practical life. Let us recall the 1953 and 1965 reforms when relatively equal exchange was established between town and country in line with the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee September and March plenums. Substantial growth in agricultural production was recorded in the first few years, but the pace of development subsequently began to slow down.

The same happened to the Food Program. Right after the CPSU Central Committee May (1982) Plenum—when prices were raised for basic types of field and farm output, markups were introduced for unprofitable and loss-making livestock units, and the loan debts of kolkhozes and sovkhozes were written off or deferred—agricultural production gained a certain impetus for development. Production growth in 1982-1983 ranged between 5.4 and 6.2 percent. Meat production increased by almost 2 million tonnes, while milk production rose by 7 million tonnes and procurements of potatoes, fruit, and vegetables increased.

However, growth rates slowed down once again in subsequent years.

This is nothing to be amazed at. Over the last few years our industry has not only failed to increase but has actually cut back its deliveries of tractors, grain and feed harvesting combines, other equipment, and mineral fertilizers to the countryside. Allocations of capital investments for the production sphere have been cut, and the writeoff of fixed production assets has begun to outstrip the commissioning of such assets. In other words, the priorities that we tried to establish with the latest decisions on the development of the agrarian sector have been eroded.

The CPSU Central Committee March (1989) Plenum elaborated a fundamentally new concept for the development of the agro-industrial complex which incorporated a corresponding investment policy, the improvement of production relations based on a mixed economy and forms of economic activity, and the social revival of the countryside. These decisions were not, unfortunately, promptly supported either by state organs—as regards being backed up with resources—or by party and economic organs at local level. The gulf between words and actions that has already led on several occasions to political decisions being devalued can be observed once again.

[PRAVDA] There is a "great confrontation" of views of how the agro-industrial complex should be developed: Some people favor private farming [fermerstvo] alone, while others favor kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Is this good or bad for practical work?

[Stroyev] I do not share the opinion of color-blind people whose vision of the colorful picture of public life is restricted. It is not confrontation but real diversity, durable vertical and horizontal integration ties, scope for all forms of ownership, and servicing systems that will set us on the path of progress. This is particularly important in conditions of the transition to regulated market relations, when consumption value—rather than an abstract price originating in the depths of bureaucratic departments on the basis of the remainder principle—will be the authentic indicator of the utility of various labor.

I think that the transition to the market must begin not so much with price hikes, since this may capsize the whole market reform, as with the creation of a competitive mixed economy and the destruction of central departments' monopoly. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes can finally be given the same scope as cooperatives. Small-scale enterprises and lease, joint-stock, cooperative, family, and individual forms of ownership can then be stimulated and the entire banking system reformed with a view to stabilizing the money supply.

Let us recall that, when the country found itself in a highly complex position, V.I. Lenin was unable to demand that the chairman of the Gosbank [State Bank] Board print money, yet we can, just imagine! Hence money has become an abstract accounting unit instead of a universal equivalent. In this respect one can agree with the opinion of some economists who are proposing to withdraw the central emissions bank from operational subordination to the government.

I am firmly convinced that the transition to a market economy must begin with the agrarian sector of our economy, with the processing industry.

First, they account for 90 percent of food products and 70 percent of retail commodity turnover.

Second, elements of a mixed economy and diverse forms of economic activity began to develop here earlier than in other sectors. A parallel competitive system could be set up here within a short period with the state's and society's backing, capable of rapidly stepping up food production and responding to the needs of the market.

Third, Too much time, effort, and money is being spent on restructuring base sectors in industry, breaking monopolies, and conversion; new seats of social tension may develop. Achieving national accord, developing a targeted state program, and boosting agriculture, processing, and light industry altogether, thus providing the country with food, clothing, and footwear—this is the aim which can unite and consolidate our society today. If

the CPSU manages to achieve this kind of nationwide accord, it will enhance its prestige as the ruling party.

[PRAVDA] Do you have data regarding the attitude of the peasants themselves to diverse forms of ownership?

[Stroyev] Many sociological studies are being carried out now, but they cannot always be trusted. The whole point is who conducts them and with what aim, at what level is the poll carried out. In Orel Oblast, for example, where lease and family farms and autonomous peasant livestock units have struck deep roots, in response to a question about the form of ownership and economic management peasants prefer, 55-56 percent answered that they would like to work on the lease system while one-third would like to work on the family basis, within farming units dealing with all servicing questions. This figure is considerably lower in other regions.

I am often visited by people who want to work autonomously but do not receive backing at local level. For instance, I recently spoke about this with M. Borozdin from "Rossiya" Kolkhoz in Belgorod Oblast's Borisovskiy Rayon, V. Surtsev from "Temizhbeyskiy" Sovkhoz in Stavropol Kray, G. Potapov from Guryevo Village, Kalinin Oblast, and others. They are all very keen on this new work, but complain how difficult it is to become the master on the land.

The point is that the laws are not yet working, since there is no clear mechanism to implement them. A number of places are having difficulties with selling and processing output. It is no coincidence that these questions are scheduled to be examined at the Presidential Council in the near future.

[PRAVDA] How do you perceive party committees' role in perestroika in the countryside? Should they not indeed "interfere" in the economy? And how should they interfere if they do?

[Stroyev] Seeing that the party is proclaiming the implementation of profound economic reform and social transformations in society, and the revival of the peasantry, how can it evade the practical implementation of these wide-ranging goals?

The individual's lack of economic freedom is the main contradiction inherent in the current period, the watershed for all political platforms and views. There can be no reliable foundation or real basis for democracy or social justice without freedom. We cannot strive to set up a rule-of-law state and ensure the primacy of universal human values without it.

That is why party committees' main concern must be to emancipate productive forces and to transfer economic power to working people via the mixed economy, via diverse forms of economic activity and responsibility for the results of production. That is how the party can win most extensive support among the entire people.

Shirking these problems may reduce the party to a discussion club, self-service, sectarianism, and an

inability to implement the planned program. I do not think that any political party can permit this.

[PRAVDA] In your view, does the prevailing concept for the development of the agro-industrial complex need to be further improved and clarified?

[Stroyev] I think so. We have hitherto succeeded in revealing the basic "outline" of the impending reform. But we still have to work out the parameters, test specific models, and obtain real confirmation of their effectiveness and society's backing. We need to be fully aware that even a very sound model will not produce results if it is not actually put into effect. We must take our historical experience, economic state, and the social and moral mood into account. These are the kind of approaches that will meet with understanding and support within society.

[PRAVDA] How sound is your feedback from practitioners? What form does it take?

[Stroyev] I try to visit localities whenever I can, talk to people, and consider their opinions of current events.

What is more, people constantly come to my office and send me many letters. They have begun to talk more openly about the accumulated problems and make their own suggestions on various questions. This I see as a considerable contribution made by perestroika and the mass media.

It is important to channel our main efforts here into creating a systematic approach to the resolution of the sorest points within the country's agrarian complex. I am convinced that questions of housing construction, equipment provision, and processing could have been resolved considerably earlier if these problems had not only been promptly worked out but also consistently resolved. The most important condition for the implementation of any—even the most complex—task is to pool everyone's efforts and display the political will and consistency. I think that the 28th CPSU Congress will be the turning point when we switch from the adoption of decisions to the actual pursuit of a new course in agrarian policy.

Military

Baklanov Interview on Defense Conversion

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[Text] Moscow June 29 TASS—The scope and problems of the conversion of the defence industry exceed by far the framework of the defence sector, Oleg Baklanov, secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, said in a PRAVDA interview today.

He said the government had discussed a draft state conversion programme for the period until 1995 and submitted it to the Presidential Council. He described the implementation of conversion as a national task.

"New political thinking, the awareness of the need to solve interstate problems exclusively by political means, and the renunciation of the use of military power as an argument—all these mark a sharp turn that has required much courage from party and state leaders," Baklanov said.

"Reductions in defence spending require a different approach to the development and production of armaments and military equipment.

"Types of military equipment under production or development will have to be reduced, and the equipment will have to be improved and made more reliable.

"The successful accomplishment of these tasks remains the main duty of the defence sector. We must do everything to reliably defend the peaceful labour of Soviet people."

The secretary said the implementation of such large-scale reforms would require not only time, but also "considerable expanses of material, technical and financial resources."

"The production of armaments and military equipment, as any other production, has its own specific features. This is why hundreds of workshops and enterprises will have to be modernised, new technologies will have to be developed and tens of thousands of defence industry workers taught 'civilian' professions," Baklanov continued.

"An estimated R10 or 11 billion will have to be spent for the purpose before 1995."

Baklanov pointed to the need to solve a whole set of problems connected with the "social protection" of workers released through conversion.

This, he said, means the "payment of average wages to workers for the retraining period, benefits in pensions, the preservation of economic incentive funds at enterprises that are to be converted, the solution of communal problems and many other things."

Russian Draftees Demand To Serve in Russia

*LD2806140590 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1245 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Today we continue the theme of the crisis in the Army. The need for reform, democratization, and most important, the humanization of this institution is now perfectly clear. If this process goes slowly, the contradictions between the Armed Forces and other groups in our society may intensify dangerously. The report which you are about to see was filmed outside the building of our television center [video shows group of women and young men surrounding two Army officers]

[Unidentified woman] Its only two months since they killed my son, and you are trying to set my mind at rest.

It's only two months today since they killed my son, a border guard in Armenia. He was supposed to come home in the fall, but they killed him.

[Unidentified young man] We are not refusing to serve, but in Baku we [word indistinct]. [video shows placard on which is written: "Service in Russia for the children of Russia"]

[Liliya Lashchenko] How has it come about that they were promised service in Russia but that they are being sent to Baku and without having been given advance notice?

[Unidentified Army officer] In this matter it is necessary to deal specifically with each case, in specific terms with every draftee. [video shows the other officer, again surrounded by women and young men]

[Yu.F.Chayko] Tomorrow the lads will be reallocated to other commands and formations, and I will personally sort things out with each of them. They will not be punished for this matter. These lads will serve in Russia.

PRAVDA Discussion of Military Reform Viewed

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[V. Izgarshev and N. Sautin account of discussion held at the PRAVDA editorial office in Moscow 17 June, under the "Precongress Meetings at the PRAVDA Editorial Office" rubric: "The Army and Perestroika"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] It was already reported that a debate on questions of military building, reforms in the Army and Navy, the role of the party and of political organs in the Armed Forces, and the personnel's life and training was held at the PRAVDA editorial office.

The following took part in the meeting: Major General V. Bepalov, military commissar of Moscow City; Colonel V. Burov, department chief at the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Finance Directorate; Colonel E. Vorontsov, deputy chief of the Military Construction Units Political Directorate; Major General N. Grebenkin, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate Ideological Work Directorate; Hero of the Soviet Union Professor Colonel, Retired, V. Yevdokimov; Major A. Zakharov, commander of an air force flight; Lieutenant Colonel N. Ilkin, deputy chief of a combined unit's political department; Colonel N. Karasev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate Social Sciences Department; Professor Colonel A. Kuznetsov; V. Koshelev, consultant at the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions]; Major General V. Marchenkov, commander of the Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division; Major General K. Maslov, member of the Military Council and chief of a combined unit's political department; Lieutenant General I. Matveyev, chief of directorate at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; Major General Yu.

Rodionov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate; Colonel N. Ryazanov, deputy chief of department at the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; and Major S. Pivovarov, student at the F.E. Dzerzhinskiy Academy. A. Gorokhov, PRAVDA Military Desk editor, also took part in the conversation.

The discussion was chaired by I. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA.

[I. Frolov] This meeting with you, representatives of the Army and Navy, is of major importance. As you know, PRAVDA stands on clear-cut positions as regards coverage of military matters. PRAVDA's staff members support the perestroika processes which have affected the Armed Forces. Radical changes are now under way in the Army and Navy, affecting not just the strictly specific issues of military building but also the entire sphere of servicemen's life and activity, their prestige and social protection.

We would like to hold a constructive meeting. What is it that perturbs Army and Navy servicemen today? It is primarily the need for profound military reform on the basis of the new defensive doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency. What is the system of priorities here, what will we give up and what will we retain? It is clear that the reform must not result in the Army's weakening. On the contrary, it must help to maintain and augment the Armed Forces' combat might. And I think that there is plenty we can discuss here and bring to the PRAVDA readers' knowledge. It is very important to ensure that they receive this information directly from people engaged in military work.

Certain differences of opinion emerged during the discussion of the actual concept of future military reform. The Army leadership is often reproached because—or so it is claimed—what is planned is only some sort of cosmetic repair rather than transformation of existing military structures. The question arises: What is the essence of today's approaches toward reform? On what points do they converge and on what points do they diverge? I think that all this is related to a more general formulation of the question of relations between the Army and the people. The Army in our country cannot exist like some sort of a caste, isolated from the people. Therefore, issues concerning the Army always concern the whole people.

There are occasions when the Army is not so much criticized as groundlessly censured. This is often due to a false view that the Army is supposedly no longer needed. I think that our military comrades will have something to say about this. Our people must be broadly informed on these questions.

Voices can also be heard talking about depoliticization. Can there be a neutral Army in this sense? In this context, what should be the status of political organs, what should be the essence of their reorganization? This is closely linked with the question of tasks concerning the

strengthening of the personnel's political-moral condition, military discipline, and law and order. We would like to hear about the CPSU's role in Army life and Army structures. There are more than 1 million party members in the Army. This is a huge force. But other parties will probably emerge as well. The multiparty system in the Army poses a fresh problem. Proposals have already been made that party membership should be suspended during service in the Army. What is your opinion on this issue? Should you conceal the fact that you are communists while in the Army, for the rest of your lives?

There are questions associated with the withdrawal of our troops from East Europe. Dozens of letters to PRAVDA testify that servicemen returning home are not properly supplied with housing, medical services, kindergartens and schools, or jobs for their wives. A multitude of such social problems affect servicemen's moral state. How will they be resolved and by whom—the Ministry of Defense, the local soviets, or—in all likelihood—through joint efforts by all?

On instructions from the president of the USSR, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Finance, and the Gosplan [State Planning Committee] recently elaborated a targeted state program for the social security of servicemen and members of their families, as well as for those being discharged or have resigned from military service. We would be interested in your opinion about the future of this actual program and its key elements.

The Army is frequently diverted to tackle the solution of national economic questions: harvesting, road building.... Is this the proper way out, what is the return to the national economy, and what are the losses suffered by the Army itself?

Briefly speaking, the realities of Army life have raised numerous questions and problems. They perturb not just the military but also our entire society.

[N. Grebenkin] I would like to say a few words about the so-called depoliticization of the Army. I assume that those who promote this idea pursue the unseemly goal of detaching the Army from politics and the party. Speaking of depoliticization, in my view, they imply depatriotization. I think that there is no need to go to any great lengths to expose such depoliticization. The Army has always been and will remain an instrument of the state, the means or one of the means for the implementation of its policy. The protection of state interests is a matter of politics, and the Army at all times has been, is, and will be within the framework of politics. This is the general tenet.

There is another one, more specific. Everyone serving in the Army is, one way or another, involved in politics. People have ideas and personal aspirations and, whether we like this or not, they objectively participate in the implementation of policies. A soldier or an officer, even though he wears a military uniform and is within the

Army's framework, protects the fatherland and the ideas he is serving. This means that he is no longer beyond the scope of politics.

[Rejoinder] A question arises in this context, which has been actively pushed—or, to put it more harshly, provoked—recently. Will the Army not collapse following the emergence of the multiparty system?

[N. Grebenkin] Here is my forecast: Even when people holding social democratic views or other ideas appear inside the barracks, they will agree on one main point: The defense of the fatherland and the service to the people will be paramount for all. Otherwise, the Army's entire meaning will be really lost.

I think that there is no need to speak of the role played by the Communist Party. I shall not repeat well-known points like who created the socialist Army, the new-type Army, who it was that successfully waged the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War.... I shall speak about the present. Despite all the tribulations, despite all the economic, political, social, and spiritual complexities that our society is experiencing, the Army has not abandoned its post, which I would even describe as sacrificial. After all, there is a whole series of situations, especially during interregional and interethnic conflicts, when the Army's service is really sacrificial because it comes under fire from both sides, the left and the right.... In essence, it stands like a demarcation wall, protecting people from bloodshed. Despite the negative attitude toward the Army which is cultivated by some mass media, despite the complexities involving material supplies for men in military uniform, it has not abandoned its post, it performs its tasks with honor and selflessness. And it is the party that breathes the spirit of cohesion in military collectives.

The party, by creating a renewed fatherland, is boosting a soldier's potential of love and respect for his fatherland. Whereas love for the fatherland has always been inherent in someone living in his native land, the fatherland today—renewed, more humane, and democratic—is becoming even dearer to each and every one. These ideas originate from the party, and I think that nobody can play down the credit due to it for this.

[Rejoinder] Recently we have seen the active promotion of the question that, if our Army had been better paid and if everything to do with military service in general had been based on rubles, on the hire principle, very many questions could have been eliminated.

[N. Grebenkin] I would not like to pit rubles against duty. People who lack material backing cannot serve ideas. Equally, however, people who are not armed with ideas and are not committed to their patriotic and military duty and loyalty to their fatherland cannot perform their tasks either.

[N. Karasev] I would like to say a few words on the question of any army's politicization. Growing numbers

of social and political organizations are emerging nowadays. They are politicized to varying degrees, but they all have, as a rule, a [program] section on defense. This means that they also formulate their defense policy. This, I think, offers convincing proof that the purpose of talk about the Army's depoliticization is only to replace one policy's influence on the Army by another.

I raised the question of defense policy because now, on the eve of the 28th party congress, the experience of our defense building is being viewed and reviewed in connection with the adoption of the new military doctrine. Priorities must really be defined here. Nowadays we come up against arguments like these: Radical solutions to military questions suggest themselves in the conditions of crisis processes in the economic sphere. Primarily as regards cutbacks, savings, and so on.

I think that this is actually happening because no priorities have been defined here. In my view, these priorities could be as follows.

Let us sort out the political background of defense building. When talking about transition to reasonable sufficiency, the starting point ought to be provided by accords which enable us to define reasonable sufficiency. This is the first starting priority.

Second in priority comes the fact that discussion about any changes in the Army's structure, arms, and equipment can be conducted only on the basis of political accords. For example, political accords about reductions of medium-range missiles provide the starting point for decommissioning these weapons from the Armed Forces' structure and ceasing their future production. The financing of defense comes third in priority. Since we have started talking about cutbacks based on reasonable sufficiency which has been politically defined, it is only natural that financing should also cease.

The fourth logical step in these priorities is the cessation of military production or the alteration of its structure to the extent that losses are not covered. And finally, the callup structure and the units' manpower acquisition methods should also change.

[I. Frolov] I think that this would be an appropriate point to say a few words about conversion. After all, it has a direct effect on the solution of socioeconomic tasks and is directly associated with improving the people's life.

[N. Karasev] When the Ministry of Defense stops placing orders, industry halts production. But this is not conversion. Conversion ought to mean a system of financial-economic and socioeconomic measures for retooling from the production of one category of goods to another. Fine, the Ministry of Defense stops ordering, so what? Aviation plants will start turning out armored shopping bags. Something that is probably needed, but does it make conversion worth while?

[Rejoinder] An opinion is being expressed nowadays that the conversion mechanism has not been sufficiently thought out, that conversion is not a matter for the Gosplan alone.

[N. Karasev] I agree. We military economists are kept at arm's length, even though it was we who studied the world's experience in this sphere, like West Germany's and other countries' for example. Many gross mistakes are being committed. First, there has been a violation of the principle of selecting the output to be newly adopted which, as a rule, ought to be technologically very closely related to the military output being replaced. Second, the cessation of the manufacture of military equipment and the transition to conversion in fact seem to proceed outside the radical economic reform, following administrative edict whims indicating what ought to be manufactured.

[Question] Now we are withdrawing our troops for East Europe and Mongolia. Huge amounts were invested in social amenities for base camps now remaining outside the Soviet Union's borders. What funds will be used to finance the provision of amenities for servicemen from units being withdrawn who will be stationed inside the Union?

[N. Karasev] It is hardly justified to shift all the economic responsibility onto the Ministry of Defense.

I think that it was very correctly decided to set up a state program aimed at providing social and consumer service amenities for officers and their families. It does not cover only the officers being withdrawn—we have more than enough difficulties inside the country. There are 173,000 servicemen's families without apartments. At least 25,000 more families will be added to this number following the withdrawal. The socioeconomic solutions here must be far-reaching, comprehensive, on a large scale. The draft state program is already prepared. It comprises three sections. The first lists all the legal documents which we hope will be adopted by the Supreme Soviet when discussing the question of socioeconomic protection of servicemen and their families. They will include a law on the status of servicemen, a law on defense, a law on performance of service, and so on.

The two other sections are devoted to the standards of material and consumer service provisions for servicemen and their families. Next comes the solution of the housing problem. The Ministry of Defense will build or purchase 24 million square meters of housing during the current and the next five-year plan periods. There will be 19 million square meters handed over by military construction units and we should receive 5 million square meters from local organs.

[V. Burov] Let me develop this thought further. The Armed Forces' development and the advance along the path of military reform will be successful provided the most energetic measures are taken to solve the Army's and Navy's social problems.

First, a series of measures have been adopted on the provision of social protection for servicemen being released due to cutbacks in the Armed Forces.

Second, decisions were adopted in 1989 to raise the level of material support for servicemen, and they have been implemented since 1 January 1990. The cost of these measures is R1,227,000,000.

Third, work has been done to improve pension provisions for servicemen and their families.

Fourth, in compliance with the CPSU Central Committee decisions, a program on social security provisions for servicemen and members of the families and for persons discharged from military service was elaborated. The draft program has been submitted to the USSR Council of Ministers.

[A. Kuznetsov] I would like to discuss military reform. A comparative analysis of armies whose manpower acquisition is based on the voluntary hire principle or on the principle of universal military service led us scientists to the following conclusions. We had exaggerated the importance and role of the principle of universal military service. Now it is no longer possible to overlook the fact that a part of the population and young people express a genuine social protest against army service—this includes draft evasion and desertion from the Armed Forces.

There are armies whose manpower acquisition is based on the voluntary principle—in the United States, the FRG, Italy, France, the PRC. Our servicemen were formerly taught: A hired army is made up of murderers, rapists, plunderers, marauders.... In-depth studies have shown that an army whose manpower acquisition is based on the voluntary hire principle also has positive aspects.

Many military scientists do not share the stance held by a number of military leaders who believe that our servicemen's professional training standards are in no way inferior to, say, the standards of U.S. servicemen.

[A. Gorokhov] Which category do you have in mind?

[A. Kuznetsov] Soldiers and sergeants in the first place. Our service lasts two to three years. How can you compare such a soldier with someone who has spent 10-15 years serving in the army?

[N. Grebenkin] I would like to contradict Prof. Kuznetsov. When talking about social protest by young people taking the form of unwillingness to serve in the Army, I would like to mention two factors which gave rise to this process. One of them is that this protest has been inspired and implanted among young people. This can be seen in the Baltic region and the Transcaucasus alike.

[I. Matveyev] I share Gen. Grebenkin's stance. But a series of other problems must also be borne in mind

when talking about social protests. They include equality before the law and universal military service.

[V. Bespalov] Social injustice has swollen to such an extent in the last two-three years and has effected the callup to such an extent that less than one-fourth of draftees in Moscow are conscripted into the Army. VUZ [higher education establishment] and technical college students get deferments. Even those who will simply never complete their 10th grade get a deferment. We then have deferment for talented students.... I'll let you in on a secret, for some reason children who are backed by "special" parents seem to be especially gifted.

Virtually one out of every 10 avoids service for health reasons. We find that only 20 percent can be sent to any branch of the forces, be it as submariners or paratroopers....

[I. Matveyev] The process of separating the Army from the people started earlier. The people are separating from the Army, the soldiers from the officers, the junior command link from the senior link, the generals from the officers. We are now reaping the results.

And now about the draft. Look at 1988 for example. Only 58 persons out of every 100 were drafted union-wide. The figure stands at 49 today. A forecast for 1993? Only 40 will be drafted. Only 25 persons out of every 100 in Leningrad get drafted into the Army.

[Rejoinder] Here is another painful question. About bullying. What could you say about it?

[I. Matveyev] This is the tastiest of morsels for many publications. How do we ourselves appraise the state of military discipline? Let us assume that there have been five incidents in a unit comprising 250 men. Another unit has 2,000 men, and there have been eight incidents. Which one should be berated? The one with eight or the one with five? The one with five, of course, because it has fewer soldiers. But now let us compare figures of offenses per thousand in the Armed Forces and among the same number of teenagers of draft age. The man in the street will immediately see where order prevails.

[Rejoinder] According to USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] data, there were 212,000 crimes committed by teenagers of draft and predraft age last year. Some 44,000 of them will join the Army this year.... Are they likely to undergo reeducation just by donning a uniform?

[V. Marchenkov] As a division commander, I am especially worried by the question of the Army's depolitization. And specifically by the debate around the elimination of the political workers corps. I believe that today it is still early to talk about this. We are not conscripting young people on a competitive basis, we have to work with the recruits we get. At times they are both physically and spiritually weak. Many have been subjected to soapbox therapy, others have even belonged to guerilla

organizations. I must also add the drug addicts, substance abusers, and those with criminal records. It is not easy to work with them. And if we commanding officers were to combine educational and political functions with command functions, we would simply find ourselves unable to perform our main task—to strengthen combat readiness and combat training.

About military discipline. There are many negative phenomena in our Army. They are also to be found in our own division. It is obviously necessary to review the program for political workers' training. About one-half of the combined unit's soldiers now come from the Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics. This means that political workers must be trained and made familiar with the customs and cultures of these peoples.

[Rejoinder] Commanding officers as well, of course.

[V. Marchenkov] Exactly. I would also say that a soldier's trust must be gained. Let me give you an example. We were on exercises in Gorkiy Oblast. I ordered that all natives of Gorkiy serving in the division—about 90 men—be given home leave on the Friday. All 90 men came back by 0600 hours on the Monday morning, nobody stayed behind. After that we decided to be more active in giving soldiers short-term leave, just a day or two.

But life marches on and views change. Soldiers have drawn up their own leave schedules. The best are determined on a competitive basis and they are given leave travel vouchers. Soldiers can win such leave again after three months.

Gen. Grebenkin said here that the ruble does not govern conscience. Ideological tempering is, of course, the main element. But even Frunze said that the Army is a fraction of society and our life is not separate from society's. This year, for example, I had about 30 young officers, aged between 28 and 30 years, resigning due to unwillingness to serve. Why did they leave? A bus driver works eight hours and earns about R500 a month. An officer is on duty detail between six and eight times a month. After duty, he has to prepare for study sessions. Running for fire practice at 0600 hours. No apartment. Our division alone has about 300 families without their own home. Wives in the countryside rent tiny rooms lacking elementary amenities. The foodstuffs situation is bad. Husbands are away on duty for a month and even two months at a time. Living in tents while there. And how much does such an officer earn? About half as much as a bus driver.

[Question] You are a delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress. What would say from its rostrum?

[V. Marchenkov] First and foremost, I would raise the question of officers' prestige. After all, we have reached the point where officers are instructed to leave their work in the evening dressed in civilian clothes. Servicemen have been known to be beaten up in Moscow....

[A. Gorokhov] And how is the service's prestige to be boosted?

[V. Bespalov] I think that servicemen must earn much more than any skilled workers. To ensure that people rush to join the Army. And when all needs are properly met, the competitive basis will develop. Working hours will be set according to norms, and there will be proper leave schedules.

[S. Pivovarov] I am profoundly convinced that we will not boost the prestige by any violent or forced measures. The Army alone can boost its own prestige. And it can do this only when its gets down to nothing but its proper army work. Our airborne assault troops seem to have more combat training, but nonetheless a unit commander finds himself in situations when, in order to ensure his unit's supplies, he is willy-nilly forced to "detach" his soldiers either to build stokeholds or to work in a subsidiary farm so as to deliver meat to the state....

Officers are unhappy about the uncertainty: What future lies in store for our Army and state? Will we have a Union or not? If yes, what sort of a union? What laws on defense and on state service lie in store?

I think that the 28th party congress will dot quite a few i's.

I would like to say a few words about the question of party organizations within the Armed Forces, bearing in mind that the multiparty question in the country has been virtually resolved. This is the situation now: We have the political organ and the party organization. Who duplicates whom? This is what I think: Let us retain the political organs we need, just reorganize them and make them independent of the commanding officer's opinion. As for the party organizations, they will probably prove virtually unnecessary in the future, especially in the conditions of a multiparty system. But these are suppositions; why does the Main Political Directorate not produce a specific program? Why not submit some sort of proposal to the congress?

[N. Grebenkin] Proposals have already been prepared for the draft 28th party congress resolution on military questions.

[A. Gorokhov] The General Staff is experiencing difficulties with conscription. Will you raise with directive organs the question of radical cutbacks in the Armed Forces? In military construction units, for example.

[I. Matveyev] I agree. But let me repeat that the question of the Armed Forces' numerical strength is a political decision. As regards military construction detachments. We have repeatedly submitted proposals about their elimination to civilian ministries. They carried out on-the-spot inspections of their efficiency. The detachments operate on the economic accountability principle. When the time comes to be discharged into the reserve, some

soldiers from military construction detachments have to write home and ask for money to repay their debts. So much for productivity....

[Rejoinder] Military construction servicemen often visit PRAVDA and tell us about their daily life....

[I. Matveyev] But the ministry is unwilling to part company with them—cheap labor.

Look at harvesting for example. Current plans seem to envisage the secondment of 40,000 motor vehicles. I already receive telephone calls from the [military] districts, begging me not to touch them. But this decision was made neither by the General Staff nor by the Ministry of Defense.

[Rejoinder] But even in army conditions it is necessary to think of economic accountability and the people's money.

[I. Matveyev] I agree. Then the secondment of our motor vehicle battalions would sharply enhance the local leadership's concern and would dampen their tendency to freeload.

[E. Vorontsov] The Supreme Soviet raised the question of disbanding military construction units working in the national economy. This is only fair. In my view, however, it is premature to abolish military construction units performing tasks for the Ministry of Defense. First, this is an existing complex with huge scientific and technical potential and hundreds of production associations which, for several decades on end, have been successfully performing tasks in the interests of all branches and categories of troops, supplying them with housing and creating their training, material, and combat base.

Rumors claiming that there is nothing good in military construction units are now circulating everywhere; we cannot accept this and we would invite correspondents to visit any military construction organization. We have hundreds of frontranking collectives whose labor efficiency is much higher than that of their civilian counterparts. Let alone the scientific and technical renewal and updating of the entire military construction complex.

[V. Yevdokimov] I served 45 years in the Army, and even though I am retired now, I can appreciate all the problems of the military. In my view, there is an acute problem concerning the social protection of Armed Forces veterans who served after the war. They are still able to work but encounter insoluble problems. And yet there will be about 100,000 more officers who will join the ranks of veterans.

They will encounter no end of difficulties—housing provision, medical services, employment.... We set up councils of Armed Forces veterans to provide effective assistance to young reservists. They are already actively operating in many cities all over the union. This is a huge

detachment of Soviet people dedicated to the ideas of patriotism and internationalism, and 90 percent of them are communists.

[V. Koshelev] As a Central Council of Trade Unions official, I am worried by the problems of Army and Navy workers and employees. They have been passed over in silence for a long time. Nobody talks about them even now, in the sixth year of perestroika. The mass press carries virtually no reports about the problems of the 17,000 trade union organizations uniting these workers and employees. Dispersed—according to someone's whim—among 18 sectorial trade unions in which they make up an insignificant minority, virtually unprotected in the legal sense and primarily at Ministry of Defense level, even their social needs are met according to the so-called remainder principle.

The need to make their presence felt raises the question of uniting all Army and Navy trade union organizations within a trade union structure which could fully exercise the rights granted to all sectorial trade unions.

We believe that this must be a single trade union built on the principles of federalism, in other words a federation of the trade union of Soviet Army and Navy workers and employees.

[Yu. Rodionov] Today we are all striving to maintain the authority and prestige of the officer's vocation at a sufficiently high level, to ensure each officer's confidence in long and fruitful service.

Take the Armed Forces cutbacks for example. In order to avoid repeating the mistakes of past cutbacks, the best possible option was adopted: The cadres being discharged are not those whose position is being abolished but those who have reached the upper age limit and have the right to pension provisions along Ministry of Defense lines. More than 44,500 such officers were discharged in 1989. They all receive the pensions envisaged by the government.

[Rejoinder] Are personnel organs not worried by the problem of young officers' resignations?

[Yu. Rodionov] They are very worried indeed. There are many reasons behind this, but the main ones are to do with social and consumer service amenities where there are numerous unresolved problems. They were already covered in detail here.

Take the housing problem for example. Union republic councils of ministers fail to completely fulfill the decision on allocating housing area to the Ministry of Defense to meet the needs of homeless servicemen. At the start of this year the indebtedness stood at 475,700 square meters of housing area, which translates into 16,000 apartments.

Much attention is being given to ensuring the application of the principle of social justice in officers' service. In addition to regions in the Far North and areas ranking on par with them, the last two years have seen a

considerable expansion of the list of areas in the USSR with harsh and adverse climatic conditions where officers are paid additional benefits.

The expansion of the list of areas with harsh and adverse climatic conditions demanded a new approach toward organizing and implementing the rotation of officers serving in these regions.

More than 40,000 Army and Navy officers are rotated every year.

[N. Ilkin] I serve in the Air Defense Forces. To be frank, the service is tough. In between we have to perform nonservice duties: Mowing grass, hewing shrubbery, clearing fields.... Whenever representatives of the Ministry of Defense leadership arrive, the first thing they ask is about external gloss rather than combat readiness standards.

There we were, expecting a fundamental turnabout to occur in our Air Defense Forces following the well-known incursion by West German flier Rust in our country. Today, in the course of meetings with military voters, we have seen for ourselves that there have been no serious changes for the better. Neither in staffing, nor in technical supplies, nor in attitudes toward people. The struggle against low-altitude targets has yet to be fully thought out. An example? Batumi.

If anything is gratifying, it is the approach adopted by the Air Defense Forces commander in chief toward the implementation of the program for social and consumer services provisions for the troops. There will be designated cities in our country so that each officer can choose a city two years before leaving the service and he will be guaranteed an apartment there.

As regards educational work with people, I agree that there is no army anywhere in the world without people exerting influence on servicemen. Whether we like it or not, the multiparty system will come into being. Evidently, political organs will change their functions and will become state organs.

[K. Maslov] I would like to say a few words on three questions. First, about the military reform. I believe that a detailed elaboration of the concept of military reform ought to be conducted on a genuinely scientific basis, taking into account the long-term development prospects of the military-political situation in the world.

The second question concerns political organs. I have a rough understanding of the ultimate goals pursued by the critics and "abolitionists" of political organs and party organizations who are either unwilling or unable to comprehend that the artificially created crisis of Marxist-Leninist ideology is not the result of inaction by political organs and political workers, not a crisis of its ideals. The political departments and political staffs have always been reliable assistants of commanders in solving the tasks of combat and mobilization readiness, in work with people.

The third question is about military training establishments and the troops. I think that one of the reasons behind the troops' serious complaints against VUZ's is the fact that the structure of military education does not correspond with the content and nature of military labor. It is, after all, well known that a military man's labor is differentiated not only in terms of vocation and specialization but also in terms of complexity. I am convinced that each level of labor complexity must have a corresponding level of military education. If this correspondence is lacking, or if it is incomplete, the Army encounters a series of negative phenomena: incompetence, protectionism, lack of professionalism, loss of the military profession's prestige, decline of the service's prestige, and consequently decline of the Army's prestige.

Thus, the military reform must provide for elaboration of a new concept of military education.

PRAVDA note: Not a lot of space has been allocated to the military question in the CPSU Central Committee's draft platform for the 28th party congress. But it has been presented in depth and pithily. The conversation with military comrades in the PRAVDA editorial office confirms: The Armed Forces have welcomed with huge interest the party's pregress documents; they awaken creative thinking and encourage energetic actions aimed at strengthening the party ranks and further enhancing the country's defense capability.

Baltic Republics

Debates on Lithuanian Moratorium Continue

LD2906132490 Moscow TASS in English 1317 GMT
29 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Kasis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius June 29 TASS—A second day of debates in the Lithuanian parliament about the government proposal to declare a moratorium on the March 11 Declaration of Independence made it clear that deputies were unanimous in stressing Lithuania's right to sovereignty and statehood. But as regards a moratorium on the declaration of independence, differing views have been aired.

Professor Kazimieras Antanavicius, for instance, said, "hardly anyone will understand our reluctance to begin talks with the Soviet Union. It is necessary to announce the moratorium today".

Writer Vidmante Jacukaite stressed that "if there is a chance to begin talks with Moscow, it must be seized immediately. If no chance is available now, it should be sought".

According to Jacukaite, the moratorium announcement should be made conditional on the lifting of the economic blockade and the restrictions on the entry to Lithuania from other countries and on the non-use of force against draft-age young people seeking to evade the Soviet Army call-up.

Academician Vytautas Statulevicius said he was certain Lithuania should seek a two-year transition period for settling relations with the Soviet Union.

Many deputies, however, were not inclined to look for a reasonable settlement. "We have no mandate to abolish or suspend independence. We stand to gain nothing from this, while the Soviet Union stands to gain all," said Deputy Statis Malkevicius.

His colleague Saulius Peceliunas told the parliament that the text of the government proposal was "unacceptable and even dangerous".

Deputy Jonas Liaucius proposed to announce—for the duration of negotiations with the Soviet Union—a moratorium not on the March 11 act "On the restoration of the Independent Lithuanian State" but on the implementation of this act.

Debates continue.

Landsbergis Reads Draft Statement on Moratorium

LD2906103290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian
0909 GMT 29 Jun 90

[Draft statement of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania read by Supreme Council Chairman

Vytautas Landsbergis at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] Allow me to read this draft statement. It has been distributed, but other people are also listening to me:

A statement by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania.

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, being and remaining the spokesman of the sovereign powers of the nation and state, restoring the independent Lithuanian state and striving for the implementation of all these powers, and for this purpose striving for interstate negotiations of the Republic of Lithuania with the USSR, proclaims from the beginning of such negotiations a unilateral 100-day moratorium for the act of the 11 March 1990 on the restoration of the independent Lithuanian state, that is, suspends legal actions stemming from it.

At the beginning of the negotiations between the Republic of Lithuania and the USSR their aim is defined in a special protocol by the authorized delegations of both sides. The moratorium can be extended or discontinued by a decision of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania. If, because of some events or circumstances, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania of the current convocation is unable to carry out its legislative functions, the moratorium become invalid at that moment.

On the announcement of this statement, the previous resolution of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania of 23 May 1990 No. 126 becomes invalid.

At the same time the following resolution should be adopted:

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania resolves:

1. To acknowledge that the resolution of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania of 23 May 1990 No. 126 is invalid.

2. This statement becomes valid on the day it is adopted.

Vilnius Radio Carries 28 June Supreme Council

LD2806143690

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0700 GMT on 28 June begins a live broadcast of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

The session, chaired by Deputy Stankevicius, begins with a discussion of the session agenda, which includes the following: draft law on environmental protection; draft taxation law; changes in administrative rayon borders and alterations in the names of some villages in the republic's rural areas; the Lithuanian government's proposal to declare a moratorium on the declaration of independence.

At 1215 GMT the session participants reach the debate on the draft taxation law.

At 1248 GMT a vote is taken on the proposal to discontinue the debate on the draft law of taxation. By the majority of votes the law is adopted. The draft of the law on taxation will be published for public discussion.

At 1303 GMT after a short debate, a vote is taken on the proposal to extend the period of parliament's work until 31 July. The motion is adopted.

At 1304 GMT the last item of the agenda, the moratorium, is discussed. Deputy Rimkus says that since both Landsbergis and Prunskiene went to Moscow perhaps they could make a report on the latest trip.

At 1306 GMT Prime Minister K. Prunskiene takes the floor. She says she did not have very much new to add. She notes conditions for negotiations in more concise form were presented. She says "now we have arrived at the stage when the question which we had been seeking to discuss with the Soviet Union, is being discussed." She notes negotiations should not be postponed. Several new ideas emerged while discussing the federation with the leaders in Moscow. Prunskiene says there was and there always would be moments in the negotiations that Lithuania will always find unacceptable. However, she continues, "we risk more if we refuse to proceed forward rather than going to the negotiation table." She then notes that yesterday "I heard the same ideas only presented in a more elaborated way," when she was with Yakovlev and Ryzhkov.

At 1316 GMT K. Prunskiene concludes her report.

At 1317 GMT V. Landsbergis takes the floor. He says Deputies Saltenis, Jarmolenko, Okincicas, K. Prunskiene, and himself took part in the meeting in the Kremlin yesterday. Speaking about the issues discussed at yesterday's meeting, Landsbergis notes that the subject of independence was broached first of all. Landsbergis said he advised the meeting participants that Lithuania would come to the negotiations as an independent republic.

Landsbergis further said that Gorbachev said unless a moratorium is declared on the act of independence, negotiations would be impossible. The dignity of both objects of the negotiations—the USSR and Lithuania—would be saved. Landsbergis noted that Gorbachev said the Soviet Union would not be against self-determination and that he expects Lithuania would choose the act of independence again, but then very difficult and detailed negotiations would have to be held to sort things out. He believes no decisions will be made today.

At 1327 GMT Landsbergis finishes his report. Questions follow. Landsbergis is asked if he has confidence in the government. He says if he had to take a vote on the issue he would vote for the confidence in the government of this republic. The deputies ask questions about the meaning and implications of the moratorium.

Prunskiene asks, "Do you remember what Gorbachev said after the 11 March? He said negotiations were possible only with an independent state, therefore, the start of negotiations could be seen as a significant step made by the Soviet Union toward the solution of this problem."

At 1359 GMT the session adjourns.

Moscow Talks Discussed

LD2806160290

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1422 GMT on 28 June resumes its live coverage of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

At 1423 GMT an unidentified deputy asks if the deputies who went to Moscow together to discuss the situation with Gorbachev could answer questions.

At 1425 GMT Deputy Jarmolenko takes the floor. He gives his account of the meeting in the Kremlin. He says he thinks that during the second part of the meeting not all the arguments from the Lithuanian side were heard. Jarmolenko says he wants more debates before he could express his point of view. Next Deputy Okincicas says he found it very difficult to cope with because of the immense responsibility. He thinks the Lithuanian side should explain the difference in the interpretation of the same facts and the same events.

At 1440 GMT debates begin. Deputy Sakalas takes the floor. Sakalas says Lithuania should begin negotiations with the Soviet Union, otherwise "the fifth column and the Soviet security forces will continue to exercise the upper hand in this republic." Sakalas presents the point of view of the Central Group in the parliament.

At 1452 GMT Algirdas Patackas takes the floor. He says Lithuania should not be frightened by the embargo. He calls for emotional and moral endurance. He says the pressure from the West should not be undervalued; the Soviet Union needed help from the West and Lithuania had been an obstacle to obtain this help.

At 1459 GMT an unidentified deputy takes the floor. He says that after the declaration of the moratorium the parliament, which had been democratically elected, would continue to exist. In case of any violence against Lithuania, he believes hardly anything could be done about it. He also believes the very start of negotiations would be, in a way, recognition of Lithuania's independence. Following this, Patackas dwelt upon the situation which would emerge in Lithuania if negotiations failed to start and embargo continued. He also says the world's attention was back on Lithuania when the Lithuanian government began to speak about a possibility to declare a moratorium on the act of the independence. He said "Gorbachev at the moment has concentrated absolute power in his hands. We know him as a politician." However, he continues, we would not know the one who might replace him. He concludes his remarks by saying

that if Lithuania proved to be persistently inflexible this could irritate the leading politicians of the world.

At 1510 GMT Deputy Genzelis says, "We have become a playing card for various political forces in Russia." He also says Russians would never sacrifice anything to help Lithuanians because they would not want the Russian empire to collapse. He says he believes that after the moratorium had been declared "the embargo would not be lifted immediately, new demands will be placed, and we will suffer a great moral defeat." He notes the embargo was needed to incite totalitarian passions. He then criticizes the government, saying there is no unity.

At 1535 GMT the debates continue. Some deputies note that the Russians would immediately assume that now the Soviet Constitution is back in operation in Lithuania.

At 1537 GMT deputies express their concern that declaring a moratorium on the Act of Independence could open the door to presidential rule or other undesirable consequences. The facts of Lithuanian history are noted and that Lithuania has only restored the independence which had been usurped by the Soviet Union.

At 1600 GMT the debate continues.

At 1645 GMT the session is declared closed until Friday 29 June. The chairman notes that tomorrow's agenda will include the continuation of the debate on the moratorium. The deputies are reminded that tomorrow the plenary session will start at 0600 GMT and will finish at 1230 GMT. The chairman also notes that at 1100 GMT the government hour will be held as more than four issues have been raised for the government to answer.

At this point the session and the live relay ends.

Landsbergis Reports to 28 June Supreme Council

*LD2806193190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian
1317 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[Report by Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuanian Supreme Council chairman, at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] Esteemed deputies, today I can make certain references to yesterday's conversation. You know the participants from the Soviet Union, its very political pinnacle, the elite—four of its most important individuals; representing our side, as you know, were the prime minister, myself, and three deputies. Also, you know who, don't you? Saltenis, Okincicas, and Jarmolenka. The prime minister and I decided to take them, so that there would not be any sort of positions being taken and so that there would be a wider range of views on the whole matter.

Well, first of all, who participated at this meeting? Since there were two people who had not participated in the previous days' conversation, I briefly recalled our

problem as we see it; the basic problem and aim comprise negotiations, which does not constitute an aim in itself, but, however, a stage leading to the aim and, of course, a means of resolving stress and bilateral problems. Considering that, positions for a solution should be comprised of clear negotiation subjects and those who are to participate in the negotiations. Naturally, as far as we are concerned, the object of the negotiations is regarded in a unilateral sense—regaining the full prerogatives of an independent state. Well, as far as subjects are concerned, it means, I, Lithuania alone and as a state with the Soviet Union, or the three Baltic states, and so on.

Well, another question consists of this preparatory stage, following which the official negotiations could start. A preparatory stage, which is called negotiations on negotiations; it could be called something else—consultations or dialogues. Here then, it, the object, the start and also the conditions should be established.

Well, Mikhail Gorbachev has presented, more or less, what we are already familiar with, the concept that we must seek—allegedly we are going toward compromise. Also, the Lithuanian side should take a step toward compromise, which would consist of suspension of the act of independence. On the part of the Soviet Union, the compromise would be the renunciation of the demand to repeal the act, transcending into a demand for the moratorium. In this way both sides preserve their prestige and can demonstrate they have not been forced to their knees, since, so to speak, they are not being forced to their knees. Otherwise it would be difficult for them to agree with the USSR's Supreme Soviet and it would probably be impossible to accomplish with the fourth congress.

This is how the conversation proceeded. Thus, the problem rests in the fact that we are both partners in the same boat, and we must find a solution. However, he [Gorbachev] stressed very strongly that the moratorium is absolutely necessary. Without it, no talks of any kind! At this point, both the prime minister and Saulius Saltenis tried to bring up the subject of the softening or removal of the blockade as a sign of goodwill. It was obvious there cannot even be any mention of it.

Thus, the following perspective was more or less revealed. Following our enactment of this [moratorium], efforts will be made to restore that which has been destroyed—these are the very words that were used—and Lithuania will again feel the way it felt earlier.

A process, his political process, begins in this way. This, I think, means that here, a positive meaning was held in mind, so that there would be no impression of difficulties of a destroyed economy, so to speak. Thus, a process begins in which, for which, explanations are not needed from the outset concerning subjects, objects, and other such similar trivia. Moreover, it is important to begin, so to speak, and then the Lithuanian delegation would arrive for consultations, using that same opportunity to

glance at the new Union agreement, and that would constitute the Soviet Union's proposal. In other words, there would be proposals from both sides. Their side will really set out a proposal to review and to choose the easiest and the most liberal conditions. They understand that our position will most probably be one of proposing an act of independence. Also, it means that the Soviet Union agrees with the principle of self-determination.

However, there will be very many matters in need of explanation and those details will already become negotiations. Well, Lithuania will choose. So, this question was addressed several times. Occasions have arisen to correct this [statement] several times, by pointing out that Lithuania has chosen already, and now further problems, and not those involving choice, need to be solved.

Well, this way—so that I could comment on this. [sentence as heard] That which we often either expand on or remind them of was brought up [again]—either points of historical justice or international rights, but these are not addressed in this type of conversation. I mean that a practical and procedural consideration is given, from a certain position of pragmatic policy, although we had proposed certain measures, by use of which the Soviet Union could exit the situation honorably and with great ease.

Well, what was one result of this, in addition to the fact that clarification of position is always useful, of course. Well, we could clearly note, since that question came up, so to speak, that the negotiations would be between two sides: they would be bilateral negotiations. And we were told, that since the two sides will sit on opposite sides of the table, they will indeed be bilateral. And within that the moratorium decision, if we are to issue such, its duration and conditions, since as you know, much has been stated about these in our earlier documents. And this is already understood by the USSR leaders, that this may not be formulated in that decision.

A possible work [involvement] by experts, a meeting by experts of both sides, has also been touched upon. I proposed that experts could begin their work by discussing the problem of a possible moratorium, prior to making that decision. The answer was: No, first, the moratorium and after that maybe everything else.

It means, things are as follows: In comparing it with the previous conversation, such matters so unpleasant to our ears and hearts as a return to 10 March were not stressed, not even mentioned at all. Such concepts were absent. The conversation did not mention the results, or the entire collection of juridical acts, but did consist of discussing one act, namely that supposedly this decision would open the door.

Thus, the situation is rather clear. Most probably we should not expect any early elimination of the blockade without having adopted that decision. It remains a big question, if such a decision is not arrived at over a longer period of time. This will depend on the development of

the internal political situation in the Soviet Union, our endurance, and whether or not a crisis will arise in Lithuania.

I would say that this belongs to the realm of other discussions and I would like to deliberate these matters and prepare a statement of my own, for which I did not have sufficient time last night.

Are we going to vote tonight? If we do not vote, I hope that the Supreme Council will perhaps grant me the floor again tomorrow. Thank you.

Prunskiene Addresses 28 June Supreme Council

*LD2806192990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian
1306 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[Report by Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene at the Lithuanian Supreme Council Session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] I do not have very much to add because, after having summed up the previous talks—the first one when we adopted the act, the second one when we went there [to Moscow] and talked to Lukyanov and Ryzhkov—and then the telephone conversation before the start of Tuesday's [26 June] session which was followed by yesterday's extended explanation of the theses, I do not think I have anything very much to add to all of this.

I can repeat once more what the formulation is. However, how we have to read it is yet another question. The formulation which emerges from this scenario is that through a moratorium, which is being stressed as a condition on their part, and, consequently, as a response to this, the embargo will be immediately lifted after this step [moratorium] has been taken and will be followed by negotiations to solve the Lithuanian question.

The Moscow side envisions solutions within a range starting with the Union treaty which is under discussion—where we are not specifically invited to participate in its preparation, but they are still offering us the rights of observers, and this is also only a proposal—and ending with confederation, association, or an independent state where the relation variants are improvised stressing that under market conditions market relations should not be abolished.

Well, so far as the other problems which may be raised or not raised are concerned I do not want to repeat them once again. If we look from our side we should see the meaning of this talk, to my mind, proceeding from this point: Do we believe that everything has already been done in order to achieve independence or, indeed, was our aim to declare it or to implement it? If we do not have the implementation which we wish to have but we aspire to have it, then the question arises on how this can be done. If the implementation and the consolidation, that is, solving the issues with regard to armed forces, borders, and other issues is achieved by negotiations—as the

whole world has asked us to do and as we ourselves have underlined in many draft documents the need for these negotiations—then an agreement must be reached concerning the start of these negotiations. We must admit we have failed on several occasions to reach an agreement the way we wanted it, starting with the 11 March appeal to recognize us and to restore historical justice, and so on. We have now arrived at the point when this question [of negotiations] is being discussed.

The question arises automatically: If this condition which has been imposed by the opposite side must be regarded at this point as strict, then do we reject the negotiations in general or are we looking for other means to reach these negotiations at some later time? Of course, debates on the issue can be held in this way too. However, while debating it we must have answers to these questions. [passage omitted]

Several new points came to the surface during the talks. These concern developing more fully the concept of association and what it would mean. Would it contradict the implementation of independence or not, as well as other things?

There was no direct allusion to the position of 10 March. Let us recall how this 10 March position came about. [passage omitted] In that conversation we could find instances, statements, and points of view which we do not like and never will. Arguments were put forward that it will not be easy for us to negotiate, that many obstacles will be placed in our way. [passage omitted]

However, we are planning to go to negotiations and today we are not resolving the problems of this week or those of next month; we have to remember that we shall be in the position to solve these problems when the situation emerges. One cannot solve in advance all problems in one's life nor can all obstacles on the way be removed. [passage omitted]

The moratorium is not a goal in itself, it is not an aim, it is a means for negotiations—and negotiations are not an aim either. It is a way of reinforcing independence. It is a way to do what we have not yet done. If we do not want this, then that is another question. One can hear what one wants to hear and I think that this is one of the most important reasons why we sometimes hear different things when we hear the same words. It depends on whether we want to find a way to arrange the actions while proceeding forward, or do we want to find a way to justify our remaining in the same place? My position, as well as my way of acting and thinking, is rather the first than the second. Thank you.

Lithuanian Parliament Discusses Moratorium

LD2806223190 Vilnius International Service
in English 2130 GMT 128 Jun 90

[Text] Today the Lithuanian parliament started debates on the possibilities of declaring a moratorium on the independence act of 11 March. And it was namely today

that the object of the discussion has been finally made much more precise due to the meeting of the Lithuanian leadership with President Gorbachev yesterday. The Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the Soviet parliament Anatoliy Lukyanov, and Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Politburo, participated together with Mikhail Gorbachev in the meeting with Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian parliament, and the Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene.

The leadership of the Kremlin requested to declare a moratorium on the independence act, while Mikhail Gorbachev rejected his own demand to repeat the act altogether. The minute the moratorium is passed, Moscow stops its economic embargo against Lithuania and even provides Lithuania with special aid to help it ease out of the present difficult economic situation. These are the primary conditions for a dialogue on future negotiations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Kremlin did not conceal their intention to try and persuade Lithuania during the future negotiations not to cut all political links with the Soviet Union. A federation, or even an association of states, will be proposed to Lithuania and the other Baltic republics as well as with functioning market relations. The negotiations are going to be held on an equal basis for both sides, therefore it will be up to Lithuania to decide its own future—to be within or out of the new federation. All this was conveyed to the parliament by Kazimiera Prunskiene and Vytautas Landsbergis. The Lithuanian prime minister stressed in her speech that declaring a moratorium would not mean rescinding the independence act. The moratorium would only mean declaring that the rights resulting from the act are being postponed. The right of telling the Soviet Army to leave the territory of Lithuania would be delayed, as well as the right of complete control of the Lithuanian state border.

Vytautas Landsbergis was the next to speak. He said that the Kremlin proposed bilateral talks, while the Baltics have foreseen a possibility of negotiating between Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other.

Vytautas Landsbergis did not mention in his speech that the leaders of the Baltics are most probably going to have consultations on the issue in Tallinn this weekend.

The chairman of the Lithuanian parliament also noted that the Kremlin leadership had agreed to various conditions being attached to the moratorium, as for instance the aspect of its duration.

Lithuanian Deputies Disagree on Moratorium Issue

LD2806203190 Moscow TASS in English 2009 GMT
28 Jun 90

[Text] Vilnius June 28 TASS—By TASS correspondent Kazys Uscila:

The Lithuanian parliament, after a one-day interval, today resumed the discussion of the republican government's proposal to announce a temporary moratorium on Lithuania's independence for the period of negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene told deputies at the beginning of the discussion that during the Wednesday meeting between President Mikhail Gorbachev and Lithuanian leaders "further prospects for the possible development of events became clear."

"Lithuania's moratorium on the independence declaration, demanded by Moscow as a condition, would be followed by the lifting of the economic blockade and the beginning of negotiations on the Lithuanian issue," she said.

The prime minister said the moratorium was a means to start negotiations in order to seal independence.

Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis described the government's moratorium proposal as "requiring improvement."

He pointed to the need for "mutual compromises" and said that "perhaps, the blockade will not be lifted without our conciliatory step."

Deputies sharply disagreed on the issue. The discussion will continue on Friday.

Lithuanian Moratorium 'Vital' for Gorbachev

*LD2806233190 Vilnius International Service
in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[Excerpt] [passage omitted noting Deputy Nikolajus Medvedevas' return from Moscow, where he had been observing the USSR Supreme Soviet proceedings and other processes taking place in Moscow] According to Nikolajus Medvedevas, it is simply vital for Mikhail Gorbachev to have the Lithuanians announce a moratorium by Monday, when the 28th CPSU Congress is scheduled to begin.

In addition to this, with Lithuania having announced a moratorium before Monday, it would be important for both sides to sit down at the negotiation table, for at least two minutes, in the words of Nikolajus Medvedevas.

In Nikolajus Medvedevas's opinion, if the congress happened to be postponed—and this will be decided upon tomorrow—it would prove beneficial both to us [Lithuanians] and to Mikhail Gorbachev, as time is swiftly destroying the conservatives' opinions.

Nikolajus Medvedevas was one of the deputies who asked Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene some questions at the plenary session today. He asked whether the very start of negotiations would not constitute to a large degree recognition of Lithuania. In total agreement with this, the prime minister reminded everyone of the words

spoken by Mikhail Gorbachev back in March—that he could conduct negotiation only with foreign states. [passage omitted]

Gorbachev Asks Pope To 'Calm Down' Lithuanians

*LD2806224190 Vilnius International Service
in English 2130 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[Text] The weekly MAZOJI LIETUVA, published in the Klaipeda region of Lithuania, has revealed without disclosing the source of information that a special Soviet convoy [as heard] was sent off to the Vatican with a letter from Mikhail Gorbachev to Pope John Paul II.

The letter asks the pontiff to calm down the nationalists of Lithuania so that they would stop endangering the policies of the Soviet president and would adhere to the decisions of the Helsinki conference.

The pontiff replied that he fully understood the difficult situation of Mikhail Gorbachev, but his heart has always been with the Lithuanians. Pope John Paul II reminded Mr. Gorbachev of the unsuccessful attempt to visit Lithuania. He now hopes to come to this Roman Catholic country next year.

Lithuania's Shved on Citizenship Attestation

*LD2806203890 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1743 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[Station correspondent A. Paulyus interview with Vladislav Nikolayevich Shved, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania on the platform of the CPSU, location not stated—live or recorded]

[Text] [Paulyus] The immediate grounds for our interview today with Vladislav Nikolayevich Shved, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU) is this report in the newspaper EKHO LITVY. This reports that the first attestation of citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic has been bestowed. And you, Vladislav Nikolayevich, expressed the wish to comment on this fact.

[Shved] Yes, indeed. This is an extraordinary act precisely when one takes account of the situation today both in Lithuania and in the Union. On the one hand, appeals are being made in Lithuania for accord, for respect for the USSR, for dialogue with Moscow. And against this background of what I would call worthy appeals, what I would call a certain victory for the constructive line, suddenly there is such, what I would call, an ill-considered step—and not only unconsidered but premature in my view—as the bestowal of an attestation.

Why do I think that it is premature? The point is that the bestowal of the attestation is accompanied by the signing of obligations. So, Landsbergis signed the following obligation:

[Paulys] The chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium became citizen of Lithuania number one, if one expresses it thus.

[Shved] Quite right. This is what he signed. And this is what everyone will sign: I, Vytautas Landsbergis, receiving the attestation of citizen of the Lithuanian Republic, undertake to observe the laws of the Lithuanian state and its territorial integrity. In effect, this is an oath of loyalty. And taking account of the fact that citizens of the USSR—which today means everyone living on the territory of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]—when they receive this attestation are thus automatically deprived of citizenship of the USSR.

And so, when we speak today about seeking dialogue with the USSR it is scarcely appropriate precisely today to carry out his action. In general, it seems to me that a number of aspects of the statements of the government and the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania today are not in accord with the real actions and the real atmosphere which reigns in our republic. Let us take the press, for example. Unfortunately there is still an unending stream of what I would call caricatures, rather improper expressions addressed to the USSR, to the president, and to Moscow.

[Paulys] And toward the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU), too.

[Shved] Well, we do take that into account, it is a normal phenomenon.

[Paulys] You have become used to it?

[Shved] Yes, we have already become used to that. But I would like to speak about something else, about international practice. If we wish to conduct a dialogue with someone then we must show respect for him. And today there is not one state which, perhaps, has more critical relations with the USSR which would permit itself to make such attacks as happens here in Lithuania.

We consider that this step is premature. And we consider that without agreement, without mutual accord with the USSR, citizens of the USSR today should not be deprived of citizenship of the republic. Why do we speak about depriving people? The point is that the campaign for the bestowal of attestations is being accompanied by what I would call a very interesting psychological campaign. Various rumors are being circulated—by the way such reports are percolating through to television, too—that people who do not receive attestation of the Lithuanian Republic will not be attended to in out-patients clinics, or in shops, they will not be paid their pensions. In general there is mass of rumors.

You know it is one thing when you and I know that this is perhaps groundless. It is quite another matter when we see how ordinary people react to this. And in this

situation it seems to me that it is rather ill-considered to take this step when we are going in for talks with the USSR.

[Paulys] It says there that a citizen of the Lithuanian Republic cannot be a citizen of another country.

[Shved] Only in special circumstances.

[Paulys] They are referring to the USSR, of course.

[Shved] But at the same time, for example, I represent the citizens' committee of the Lithuanian SSR. We consider that we have about 1 million supporters and these people cannot be expunged today from the list of citizens and that is what is happening. And we would like the Government of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet to make the corresponding statement. That is, not for the sake of any particular person but for the sake of ordinary people who today are waiting to be protected and to see whether their interests will be protected.

And in this connection, one would like to believe the assurances given by the government, by the leader of the republican government. Prunskiene, that the interests of USSR citizens will be protected. But so far, practical deeds and the real situation are quite different. I think that in order to go in for talks, to try to find a consensus, to try to understand each other, it is necessary to create the essential sociopolitical situation. It is necessary to try to behave in a proper manner toward one's colleagues.

[Paulys] That is, of course, it is very important for people to be able calmly and rationally to weigh everything up and think over, as the question of the moratorium has to be decided.

[Shved] Yes, I think that a moratorium is one of the aspects which would make it possible, to a certain extent, to stabilize the situation. I do not say that it will fully resolve the problem. We consider that the problem should be resolved on the basis of the decision of the Third Congress of Peoples Deputies. That is, it is not a question of Lithuania not being able to secede from the Union—and I fully support the opinion of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev which he expressed in the United States—but of the method by which this will be implemented. We cannot agree with the method because this should be resolved by the Lithuanian people by means of a referendum and on the basis of the law—the law of the USSR on the secession of a Union republic. I think that then there will be no problems, no uncertainty about the future and there will not be the confrontation which exists today in the republic. And if the Lithuanian people decide to secede from the Union, well all right. The only thing that we would want is that we should keep the right to try to bring to the Lithuanian people all the advantages that Lithuania, the Lithuanian free autonomous socialist republic could have in the union of free sovereign socialist republics.

[Paulys] Tell me, how do you assess the situation in this party organization, in the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU) on the eve of the 28th congress.

[Shved] You know, people have great expectations of the 28th congress. They have the greatest hopes for it—primarily for the consolidation of the party, for its democratization, and for a program to be proposed at the 28th congress for getting both the party and the country out of the crisis.

There have been very many slogans, very many appeals, very many drafts which, unfortunately, have not been implemented. We think that the 28th congress will give a reply to a whole range of questions which have been raised by life before the party and before the country.

[Paulys] But what is the position of the party organization of Lithuania? You have already spoken about the attacks and the difficult conditions in which it works.

[Shved] You now, as far as attacks are concerned, they are probably an inevitable process. Only, perhaps, they are frequently somewhat unseemly but I do not want to talk about that. I think there is no point in complaining and all the more so since our party's situation is getting stronger. Whereas before the first stage of our congress we had 35,000 members, we now have 40,000 members. In a whole range of rayons new rayon and urban party committees have been set up. That is, the situation of the communists, in spite of the campaign of isolation and the campaign of what I would call repression against them in the republic, continues to strengthen.

[Paulys] What is the attitude of young people to the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU)?

[Shved] You know what is strange here? The people entering the party are either over 50 or else young people. Today, I had a meeting with young people from Sverdlovsk and you know we found a common language. And it is not just people from Sverdlovsk that we meet. We have meetings with our young people in Vilnius and other towns. Young people want social justice. They want a democratic society. They, too, have already got tired of promises. And when we declared that our party will stand on a platform of social justice and protecting people's rights, in general, this made it possible to a certain degree to ensure the attractiveness of the position of our party in the eyes of young people.

[Paulys] Let us end on an optimistic note. How do you see Lithuania in the future, say in five years time.

[Shved] I would like to see Lithuania independent from dictate, independent from any pressure, and a Lithuanian people free in the expression of its will, in its self-determination, but in fraternal union with all the other republics. Because it is precisely in this complicated time that the Lithuanian people, having overcome all the difficulties which exist today, will be stronger if it has alongside it the Belorussians, Latvians, Estonians,

Russians. Not dissolving the Union but uniting on a new foundation that is probably the guarantee that we can eventually live together.

Estonian Deputies Protest New Immigration Law

LD2806175590 Moscow TASS in English 1730 GMT
28 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn June 28 TASS—Three groups of deputies—for equal rights, communist faction and virumaa—have lodged an official protest with the Estonian parliament in connection with the immigrant law it adopted on June 26.

The groups, comprising a total of 27 deputies, refused to take part in the vote on the new legislation.

The protest describes the immigration law as another step in the offensive against human rights and an attempt to turn Estonia into an ethnocratic state in which the non-native population are assigned the part of emigrants in their own country.

The law was passed in violation of the Constitution of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, the protest note said. Voting rules were bent, too. Since the law affects constitutional provisions, it should be adopted only if at least two-thirds of deputies support it.

Only 60 deputies out of 105 voted for the legislation.

The deputies demand an immediate legal study of the law and its revision should the study reveal a departure from international and state legal norms.

Copies of the protest note were sent to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, to the Committee for Constitutional Compliance and the subcommittee on human rights at the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Glasnost, Rights and Applications from Citizens.

Estonian Immigration Law Provisions Examined

PM2906090190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jun 90 p 1

[Dispatch by correspondent G. Sapozhnikova: "From the Humane to the Ridiculous. Law on Immigration Adopted by the Estonian Supreme Soviet Session Yesterday"]

[Text] Tallinn—If the most popular names given to new-born babies in the Estonian city of Tallinn are Katya and Sasha, then something must be done. What? Immigration must be restricted to a minimum degree and emigration encouraged to a maximum degree. The first Estonian changes two years ago began, in fact, with the answer to this question. And the first cracks in relations between the indigenous and nonindigenous population appeared. Because, if there are too few Estonians on primordial Estonian territory, then someone must be to blame.

The Law on Immigration, which was adopted yesterday and which has cast a shadow on the republic for the whole of last year, fits perfectly into the logic of these opinions. Judge for yourselves. The law's task is to promote the preservation and formation of a permanent Estonian population. How?

By establishing a quota for immigration (a maximum number of entrants), creating a Migration Department which would examine applications by all applicants to take up residence in Estonia, and "providing assistance to persons wishing to leave Estonia for the USSR or other states."

Moscow and Leningrad both regulate their size, so what is so special here? And if we look at the fate of those who want to leave Estonia willingly or if we read the subtitle of one of the articles in the Law on Immigration—"Facilitating the Adaptation of Persons Who Have Taken Up Residence in Estonia"—we would see nothing but humanitarianism. In the first instance, emigrants are given assistance from the Estonian State Migration Fund and, in the second case, the government is creating a system of courses to study the Estonian language, culture, history, and state structure.

And yet, the Russian-speaking deputies from the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet declared that the Law on Immigration contradicts the Declaration on Human Rights, and did not participate in the ballot as a sign of protest. According to them, the law in its current version contains concepts that are not simply new and unusual to our minds, but are also paradoxical.

For example, the immigration quota (under the law, it should not exceed 0.1 percent of Estonia's permanent population, approximately 1,500 persons per annum), also includes family migration. That means that if, for instance, I decide to marry someone who is a permanent resident outside Estonia, I must hurry up and do so at the beginning of the year. It is safer that way, because by December the quota might suddenly get used up.... And what then? A. Kollis, general director of the Migration Department, explained it thus: You will be put in a waiting line and the next year you will be in a privileged position.

Furthermore, the Estonian Supreme Soviet has the right to change the quota if state interests demand it.

And that is not all. Even if the Migration Department finally allows me to change my family status, my imaginary immigrant husband will be given a residence permit for six months. If I do not get fed up with him in that time, it will be extended by another six months, and then by four years. And then, always provided that I do not object, and provided that my imaginary husband goes through the adaptation period successfully, he will be given a permanent residence permit.

Furthermore, all this time my better half will be thoroughly monitored by the law enforcement organs and if,

God forbid, he should ever break the law, we would both be certainly banished from Estonia.

And during these four years, until my husband receives a permanent residence permit, he will be unable to acquire real estate, or lease housing space, or join any housing, dacha, garden, or garage cooperative.

However, none of this threatens me. This is because the settlement and residence of USSR Armed Forces military unit personnel and of embassy, consulate, and mission personnel... are regulated by agreements between the USSR and the Estonian Republic. This means that I, being a foreign correspondent, no longer qualify for a permanent residence permit in Estonia.

Estonia, Leningrad Sign Cooperation Communiqué

*LD2806142490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1300 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[Text] A meeting between Anatoliy Sobchak, chairman of Leningrad soviet and Edgar Savisaar, head of the Estonian Government, has taken place in Leningrad. They signed a communiqué on further cooperation between Leningrad and the Estonian republic in the economic and cultural spheres.

Independent Baltic Communist Parties Meet

*LD2806135290 Moscow TASS in English 1339 GMT
28 Jun 90*

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga June 28 TASS—Heads of "Independent Communist Parties of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia" have signed a protocol on cooperation after a two-day meeting in Riga.

Assessing the forthcoming 28th Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Congress, the participants in the meeting told a news conference today that the congress will decide the vital questions of who stands at the helm of the party and how the CPSU would fit into the general political system.¹

Estonian Communist Party chief Enn Sillari suggested forming a left-wing bloc to ensure the future of the multiparty system. The idea was supported by Lithuanian party leader Algirdas Brazauskas.

Latvian Communist Party chief Ivar Kezbers held pro-union Baltic communist parties partly responsible for the fact that the political pendulum had swung to the right. All three leaders expressed support for the acts restoring the independence of Baltic republics and decided to pool efforts to work out a plan to implement the idea of independence.

The meeting passed an address to the 28th CPSU Congress calling on it to democratise relations between communist parties, stressing the need "to restore historical justice" vis-a-vis the Baltic republics, in connection with their incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940.

It was announced at the news conference that this document would be distributed in Moscow by Estonian delegates, because neither the independent Lithuanian Communist Party nor the Independent Communist Party of Latvia have been invited to the 28th congress.

RSFSR

Kuzbass Council Supports 11 July Miners' Strike

LD2806183290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1800 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] The present-day workers' movement puts forward political tasks. In accordance with the decisions of the All-Union Congress of Miners and the Confederation of Labor, warning strikes are to be held in major coal-mining regions on 11 July. The demands include the resignation of the government and the formation of a new one through talks between the country's most influential forces, the abolition of the CPSU's privileged position in enterprises, and the nationalization of CPSU property.

(Shablinskiy), secretary of a Moscow workers' club, told the INTERFAX correspondent that a telegram from the council of workers' committees of Kuzbass came today. It says that the council supports the appeal of the Confederation of Labor and has come to the conclusion that a warning strike lasting up to 24 hours is necessary.

Vorkuta Strike Supported

LD2806193690 Moscow World Service in English
1500 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] The independent trade union of Soviet miners has decided to back the strike at the mines in Vorkuta region in the European north scheduled for 11 July. The decision was taken by a plenary session of that trade union's council. But the enlarged council of the labour staffs in the Kuznetsk coal basin spoke out against the strike. This has been reported by the INTERFAX news agency.

Primakov Comments on Russian Party Conference

LD2906102190 Moscow TASS in English 1010 GMT
29 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 29 TASS—"Conservative views and speeches can earn one popularity in certain circles, but they prevent one from conducting perestroika policies. And to oppose perestroika is suicidal for any political leader now," believes member of the Presidential Council and alternate member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Yevgeniy Primakov.

Commenting in an interview published by MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper today on the results of the recent founding Congress of the Russian Communist Party, he said that many speeches at the congress give grounds to regard it as conservative.

"The situation at the congress was complex, and there can be different assessments of it," Primakov said. "And still, though I try to avoid being overly optimistic, I hope that the newly elected leaders of the Russian Communist Party are for uniting all communists, otherwise they will dissociate themselves from perestroika."

It is noted in the interview that the support for Ivan Polozkov, elected general secretary of the Russian Communist Party, reflected the real correlation of forces at the congress and in the party apparatus.

This complicated the situation within the party, and some speeches Polozkov delivered creating his image as a conservative. But a person should be judged by his actions, not words, and Primakov invited us to wait and see how the new leader and new leadership act.

Their attitude at the 28th congress of the Soviet Communist Party will explain their position, too.

"I hope that Yeltsin and Polozkov, however different their views, have in common the striving to serve Russia," Primakov stressed.

Primakov believes that the Soviet Communist Party has not lost its leading role in society. The ways in which this role is manifested has changed. "We have so far no other force that could rally people as the party can," he said in the interview. "I believe the main role of the 28th party congress is to determine new forms of party's work with masses."

The future of the party lies not in the restoration of old methods, Primakov said. Any attempt to revive them would signal the party's demise as a mass vanguard organisation. The country has reached a new historic landmark, and a party can remain in the vanguard only if it moves ahead of the process.

Polozkov Asked About Servicemen's Problems

PM2806130190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Jun 90 First Edition p 2

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel I. Sas: "I.K. Polozkov: 'RSFSR Communist Party Will Be Party of Socialist Choice'"]

[Excerpts] On 23 June I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee, held a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists. [passage omitted]

How does the first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee regard the problems which military delegates raised from the congress platform? I.K. Polozkov's answer to this question from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent was that he regards them with understanding. During the election campaign he repeatedly met with officers and warrant officers and their families. And he saw for himself that they have very many problems. The most acute of them is housing. As

chairman of a kray soviet of people's deputies, he endeavored to do everything to alleviate these problems. As of today, he said, we do not owe the military a single square meter of housing, we meet our obligations promptly. We seek by various means to fully provide servicemen with kindergartens and creches.

The Army and the KGB cannot be outside politics, I.K. Polozkov thinks. As state organs they are themselves the instrument of politics. Therefore their depoliticization, which is being much discussed now, is impossible. As for the CPSU's influence on these organs, then, as long as it is a ruling party, such influence will be exerted.

Ligachev Interviewed at Russian Party Congress

PM2306193490 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN
in Russian 22 Jun 90 p 3

[O. Akulova, V. Solovvey "reportage from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses" on third day of Russian Communist Party Founding Congress, incorporating a "fragment" of an interview given by Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee: "At a Turning Point"]

[Excerpt] The third day of work at the founding congress of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party was a kind of watershed. Both because the delegates had already used up the greater part of the time originally planned for the holding of the congress. And because from first thing in the morning the speeches of a sloganeering nature, suitable for rallies, which had been a feature of the first two days of work disappeared. These speeches simply became inappropriate when it came to more concrete matters—the final version of the congress declaration and the elections of the party's leadership organs.

But this item on the agenda was also discussed far from simply, once again causing waiting lines for the microphones. One platform for a detachment of nearly 3,000 delegates, and the congress cannot go on indefinitely. So it is obvious that the vast majority of delegates will not be able to speak on the pressing questions. And even those who are given the floor at the congress are restricted by a time limit and by no means always have the opportunity to say everything they wanted to say. In these conditions it is not surprising that there are heated debates in the breaks between sittings and a willingness on the part of the majority of delegates to engage in active discussions with representatives of the press.

It was probably due to this fact that we were able to talk with Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. We cite below a fragment of the interview he gave to SELSKAYA ZHIZN and Moscow Radio correspondents.

[Correspondents] Are you not afraid that the formation of a Russian party in conditions where centrifugal forces are in operation in the country will lead to party disunity?

[Ligachev] No. I believe in the internationalism of Russian communists, I believe in the Russian people's traditions, in the people of Russia. We drank this in with our mother's milk, as the saying goes. That is why I am voting for the Russian party. I am confident that Russia's communists will be to an even greater extent both responsible and concerned for the integrity of our state.

[Correspondents] How do you understand the slogan "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" today?

[Ligachev] We must unite, and not disunite, the entire communist and workers' movement. Incidentally, this is even more so in that a retreat from socialism is taking place in a whole series of regions of the world. Among them, I think, Eastern Europe. That is my own view. I am very concerned about this situation. I have just read a resolution here which I signed together with others. It is a resolution of solidarity with the communists of East European countries. All the countries of East Europe cannot, of course, be lumped together, but... If you face up to the truth, it is necessary to say loud and clear that socialism in that important region of the world has suffered a defeat. I am sure it is a temporary defeat. In the end the socialist idea will prevail. The socialist community has, unfortunately, disintegrated, and the forces of imperialism have gained strength to an incredible extent on this continent. That is my view.

[Correspondents] But there probably were also mistakes in Soviet foreign policy?

[Ligachev] I think that this is primarily the result of those countries' internal development and of outside influence on those countries.

[Correspondents] Yesterday we talked with Comrade V. Starodubtsev. He was worried that little is being said at the congress about the party's policy with regard to agriculture. No Russian Communist Party position, no agrarian policy for the Communist Party is yet in sight. What do you think about this?

[Ligachev] I think people are simply overwhelmed by many other problems. Problems connected with the party's fate. So Vasilii Aleksandrovich should not be too annoyed with all of us delegates because questions of agrarian policy are not very prominent here. The CPSU congress is still to come. Everyone is worried about the party's fate. What kind of party will it be? Will there be a party at all? Will it be a party of the Leninist type? If we resolve that problem, we will resolve the agrarian problem too. Please convey my greetings to rural journalists and readers! [passage omitted]

Sobchak, Shevardnadze Cited on Party Congress

PM2506085590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
22 Jun 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by special correspondents I. Vasilyev, A. Ilyin, M. Kostikov, A. Petrushov, I. Podsvirov, V. Khatuntsev, and Yu. Shabanov: "Leaders Required"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] We asked Russian congress delegate A. Sobchak, chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet, to comment on the situation at the congress.

"I am worried by the fragmentation among communists in both ideological and organizational terms. I am making this judgment on the basis of the Leningrad City Soviet's work. You wouldn't believe the number of deputies' blocs we have seen created! With one exception—a communists' bloc. Despite the fact that the majority of deputies are CPSU members.

"This kind of passivity among communists impacts on the work of deputies' formations at various levels. This is a detrimental to the party, since it is judged on the basis of each individual communist. But look at the newly emerging parties. The people joining them are very active; in essence they are leaders. Unfortunately there are not so many leaders of this kind, in the true sense, in the CPSU today. [passage omitted]

During a break between sessions we managed to get a brief interview with E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister. Summing up the pretty heated discussions and disputes, he said:

"What is currently happening is a process of the formation and establishment of an RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party. The main thing, I believe, is that specific actions are now needed. There have been many fine words and old-style appeals at the Russian communist congress. But it is now time for specific practical activity. By all healthy forces. Consolidation of these forces will happen. I very much hope that the leader of the Russian Communist Party elected by the delegates will be able to consolidate these forces." [passage omitted]

Undelivered Delegates' Speeches To Be Published

PM2206135190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 21 Jun 90 Single Edition p 7

[Unattributed account of speech by A.P. Zhitenev, leader of the Constituent Congress Secretariat, at the 20 June morning sitting of the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress under general heading: "Discussion of the Report 'With Responsibility for the Future of Russia and the Country as a Whole'"]

[Excerpts] Esteemed comrade delegates! Allow me to inform you of certain matters pertaining to the work of the Secretariat which was elected yesterday.

As we embark on the performance of our functions, we see it as our task to make the congress sittings and the discussion of the agenda as organized and as efficient as possible. We want to avoid even the slightest slips and misunderstandings, particularly in the solution of organizational and procedural questions. I have a number of ideas I would like to express in this connection. [passage omitted]

So far there have been 170 requests from delegates and invitees to be allowed to speak. It is becoming clear that all those who have registered will not be able to speak in the time allotted for the discussion of the agenda. According to the standing orders, the texts of the speeches of delegates. I emphasize delegates, who were listed to speak but were unable to do so, will be included in the stenographic account of the congress work. Therefore, when the debate ends, we would ask delegates to supply the Secretariat, if they so wish of course, with the texts of the speeches they did not make. They must be printed and stamped. The size must accord with the requirements of the standing orders, that is, not more than five to six pages. It must also be borne in mind that all proposals and observations on congress draft resolutions and decisions and all alternative documents must be registered with the Secretariat and will be promptly sent to the working commissions for use in work. [passage omitted]

I would like to assure you, esteemed delegates, that the Secretariat will seek to carry out its tasks promptly and competently and it counts on your understanding and keen cooperation. Thank you for listening.

Isayev on Draft Law on Constitutional Changes

LD1606142690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1100 GMT 16 Jun 90

[Text] At the congress of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet. Here is the all-Union correspondent in the Kremlin. At the microphone is Andrey Nikoiforov.

{Begin recording} [Nikiforov] A central question discussed by the congress of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet today is the draft law on changes and addenda to the Constitution of the RSFSR. The preparatory commission has presented this document. Many provisions in it have been brought into line with the Union Constitution. Twenty-three deputies spoke on the draft law, while 55 deputies had been registered to speak. Proposals and remarks regarding the documents were introduced. However, the congress has not adopted the draft law and the situation remains extremely unclear since evidently it would not be expedient to leave certain provisions in the currently valid Constitution. After all, even at the Union level appropriate changes and addenda have already been introduced. I have asked Boris Mikhaylovich Isayev, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, to comment upon the situation that has arisen at the congress. Over to you, Boris Mikhaylovich.

[Isayev] Hello, dear listeners. The congress which has been going on for a month now is holding a very serious and tense conversation. And the people's deputies show very great interest in discussion of the issues submitted for consideration, especially today when I delivered a report on changes and addenda to the Constitution on certain articles of the RSFSR Constitution in the draft law concerning the political, economic, and electoral systems. And these were the lines along which we, the Supreme Soviet and the preparatory commission, were thinking when planning to bring into line the Constitution of the RSFSR with the law adopted by the USSR. But, regrettably the RSFSR deputies do not agree with this formulation of the question, since it is different now from the way it was before when the RSFSR used to adopt laws which had been previously adopted by the Union. That could be especially clearly observed after we adopted the RSFSR declaration of sovereignty on 12 June. And today many people's deputies are raising the question as to whether the Constitution of the RSFSR should be brought into line with the declaration adopted, both the preamble and questions concerning the superiority of RSFSR laws in the RSFSR territory to those of the USSR, if they contravene the interests of the RSFSR; and concerning many other issues which are clearly and distinctly outlined in the declaration of sovereignty. And I think that now when the break ends, there will be a very serious conversation. And it will be continued on the questions which the deputies are discussing very acutely. Be that as it may, today we have a way out of this dead end situation. Today's session has confirmed a Constitutional Commission.

[Nikiforov] Full membership?

[Isayev] Yes, full membership, 100 members. Today the decision has been passed. In accordance with the proposal made by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the commission now includes major experts and scientists in this field in addition to the territorial list which was originally composed. And today many speakers are saying that it is necessary for the Constitutional Commission to round up the amendments that are coming in and to introduce general proposals on the RSFSR Constitution, not only those concerning the articles which were introduced today, but also as a whole many other articles which require radical change.

[Nikiforov] Boris Nikolayevich, surely it is only possible to introduce such proposals at a regular or extraordinary congress of people's deputies. But what will happen in the meantime, say, regarding Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution?

[Isayev] Various decisions are being made here. An attempt has been made today to suspend Article 6. I repeat once again, no decision has yet been passed on this subject. The evening session will continue discussion of the changes introduced into the draft law concerning Articles 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12; and concerning changes of the forms of ownership: the law on ownership and land;

and many other articles which require changes in the Constitution today. I think that before the end of the day we will be able to find solutions to the issues raised.

[Nikiforov] Well, we will hope and wait that such solutions will be found by the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR today. I will remind our listeners that that was the interview with Boris Mikhaylovich Isayev, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. With this I will close my report from the Kremlin. [end recording]

'Stormy Atmosphere' Noted at Moscow Soviet

LD2806164490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] The issue of organizing trade in the capital was to be discussed at the session of the Moscow City Soviet today. Our special correspondent Vladimir Korablev reports by telephone.

[Korablev] The work of the concluding phase of the Moscow City Soviet's session is passing in quite a stormy atmosphere. The deputies are constantly amending the agenda. The initial 15 issues to be examined in the course of the current session were supplemented by about a dozen more today. They include, for example, the issues of the depoliticization of law-enforcement bodies, of cooperative property, and of the symbols used for decorating the assembly hall of the Moscow City Soviet's session. I would say that the last issue caused great controversy. Unlike yesterday, the bust of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin was not removed from the hall today, but the Russian tricolor appeared beside the bust. This aroused protests from the Moskva group of deputies, who left the assembly hall.

In the afternoon the deputies started discussing the issue of the main principles of organizing trade in Moscow. Two drafts were submitted for examination by the deputies. They gave rise to quite a heated debate. Many deputies spoke against introducing visiting cards and selling goods on production of passports. In a word, the discussion is going on, and a decision has been adopted for the three commissions to get together again to discuss the projects and later to adopt a corresponding decision. So the issue remains open.

Moscow CPSU Plenum Discusses Draft 'Position'

90UN2116A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 1 Jun 90 pp 2, 3

[Statements by participants in discussion at Moscow CPSU City Committee plenum on 30 May]

[Excerpts] As already reported, a plenum of the Moscow Gorkom [city party committee] was held on 30 May. Today we are printing statements from the discussions.

Statement of A.I. Zemskov, first secretary of the Khoroshevskiy CPSU Rayon Party Committee

I shall try to briefly report the results achieved by the work group of the party city committee for analyzing the draft regulations developed in the Moscow city party organization and to refine the proposals on the basis of this. The authors of the draft regulations or representatives of the corresponding party organizations were invited. In my view, they are highly qualified specialists. I think many agree with my own personal feeling: that we should discuss the regulations article by article, and that it is not sufficient to discuss them in terms of individual positions. If we are to engage in this seriously, it is absolutely necessary to try to compile our own draft from "A" to "Z." Only then can a person understand how important the structure of the document and the coordination of its individual points are.

The work of the small collective turned out to be creative. The most interesting aspects were presented in the last variants of the draft Regulations (they are now rapidly becoming outdated). For example, the latest April development, which was adopted by the Svenigorod conference of party organizations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is a very useful document from the standpoint of a systematic approach and the depth of its development. The draft Regulations of the interclub party group was considered (developed in December 1989) as were draft Regulations from our largest party organizations: Moscow State University, the Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute, the Moscow Aviation Institute, and also the draft of the Khoroshevskiy Rayon party organization. We formed the conviction that in our day it is fundamentally impossible to write a document that satisfies everyone. And therefore it is always necessary to proceed from the idea that from 15 to 40 percent of the people will criticize any document. This is related, of course, to the fact that the party and the entire society are living in an acutely transitional period. And what seems quite normal or, as they say, adequate today might be quite useless by July or October. Thus we must have a clear understanding—and the groups had it—that we are speaking about a transitional draft, about party regulations for a certain transitional period, and we shall not try to say that we have developed a draft document that will last for five or 10 years. Life will correct us.

It was necessary to take something as a basis and it seemed to us quite reasonable to take as a basis the draft CPSU Regulations, for it was the most widely read and understood. It is necessary to speak the same language as all the delegates to the 28th party congress.

The document has been distributed to everyone and it contains additions to the basic document. I shall list the main points in terms of content. The first, of course, is the primacy of human values. This is respected in the draft of the Regulations of the CPSU Central Committee and in all subsequent documents. They are reflected in the preamble and pay attention to the wordings concerning communist ideology, the socialist choice, and the

fact that the party operates within the framework of the law. A most important aspect which, it seems to me, distinguishes the party documents developed in the authors' group of the gorkom [city committee] and distinguishes them from the draft party Regulations is the direction of control or the vectors of control "from below to above." I know that many people are not willing to accept the idea of voluntary delegation of authority but, in my view, the whole work group was unanimous in its understanding of the fact that only through voluntary delegation of authority is it possible to construct a voluntary all-Union political organization. If this principal is accepted, this automatically solves the problem of the role of the higher organs and the party apparatus, and there is nothing more to explain. If the document is based on the principle of delegation of authority from "below to above," nothing additional is needed.

The section entitled "The Rights of Communists" includes points that are presumed by many party organizations. These include direct participation of rank-and-file communists in the formation of party policy and in its leadership organs through direct election of congress delegates and nomination of candidates to leadership organs in the local party organizations. They also include the idea of provision of information for communists, protection of communists by the party, support for the communist if he is nominated from the party organization, support for his election campaign, participation in the utilization of the party's material funds, and the right to withdraw from the party voluntarily.

The last point is being discussed very keenly, especially in the club of conference delegates. But it seems to me that there is no need to get especially exercised because even without the right to withdraw from the party voluntarily, that is, within the currently existing Regulations, for example, in our Khoroshevskiy Rayon party organization about four percent of the members will withdraw from the party this year. This is where we should proceed from.

Even, I repeat, within the framework of the existing Regulations where this is regarded as a personal affair, the figure is four percent per year.

The next group of questions is related to the implementation of theses to the effect that the local party organization is the basis of the party. I shall not go into this. Everyone knows this.

The development of horizontal structures. Although, in my opinion, the initiative proceeded from the draft of the "Democratic Platform," which means that certain communists greeted it cautiously and with suspicion of unrestrained radicalism. I am convinced that with the development of horizontal structures the matter will proceed in the direction of strengthening the political functions of the party and the party organizations in counterbalance to an attempt to return to management functions. And in this respect I am in favor of a planned "entry" of the party into the horizontal structures.

From the aspects mentioned above also follows the approach to the problem of the organizational construction of the party. Until we reach the point of legalizing factions, in my opinion, this says it all. In this respect there are no fundamental differences from the draft of the Central Committee; it also mentions the platform and it has not yet reached the point of factions either.

In the Central Committee draft the recognition of the multiparty system is there in black and white, and it is stated that the party will operate by parliamentary methods, but there is no further development of what that means for us, what rights it gives us, or what responsibilities it imposes on us. And if we do not take these behavior norms into account in the Regulations we will be making the same mistakes that were made during the past elections to local soviets when a number of communists enthusiastically voted against the lists drawn up by the Communist Party. In regular parties in politically developed countries this would be impossible.

The structural changes made by the work group are not so significant.

The result of our group's work were two draft Regulations and one of them, the comparative one, has been distributed to participants in the plenum. The other draft is independent and contains a number of innovations in terms of content. In order for them to be studied and discussed by all delegates to the conference I suggest that they be published either in the bulletin of the Moscow Gorkom, in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, or in the PRAVDA discussion insert.

That is the statement on behalf of the group. I request permission to raise a number of questions for your consideration. They are being discussed widely in the local party organizations. The first has to do with proposals concerning permanent delegates to the congress or conference. I do not think that this is reasonable. Here it is necessary, as it were, to dot all the "i's." In my professional view, such a status makes party committees absolutely unnecessary. And nothing new is added because the permanent delegates of the congress (conference) will have the rights to recall and monitoring—and these are rights that can now be granted to members of the party committee. Permanent delegates will create a new and unnecessary structure, a structure of party districts. In fact, comrades, it is artificial and contrived.

The next question is that of approval of the editor in chief of the party press organ. This subject is discussed very frequently. I personally think we should approve not one editor in chief but an editorial board, and at the congress or conference the editorial board should be approved or considered by the members of the collective management organ of the party publication. This, in my opinion, will be reasonable and more reliable.

Regarding control and inspection commissions. I think that the comrades who insist that the party copy the state structure, "triune power"—legislative, executive, and supervisory—are getting carried away. The transfer of

the majority of the rights to the local party organizations, the delimitation of the functions of the party and the state, the creation of a free press, and the introduction of a multiparty system have created a situation in which we do not need any additional controllers.

We should have fewer lofty sounding titles. Why do we need the title General Secretary? Let us be a little more modest. This is a general aspiration, and this recommendation should be made.

My own personal opinion is this: The Regulations should not be overloaded with democratic aspects because this reduces the efficiency of the elective organ.

And my last remark: It is not only and not so much the Regulations that are important. They are, of course, necessary but they are far from adequate. Even if we create an ideal variant of the Regulations or one that is close to the ideal we will have at best only nine or 10 percent of the votes in any election. And we must strive to win the confidence of 55-60 percent of the voters. Therefore it is very important to develop a program for bringing the country out of its crisis and tactics for the Communist Party in the elections, that is, documents which will attract people to our side.

On an average each of us must bring along five to six people and convince them. Otherwise even with our good Regulations we will have only 10 percent of the votes in any voting. [passage omitted]

Statement of I.N. Fomin, truck driver brigade leader of Automotive Combine No. 16

I am a worker. I did and still do consider the Communist Party to be a party of the working class. But the events of the last five years cause me a great deal of alarm. This alarm appeared with the beginning of perestroika. I was put on guard by the fact that priorities in the CPSU shifted from the workers, peasants, and labor intelligentsia to the privileged segments of the intelligentsia, employees, and various kinds of social climbers. These people began to prevail in the adoption of political decisions and in the mass media. Slandorous fabrications became widespread to the effect that the worker, the simple toiler was a stagnant element. Insulting slogans and comparisons appeared: "Give unto the metal worker his due," "Children of Sharikov," and so forth. This alarm was smoothed over to some extent by the fact that at the 27th party congress a task was set to strengthen and renew socialism, to purge it of bureaucratism and parasitism, and to increase the role of the workers in the control of production. With the hope of being renewed and surmounting the crisis we engaged in the work, but then something incomprehensible began.

The government and the leadership of the CPSU seemed to have decided to set a record for incompetent decisions: the degrading anti-alcohol campaign, cooperative speculation, self-financing of enterprises which developed into group egoism, the sudden leap to economic accountability, the collapse of the consumer market, the

excessive budget deficit, inflation... This is an incomplete list of the "successes" that led the country's economy to the verge of destruction. And now as though nothing had happened the leadership of the country and party are calling for us to join in on the next campaign to change over to a regulated market economy, forgetting to bring to account those who were responsible for the implementation of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress. This is very reminiscent—the older comrades will recall—of the "maneuver" of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev when he tried to conceal the failure of the five-year plan behind the seven-year plan.

But now the situation is much worse. The market economy into which they are trying to draw us is in reality a capitalist economy hiding shame-facedly behind this phrase. People might say that I am exaggerating. But we are not so stupid as not to understand what is capitalism and what is socialism.

L.I. Abalkin said that many enterprises operating at a loss at the end of this year will be turned over to private hands. If we are forced to go to these new masters to be hired and if they evaluate us in terms of profit and when we are no longer needed they throw us out into the streets, regardless of how you may assure me that this is socialism I will not believe you.

Referring to joint-stock ownership is no answer either. This is private property, a form of distribution according to the amount of capital. A person receives income without working. It is no comfort that they are promising to limit capitalism for us. We would have been able to believe this during the transitional period of the twenties when the power belonged to the workers. But there is no confidence in this with the current course of events. You know what the percentage of worker representation is in the soviets after the elections, and among the delegates to the party congress as well. Where things will actually end up is shown by the fates of the former socialist countries in East Europe.

So I ask: Will our party still be a party of the working class, a party of workers not in words but in deeds? Or will it be a party of entrepreneurs? We sincerely support perestroika and we had hoped to get rid of corrupt party and state bureaucrats who became bourgeois and betrayed the interests of the workers. And they are offering us the most pure-blooded bourgeoisie possible and passing this off for the development of socialism. Is this not treachery? In spite of certain unrealized hopes and deprivations we were prepared to help the party, above all in strengthening and developing the foundations of socialism: public ownership, planning, economic accountability, a combination of social guarantees and discipline and responsibility, and democratization of all spheres of the society. But what we have is a lack of faith in the future, mutual destruction in a competitive battle, higher prices, inflation, unemployment, a lower standard of living, and separation into rich and poor. I have grave suspicions—pardon my harshness—that some kind of dirty game is going on. I could still understand if the

communists were forced out of office and made to abandon their principles. But when communists themselves or, rather, party leaders begin to think that capitalism is socialism and the fate of the worker is to be eternally under the thumb of capitalists. There is nowhere for us workers to turn. We do not buy the means of production and we are not given small shares. But the wheeler-dealers in the shadow economy and the cooperators are prepared to become members of boards and directors of private, sometimes capitalist, companies. They will be able to do this if we remain the people, as Marx said, "who get fleeced."

We must clearly state that the CPSU should look for a way out of the difficulties on a socialist basis and not capitulate and not abandon their goals when the slightest difficulties appear. It is either turncoats or careerists who do this. We should not allow the workers to be deprived of their party. Those who do not like it and wish to use it for other purposes can leave. A multiparty system is now being formed. I think the party of the working class does not wish to betray the interests of the workers, and must do everything possible to make sure that this multiparty system is based on a socialist consensus. The socialist foundations of society must be reinforced and protected in the Constitution. And we can learn this from those very conservatives in the West; they do not capitulate in the face of difficulties and do not look for ways to solve their problems on the basis of abandoning their principles. The entire multiparty system of the West is based on protection and preservation of the bourgeois constitution. Communists and workers too must protect their socialist Constitution.

Today we are discussing the position paper of the Moscow city party organization, and I and many of my comrades who are delegates to the 28th party congress have a suggestion for the draft of the position paper regarding the most crucial aspect now—the economic situation.

We have called it: "The CPSU for a Realistic Economic Policy in the Interests of Working People." The most immediate and responsible task of the CPSU economic policy in the modern stage is to determine the ways out of the economic crisis and providing for steady, aggressive economic growth on the basis of a well-arranged economic mechanism. The strategic purview of the economic policy consists of a deep structural arrangement of the national economy, scientific and technical renewal of the production apparatus, a considerable increase in the effectiveness of production, and the creation of real conditions for steady improvement of the well-being of the workers and all members of the society.

We consider our primary tasks to be:

1. To develop effective forms of realization of socialist ownership, including individual-labor. On this basis, to transform the workers of the socialist enterprises into real owners and masters of production.

2. To release the economic and production initiative and socialist enterprisingness on the basis of the introduction of progressive forms of management and the development of economically accountable independence of the enterprises.

3. To stimulate conscientious, highly productive labor to the maximum degree.

4. To strengthen labor discipline and organization in all ways. To wage a resolute struggle against socially parasitic activity in all of its forms, the shadow economy, speculative cooperatives, and socially unjustified privileges. To develop foreign economic relations that are advantageous to our country and to our people.

The Moscow CPSU city organization supports a policy of acceleration of economic reform and considers that this should provide for all-around democratization of planned management of the unified national economic complex and consistent development of a regulated market.

Communists think that a changeover to a planned market economy under socialism presupposes all-around development and complete saturation of the market with consumer goods and in principle precludes a market for work force and capital. This changeover should be accompanied not by a reduction but stabilization and then a steady rise in the standard of living of the workers—not by pressure but by strengthening of social achievements and social protection of the working man; not by the development of mass unemployment but by the provision of conditions for complete exercise by each individual of his constitutional right to work; by the provision of complete and effective employment for all able-bodied people. Regarding the issue of price reform and price setting, we suggest conducting a nationwide referendum and we are introducing a legislative initiative for the adoption of a law on the living wage in the USSR at a level that provides for normal living conditions.

The party organizations of Moscow support the demands of the trade unions in defense of the socioeconomic rights of the working class and the working intelligentsia. We shall pay special attention to the less-protected segments of the population, pensioners, students, large families, and disabled persons. We are confident that the economic policy of the communists of Moscow will receive support from the working class and all workers of the capital.

Statement of G.V. Badeyeva, prorector of the Academy of the National Economy under the USSR Council of Ministers

It seems to me that the stated position of the Moscow city party organization is largely abstract. If we want this really to be a position paper to be read at the congress it must be concretized to a considerable degree. So that it

can determine the further direction of the work of communists and the work of the Moscow party organization.

Here is what I would like to say. When we talk about the causes of the crisis in the society we should not simply list what has happened over the past 70 years and the past 20 years. We must evaluate what happened between the 27th and 28th congresses. And here I agree completely with the preceding speaker who said that we must see with absolute clarity what happened during this time and see who is responsible for the mistakes that were made. And why all communists and many nonparty members supported this policy.

For we also followed it. Whether we are to blame or not, we shall not search for guilty parties here but for the causes. And it is probably necessary to determine clearly: Was experimentation in the area of the economy in such an immense country really anything other than shaking up the economic system? Once any large system is shaken loose it cannot stop, it keeps moving. Technicians and cyberneticists and anyone who works with systems knows this.

Further, we must say that the mistakes in the policy led to unpredicted social consequences which were not taken into account. And the mistakes multiplied. Thus the policy in the area of national relations and the policy of the economic blockade did not play the positive role for which they were intended and developed.

Karabakh was a point of departure for national dissension and hostility, and it led to civil war in Transcaucasia. We must say that this led to the escalation of ethnic disturbances and ethnic tension in various regions. But why are we not saying this?

The economic blockade of Lithuania is leading to the same kind of phenomena. And we must say that it is undoubtedly necessary to sit down at the negotiating table because a blockade of Moscow and Moscow Oblast is beginning, and there is beginning to be an economic blockade of other regions. We are destroying the market, and it is no longer just the consumer market but the market of the country's economy as a whole. This leads to unpredictable consequences because we will be forced to turn back to many, many years ago in order to create the market anew. And this in general influences not only our standard of living but also the development of the country as a whole.

Further. It seems to me that we should note that the main thing now is consolidation of forces; we should not be entering into a permanent confrontation. You understand, when you look at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and not the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Congress of People's Deputies all the time there is some kind of increasing confrontation. And it seems, well, enough—we must sit down and calmly figure things out. No. Again there is another episode, some speech which generally stirs up passions again. And this will lead to nothing good. We

cannot break out of this cycle of endless accusations and endless aggression because evil generates only evil, and we cannot decide what we should actually do. We must change from these meaningless words to real and realistic actions.

And, finally, communists should state that people should not be poor; a great country that is working well and hard today deserves to be rich, for its people to be rich, for all of them to live, as it were, in the perpetual prospect of things getting better. The idea of achieving a level of well-being and prosperity of the population has been implanted in our consciousness. Why do we think about poverty and want—is this an ideal that is worthy of us? Certainly not.

Now about the political sphere. And here too, it seems to me, we must struggle not simply for realization of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the human being, of peoples and nations; we must have a concrete plan with stages and priorities. What rights do we want to have? If we want to have the right to free entrepreneurship, the right to work—and I agree with the idea proclaimed here—then it must be emphasized. And this means that we must fight for these things now and we must include them in our programs, because this is the basis on which our tactics will be determined. Further, if one is to speak about the economic sphere, I must say that the position paper presented here is actually no different from the proposition paper of the government presented at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet by N.I. Ryzhkov. In my view we should have a certain distance. Anyway the communists must somehow evaluate this position paper today, and this evaluation will undoubtedly coincide with the program presented by Comrade Ryzhkov. Why? I shall give my opinion about this. Because this program actually discredits the idea of the market. The first thing to come is a price hike which certainly does not have to be linked to the market. What does this mean? Prices will undoubtedly rise with the introduction of market economic relations. But let us say they could double, but the government plans a two to threefold increase in prices, and on this basis market prices will rise. Do you understand what is being done? Instead of compensating for the rise in prices that will actually occur, the government first slips into our pockets and steals our money and then we will have to swim on the wave of market prices as best we can.

Further, I must speak about the notion that, say, our wealth is distributed in Moscow, and how ready are we for the market if it comes from man himself and not simply from a state program. Economists have done a great deal of work, of course, and weighed all the economic advantages, but still we as communists must judge speaking about man, about a member of our society, and not simply about some general economic picture.

The savings of Moscow residents average R1,413. Of course if we are to speak about today's food prices these savings are not much, but I should like to look from the

paradoxical side. They say we do not need gold, we do not need automobiles, and there are other things we do not need. But as a woman I think in simple terms. With this money I could buy one share in the future. I have to work half my life to buy a little ring for myself or my daughter. You understand, this means it is assumed ahead of time that the people should live in such poverty that they do not have access to such things. From the social standpoint let us look at the higher prices for motor vehicles. We have already had this, we have already been through this. This generates thievery and a Mafioso structure. Moreover, this is not a luxury, it is something we already have. I would understand if we had never had things like this. But we have had them and so we should probably proceed from the idea that we need all the goods that already exist on the market. And we cannot sort these things out administratively: People do need this and do not need that.

Then I should like to say that the communists should still probably talk about this in the congress, that in general we cannot take this kind of approach to things related to compensation and social protection. When N.I. Ryzhkov says that we will give five rubles per child and seven rubles per child under seven years of age, I, for example, feel ashamed of our government. We should not speak about this at all. What do five rubles mean in our day? Nothing. Perhaps, of course, from the standpoint of a large budget this is a large amount, all added together, but from the standpoint of a person, I think this simply degrades human dignity. And that is revolting.

The next aspect I should like to discuss is unemployment. We should now create a specific program which could reorient people, train them, and increase their qualifications if they end up without work. And the city power structures should handle this, including the city committee of the CPSU. Therefore it seems to me, and I am drawing a general conclusion, that our party position paper should be concretized and should be expressed by communists quite clearly, without any, as it were, circumlocutions. [passage omitted]

Statement of Yu.G. Borisov, first secretary of the Moskosretskiy CPSU Raykom [rayon party committee]

Having become familiar with the present draft of the position paper of the Moscow city party organization, one must note that both the permanent conferences and the commissions of the city party committee as well as the work group have worked fairly productively. It actually is acquiring the appearance of if not completion then a form that can be taken to the city conference.

My suggestion: It should be published and should reach every communist of the city and all the party organizations for the most widespread publicity so that it actually will be a position paper of the entire city party organization.

I should like to discuss certain sections and subdivisions of it once again.

The introduction is fairly well-substantiated and balanced and it objectively reflects the situation in the city and society. In my view this does not need to be augmented. At the same time I suggest giving careful attention to the thesis: "The economic system which is not receptive to scientific and technical progress has turned out to be inadequate" and so forth throughout the text. It seems to me that we should work very seriously on this proposition, on the semantic content. For it is not just a matter of a lack of receptivity to scientific and technical progress. It is much more complicated. Therefore I should like the editorial commission to work on this and this eloquent phrase should be filled with deeper content.

In the last paragraph of the second section I suggest adding: "the absence during the past five years of a clear concept of its implementation (referring to the concept of perestroika), the adoption of economically and socially ill-considered decisions by leaders of the party and the state."

In the local party organizations they frequently speak about the need for answerability for many ill-considered decisions which evoke a very harsh evaluation from local party organizations. The next point is confusing. When a difficult situation is created in production they enlist the best forces of engineering and technical personnel, workers, and production organizers, but when there is a difficult situation in the party why are party and social scientists busy elsewhere? Are these five years really adequate to work out certain areas and give scientifically substantiated or at least approximate, estimated positions regarding the development of our society for the forthcoming period or, in any case, give a good evaluation and interpret everything that has happened beginning in 1917 up to the present time.

In section three, the political one, I suggest the following: Eliminate the word "foreseeable." You know, when you read it there arises an association or analogy with the idea of "not far off." Our text goes on to say "humane, democratic socialism." I still suggest wording it: "in a humane and democratic society—socialism." Because when you meet people they ask the question: Is there any other kind of socialism? And critical, nihilistic discussions begin. And I should like to introduce a statement about acceleration of the development and adoption of the new USSR Constitution.

In the subdivision devoted to the economic sphere I support the proposal to put on the agenda for the 28th party congress questions of the forthcoming economic reform. We need a truly party-based and political evaluation of everything that is taking place and the proposals the government has brought to the Supreme Soviet. The economic subdivision, which designates the course of the stage-by-stage changeover to a regulated market of goods, finances, and resources evokes a complex reaction. We have no definite, clearly expressed position regarding the forms of ownership; nothing is said about the fight against the shadow economy; and

there are no answers to the most crucial and burning questions. Of course we cannot answer all the questions, but we must clearly answer all the questions that are truly bothering the population. The imprecise statement of our attitude toward the protection of the interests of the underprivileged social groups makes it impossible to enlist supporters from this segment of the population. The economic subdivision requires very significant work. In any case we should probably not present it to the congress in the form in which it appears now.

In the section entitled "Party Reform" I suggest introducing an addition concerning making the CPSU congresses and conferences permanent. If the term is extended the delegates are responsible for the implementation of the decisions of the party forum. They will be elected for the period up until the next congress or conference, inform central party organs on questions inside the party and general political questions, and no less than once a year they will report on their work in the local party organizations that elected them to the party congress or conference.

Today I feel awkward or something. Here we are meeting at the 28th congress and we will explain: How were the decisions of the 27th congress fulfilled? And who will receive all the complaints about the failures to fulfill them and how will we feel during the next five-year period? Or will we sit through the congress and then leave? And leave all these new questions to the new delegates of the next congress?

If we look at the position paper from the editorial standpoint, in my view we should probably give our evaluations more clearly, more expressively, and more precisely. We should eliminate such words as probably and one must think. Or, for example, I suggest striking this sentence: We must resolve the question of the formation of the Communist Party of Russia. This question does not require discussion; for our Moskovskiy Rayon party organization of 35,000 it has already been resolved. This is not a demand, nor is it a philosophical reflection on "to be or not to be."

In the economic area of the party reform it is necessary to reflect the question of the possibility of commercial activity of party organizations. It is not simply a matter of any kind of support or tacit approval but a clear and precise reflection of the need for the development of this activity of party organizations.

Congress delegates should undoubtedly be present and participate in our conference. We must be sure to give the floor to those who want to speak. We think the position of the congress delegates should not only be individual but should also reflect the opinion of the city local party organization. And as concerns proposals on the resolutions, let us still approach these documents in a weighed manner. There have been quite a few resolutions, decrees, and platforms of various kinds recently and there is the danger that they might turn into a sea of paper.

Statement of O.V. Melnikov, lead engineer of the Central Scientific Research, Planning, and Experimental Institute of Educational Buildings

A great deal is being said about consolidation of the party. The subject is quite necessary, but we must have a clear idea of the stage in which and the point at which we shall be consolidated. Because if we raise the question of consolidation with the anticommunist party of USSR People's Deputy Nikolay Ilich Travkin, in my view this is impossible. Therefore in the position paper of the Moscow party organization we should clearly indicate the limits of consolidation.

The second thing. There are many arguments about the party's social base. I work in the delegates' club and there people have expressed the opinion that with respect to its social base the party should be oriented toward intellectual forces. They are speaking about creating some kind of elite party. Therefore I have the quite concrete suggestion to include in our position paper the idea that under these conditions the potential base for party renewal includes the broad segments of the society, above all workers and agricultural workers, the intelligentsia, and employees who have linked their fates to a socialist future and a communist perspective.

Above all I would emphasize that the nucleus of the social base are the workers and peasants. I in no way deny intellectual forces and I myself, as has been said, am a worker at a scientific research institute, but without this social base I think our affairs will go badly in the future.

Subsequently the idea is raised that under the existing circumstances it is necessary to create equal conditions and possibilities for all parties. This idea is advanced especially by the Democratic Platform, which avidly defends it.

Comrades, tell me what kind of political party voluntarily gives away its power. This is quite incomprehensible to me. Every party fights for power, including the Democratic Platform, which fights as hard as it can given its capabilities. I can give you this example. On 16-17 June the movement of the proponents of the Marxist Platform in the CPSU, because of the kindness of I.I. Zaslavskiy, chairman of the Soviet of People's Deputies of Oktyabrskiy Rayon, and of the CPSU Raykom, is holding a second conference in the conference hall of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet and the CPSU Raykom. At the same time the Democratic Platform is also holding its second conference. Where would you think it would be? In the Oktyabr movie and concert hall. There you have perhaps not exactly equal opportunities, although the same Democratic Platform is arguing for equal opportunities.

Further. Much is being said about the party's organizational structure and about the fact that CPSU should get out of production and into the territory where a parliamentary type of party should be, as well as about the need to fight for votes. But with the exception of certain

categories of the population, the majority are still workers in production. Therefore, from my viewpoint, the CPSU should by no means get out of production; it should work in production. Why have we lost elections and why are we still losing them frequently? Because we are doing a poor job of working with our potential voters in production.

Further. There are extensive discussions and appeals to get away from the principle of democratic centralism. It seems to me that this is mimicry and a rejection of terms. In essence, under the condition that the subject of democratic centralism is now filled with maximum content in the area of democratization of party life, it is actually present in all of the platforms. When speaking at the plenum in my rayon party organization I said that we have never really had authentic democratic centralism, so let us give it a try, comrades. It does not seem to me that we can reject the principle of democratic centralism anyway. Here the Democratic Platform professes a strict rejection of centralism, and it advocates this principle quite clearly. I wish to remind you that the movement of the proponents of the Marxist Platform in the CPSU was formed as a result of the fact that some of the comrades who defended the Marxist principle were expelled from the Moscow party club Communists for Perestroyka because of irreconcilable ideological differences. Here you have perhaps the same principle of democratic centralism that is being promoted by the Democratic Platform.

Models of the future society and visions of the future—there are not enough of these in our position paper. I should like for these reference points, in both the near and distant future, to be designated more clearly.

About the Russian Communist Party. I have a very alarming premonition that if we do not get from the CPSU Central Committee or, perhaps, even from the Politburo a precise and clear explanation of the fact that the forthcoming 19 July conference of the Russian party organization will be transformed into a constituent congress, on 9-10 June in the second stage of the initiative congress of Communists in Russia in Leningrad there could be an election to management organs, and I am very much bothered by the possibility of such a confrontation.

In the first stage of the congress we managed with a great deal of difficulty to keep the delegates from immediately electing members to the central organs of the Russian Communist Party. I am very disturbed about this issue and I think the process could get out of the control without any warning.

Let me talk about economic policy. A couple of days ago at the delegates club the esteemed Stanislav Sergeyevich Shatalin, secretary-academician of the department of economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a member of the Presidential Council, entered into the discussion. Here, speaking before the delegates to the

28th CPSU Congress and the Moscow city party conference, he tossed out a phrase that nobody in economics understands, from the president right down to the doorman. At that time I developed certain doubts. What prospects do we have of emerging from the economic crisis in the near future and what can be earmarked and accomplished to do this?

I have a quite concrete suggestion for the position paper. We recognize the diversity of forms of ownership but we would like this phrase to be included: "While approving the diversity of forms of ownership during the period of perestroika, the CPSU gives preference to the collective forms and will affirm them and fight through political means for these forms to prevail over all forms of exploitation and coercion of workers." I wish to note that this paragraph was removed from the resolution of the Timiryazov party organization at the last conference.

More on Draft 'Position'

90UN2116B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 2 Jun 90 pp 2, 3

[Statements by participants in discussion at Moscow CPSU City Committee plenum on 30 May]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] **Statement of A.N. Nikolayev, first secretary of the Baumanskiy CPSU Raykom**

I consider it necessary to support the basic provisions of the statement of the first secretary of the MGK [Moscow City Committee] of the CPSU. In my opinion, all the definitive evaluations have been made in this speech. I should like, however, to emphasize that it seems to me that today certain points should be even more clearly evaluated. We have come up against an extremely remarkable case. It consists of the tendency toward separation of the party from the development of policy having essentially been realized in practice. This pertains primarily to the government program presented at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, which determines the life of the entire society. To be frank, I am surprised that a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers had no desire, as it were, to consult with the party about what he is taking to the unionwide forum. I am also surprised by the fact that the general secretary of the Central Committee and the country's president found time to convene the Presidential Council three times, thus fulfilling the presidential function, but he considered it in no way necessary to consult with the party in determining policy.

I think this question is fundamental: We have proclaimed and are implementing in practice a separation of functions, we have taken on the development of policy, but we are kept out of politics. I think this process today could lead to an avalanche. The separation from politics is carried out within the framework of the Moscow Soviet and in the local areas, in the rayon soviets. I consider that this situation cannot be bypassed by the

city party organization. I assume that this should be reflected in the position paper or in a special resolution.

Comrades, we are speaking about politics. We have been kept out of these politics skillfully, actively and, I would say, with forethought.

In my opinion, the function of the congress delegates in our city system deserves quite special interpretation. I assume (not only as something to be desired but as a mandatory norm) that the delegates should participate in the work of the city party conference and, in my opinion, it would be expedient even to co-opt the congress delegates into the delegate corps of the city conference. The participation of congress delegates in the work of the conference and the right to express their opinions and participate in the voting gives them the opportunity to determine their position completely and according to their principles.

Further, comrades, I think that one of the functions of our meeting today is to express an attitude toward the documents presented at the conference. In my view, the documents should be used as a basis and we should begin to figure out what can be brought up for the consideration of the city party conference.

One must say that the work on the documents has moved forward considerably. I am convinced that a role here was played by the fact that delegates of the conference and the congress were enlisted to work on the drafts of the documents. The progress is significant. As compared to the first drafts this is already a basis that can be used for discussion. But what, in my view, requires attention and a certain amount of caution? In particular, certain corrections to the draft regulations. There are provisions here which, in my opinion, contradict one another. For example, there is this situation. In paragraph five it is written that a party member may be expelled from its ranks only by the local party organization. And by nobody else. But how many examples do we have of an unprincipled attitude on the part of local party organizations toward their communists. There are many examples of this. Therefore I think it would be wrong to deprive the higher organ of the right to evaluate the actions of the local party organization when necessary.

Paragraph 10. Here it is suggested that we change over to a block structure of work of elective and higher organs in our party. But if we can create preconditions of this kind just on the basis of the regulations, we could go very far astray. Here is paragraph 18: There it simply proposes the organizational accommodation of various kind of factions and platforms. It discusses, in particular, the fact that various forms local party organizations can be created, including clubs, sections, and associations. These are essentially proposals for organizational establishment of factions. It is quite unjustified, in my view, to suggest a three-year cycle for rayon and republic conferences party congresses. If this were the case why would we hold the 19th All-Union Party Conference for which we, as it were, decided on a five-year cycle? It is

another matter that we can confirm the right of any committee or any organization to conduct any conferences or congresses whenever they consider it necessary. But, in my opinion, the regular norm should be the same—no less than five years.

I would like to support those comrades who have already spoken here about the productivity of the ideas of permanent congresses and conferences. At least in the rayon party organization we have advanced fairly far along the path, as it were, of interpretation of the forms of permanent rayon party conferences as the highest leadership organ of the rayon organization. I have in mind the fact that when the local party organizations actually receive greater rights, then such an organ will be expedient. And this position should be reflected in the regulations.

In my view we should think again about the post of party chairman. Anyway I think this form is created for a specific person. I do not think there is any point in such cumbersome structures.

Another aspect. I feel burdened by such a painstaking, scrupulous approach to the evaluation of party dues—interest and so forth... Some very mercantile approaches have sprung up among us. I am confident that if we establish one percent we will doom the party to an impoverished existence. And, after all, we have people who need material protection—not only our organization but individual communists. Yesterday I listened to the debate on the television program "Good Evening, Moscow." Our Moscow Soviet leaders spoke, and among others this issue was raised: CPSU veterans have been deprived of the possibility of obtaining food orders. So Comrade Stankevich said that it was the affair of the party and not the state to be concerned about these people. This sounds strange, at the very least. And I assume that the time will come when the party will have to protect communists materially as well. Therefore let us be a little more generous.

Statement of S.A. Potapov, first secretary of the Volgogradskiy CPSU Raykom

Members of the "Moscow" group in the Moscow Soviet sent me here to briefly inform you about the situation in which we are now working.

I have heard several statements at the plenum. Of course there is a lot of criticism against the party Central Committee and the government, and this criticism is probably fair, but let us look at ourselves and those around us.

You are discussing the most important documents, but I will tell you what is happening here in our session of the Moscow Soviet. You know that there is a block called "Democratic Russia" and there is a group called "Moscow." In our statement in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA we wrote that we were forced to create it, that we were categorically against it, but we were told that otherwise there would be no representation at all—just

in terms of quotas. But then, unfortunately, a mechanism went into operation whereby the voting went in favor of "Democratic Russia"—280 votes in favor. Representatives of "Democratic Russia" have the majority in every commission. We agreed on quota representation, but still there is not a single representative on the commission from "Moscow." The majority of our proposals fail to get a majority of votes.

No attention was paid to the declaration of the "Moscow" group to the effect that the chairman of the soviet had finally delivered to Muscovites a report on immediate measures that had to be taken in the city. And every day problems come up that aggravate the opposition. This was the case with respect to buildings and structures. What is the most glaring problem today? What happened to the mass media is happening today.

Certain deputies are making demands for withdrawal from the ranks of the CPSU a preliminary condition for appointment to the position of Chief State Arbitrator.

Statement of A.S. Yeliseyev, rector of the MGTU [expansion unknown] imeni N.E. Bauman

First I shall say a couple of words about the statements that have just been made. The Moscow Soviet has united the people elected by the Muscovites, and to a significant degree the Moscow Soviet reflects today's attitudes in Moscow. And we ourselves are to blame for the fact that it is what it is; not the party in general but just the leaders. And we should not react to this evil, but we should respond self-critically.

Now about the documents. Of course, the documents that have been presented to us already account for the situation that has actually developed in the country. But I have the impression that we are more receding under the pressure of the situation than we are really rearranging things. Generally what is any normal party built on? The party unites people who think alike according to this principle: The kind of country it wants to see and the kind of policy that should be pursued by the leaders of the country. And what kind of country do we want to see? We speak very eloquent and pleasant words: humane, democratic socialism. But does anybody understand what this means? Is any kind of decoding possible? There are no such state systems in the world, and we do not have an explanation of this definition. Then one asks: For what do we wish to obtain the people's support? What gives us reason to hope for this support? It seems that we want support just for the name of the CPSU, without any content. It seems to me that this is a fundamental issue. Until we define ourselves and what we have to offer the country, we cannot count on support from the people. I would suggest gathering our chief ideologists so that they can try to instill content in these words. Simple content that the people can understand: what the party intends to do with our country. We should probably admit that the parties and movements that have appeared recently are making considerably more

new suggestions than the CPSU is, and in this respect the CPSU is losing and has taken a defensive position.

Comrade Fomin spoke here. I share his concern about what is happening in the country although I do not agree with the conclusions that are being drawn. It is our fault that we are not giving the people correct information about how people live abroad. I was in the FRG at a plant that produces Mercedes automobiles. I know that Mercedes workers have vacations that last about a month and a half and have a 37-hour work week. There is practically no unemployment there, and the wages are such that it is possible for them to live well and it is practically painless for a person to go on a pension. And if our working class knew that people live that way there, it would want to learn something from the other system. But so far we are only frightened by the fact that it is capitalism. But we cannot take any large strides for which our country is not prepared. We need to think about the stages of the changeover to a situation in which the people in our country will live better. I do not wish to give the future system any name. But I would like for it to be reflected in our position.

Now about the regulations. There are several details in the section entitled "Democracy Within the Party." It seems to me that references to things like unity of actions and mandatory implementation of the decisions of the elective organizations are once again an authoritarian system within the party. We are rejecting it in economic life, but within the party we want to retain the same military principle of construction. This can hardly be correct.

In general I am against constructing the party according to the production principle. Many communists are working and will be working at the enterprises. And they can meet and discuss problems. But we do not have the right to create structures that are parallel to the structures of administrative control that exist today. I am even more against having such organizations in the Armed Forces, the KGB, and internal forces. In places where there is no question about the need for strict discipline we should observe undivided command.

Incidentally, I would suggest that a number of measures be implemented now. I would think that the party organizations at the enterprises should now rid themselves of the functions of participating in economic life. We should disband the personnel commissions, refuse to sign job descriptions, and remove from job questionnaires the paragraph about party property. Since we are speaking about the idea that the party is a social organization, we should assume the position of a social organization.

It seems to me that if we articulate our position in terms of the main things we want to achieve and if we are creating a truly democratic structure in the party organization, we might discover that there are no fundamental differences between us and many of the newly

created movements. And again there will be a basis for unification and not confrontation.

Regarding the second document. I do not think that today there is any reason for designating in the position paper such principles as a ramified system of state levers for economic regulation and effective state regulation of prices. I would delete these words now because state regulation is generally what should be weakened under the conditions of a democratic country.

And to be honest I do not like the first paragraph in the section entitled "Party Reform" where it says that the renewed CPSU is the party which has been able to enrich Marxism with the modern achievements of civilization and to develop a new concept of socialism and the communist perspective. If this is an assertion I cannot agree with it. If it is a wish for the future we must change the wording.

Statement of N.P. Bedrin, first secretary of the Leningradskiy CPSU Raykom

I wish to discuss four issues, at least briefly.

The basic document is the position paper. I think participants in the plenum know that both the gorkom [city party committee] and now the delegates to the conference and congress are working actively on this most important document. And the current draft which is being submitted to the plenum, of course, differs significantly from all the preceding ones and, from my viewpoint, for the better.

At the same time at the plenum today it seems to me that this statement of the issue is still correct: "Platform," "Position Paper," "Program of Action." Perhaps we have missed the train, as they say—in the sense that for the Moscow party organization the creation of such a document as a platform would be very desirable but practically impossible. But if it is not too late perhaps we could think about this some more.

At the same time I think that today's draft of the position paper could be improved. Rayon party conferences have been completed in all the rayons. At the center of their attention were essentially questions which have little to do with today's draft of the position paper. Mutual enrichment is possible here. And we must take advantage of this possibility. I shall make a couple of suggestions.

The first thing—I think our position paper still needs to contain a section entitled "Program of Action" which is intended for the immediate period and reflects the basic burning issues. Communists, nonparty members, and all Muscovites should know what the party lives on and what the struggle stands for under current conditions. And it stands for honesty, openness, and our future. And this should be indicated in the "Program of Action." I am not imposing my own viewpoint, but I think that we should find a way of reflecting in the position paper an opinion such as the evaluation or attitude toward the

activity of the Central Committee. At our rayon's conference many delegates still gave a negative evaluation to the actions of the Central Committee to solve the most important problems of politics, economics, and especially the vital activity of the party. Of the 522 delegates, 250 expressed dissatisfaction with the activity of the Central Committee. I agree with many people who have said here that the leadership has not dealt with the Politburo or the party, and the extremely important document concerning a changeover to a market economy has not even been discussed. In essence both the Politburo and the party organizations have ended up on the sidelines of the resolution, or at least the preliminary development of this extremely important turn in the direction of a market economy. And so with respect to the first issue it is necessary to clearly reflect the program of our actions in the position paper.

The second thing is about the control and auditing commission. I categorically disagree, in particular, with A.I. Zemsov that under the conditions of glasnost and a multiparty system we do not need a control and auditing commission. In the first place the control and auditing commission is not merely a watchdog organ which protects the honor and dignity of the communists—protects them from unjustified attacks. This is an organ which essentially guards our friendly relations. I am convinced that a lack of truly friendly relations will lead to the same confusion and disorder, to the same general situation in which we find ourselves now. Of course the direction of the actions of the control and auditing commission must change radically. But this organ is needed.

With regard to the regulations, the existing document, I think, is very interesting and it reflects the truly large total of opinions of communists of the Moscow city party organization. But the work commission has still become involved in creating their own "works" that have nothing to do with these opinions. This is not a bad thing, but these documents must be created on the basis of the opinions of communists.

And the last thing. The stage of the conference. I am in favor of the stages, but the task of each stage must be clearly stated. But now Yu.A. Prokofyev has explained that the second stage will apparently come in the fall. In the fall we might have not the second stage but the 29th Moscow City Conference. Since reports will be going on in all the local party organizations they will change the situation and possibly make it necessary to elect new delegates. Therefore I think we must have a more clearcut position regarding the stages today. [passage omitted]

Statement of V.M. Kubrin, first secretary of the Oktyabrskiy CPSU Raykom

We have been given a package of documents, but nobody today has said a word about the regulations of the 28th conference. I ask you to focus your attention on this. All decisions at the conference are made by a simple

majority of votes of the registered delegates when they have a quorum. And then before the second paragraph we read: The conference may conduct its work if no less than half of the registered delegates are in attendance. It is probably better to have a quorum of not half but two-thirds.

In point five at the very beginning where it is written that the voting at the conference is open, one should add: as a rule, open.

Now about the position paper. It does not define the relations between the city party committee and the CPSU with the soviets. I suggest that we must clarify this issue, perhaps with the following wording: There must be ideological and organizational unity of communists in the soviets as an indispensable condition for pursuing the strategic and tactical policy of the CPSU. At the same time communist deputies should speak out against the distraction by the political confrontation of various "bloes," contributing to the constructive work of new power structures.

I wish to support Klyuyev's statement to the effect that nothing is said in the platform about working under the new conditions of the local party organizations, taking into account the fact that we want to increase their role. Still we must make a statement in the position paper about the role of the local party organizations under the new conditions, because when you come to the local units sometimes you are held accountable for the mistakes made by the higher circles of the party leadership.

And further, comrades, nothing is said about ideology in the position paper. The position paper has a section called the "Spiritual Sphere" where nothing is said about ideology.

There is a remark at the beginning of the position paper. It goes like this: Stormy preconference discussions and the complex general democratic processes taking place in the country and in East Europe have unleashed the ideological and political energy of the communists and revealed a range of problems on whose solutions the fate of the country and party depends. Probably the phrase "liberated the ideological and political energy of the communists" is not appropriate here. Comrades, in the spiritual sphere today as never before we need one thing—to create conditions for revealing the potential of each individual.... And the same text after that.

Yesterday we had an expanded plenum of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon party committee. The plenum was stormy and resulted in the adoption of an appeal to the Moscow City Committee and the party Central Committee. I should like to discuss it briefly. Participants in the expanded plenum of the Oktyabrskiy party raykom (there are 53,000 communists registered in the rayon) express their concern about the ever stronger attacks on the CPSU and the shifting of responsibility for mistakes made in the past and the abuses of individual party leaders revealed in recent years to the present and even the future of the Communist Party as a whole.

Thus there is serious uneasiness about the attempts of the Moscow Soviet to deprive the city and rayon party organizations of their premises, which will practically make it impossible for them to function normally. The statement of individual deputies of the Moscow Soviet to the effect that the city party organization in general can have no property at all is incomprehensible. Nobody has any doubts about the existence of the Communist Party throughout the history of our state as a real political organization with an entire range of legal rights.

We consider it a matter of primary importance and honor of the CPSU as a whole and the Moscow city party organization in particular to take immediate measures for the development of correct relations between the soviet authorities and the CPSU leadership, and regulation by city and supreme soviets of the question of party property and its legal status. If the complaints against the CPSU have no legal basis, it is necessary to respond to them in the shortest possible periods of time and according to the procedure established by law.

Statement of D.M. Dankin, director of the Institute of Party History of the MGK and the Moscow CPSU Committee

The majority of people who spoke today, in my opinion, are inclined to use as a basis the draft position paper offered by the work group of the gorkom [city party committee] and the conference of secretaries. I wish to say that the draft of the position paper has been in the process of development for more than two months and possibly it has lost some of its distinctiveness and logical structure. This is inevitable since it was necessary to combine and coordinate sometimes mutually exclusive viewpoints. But the document still has the main element. It still reflects the opinion of the communists of the city regarding the central problems of the preconference discussion.

I should like to clarify that this is by no means an apparatus document, and therein lies its merit. In this case the apparatus would have created a document suited to it, it would have gathered experts together, provided premises, printed and reproduced everything, and so forth. But the content was determined by the local party organizations and social scientists. Various platforms of groups and rayons were taken into account. Therefore I think that we must talk about and work on precisely this draft and not construct any new scheme, not hastily "sculpt" something, which could lead only to hasty formulations regarding extremely complicated theoretical and political problems such as the communist future, the social base of the party, the political and economic prognosis, and historical evaluations. It is better to develop the revealed and integrated opinion of a large number of communists of Moscow. And this means that right now we must suggest that the conference and congress delegates go to the party districts where they were elected, explain the draft of the position paper, and absorb the opinion of the comrades regarding these problems. The only condition which could, in my

view, make the position paper more logical would be the appearance of a new edition of the draft platform of the Central Committee. For this is the document that will be discussed at the congress, and no other. Unfortunately and, on might say, disturbingly, the Central Committee is late again. The February draft has already played its role and, in my opinion, it does no longer hold up under criticism. Our plenum should support the appeal of the delegate club concerning more extensive participation of congress delegates in the reworking of the Central Committee draft. And I think that our emissaries in the commissions and work groups for preparing the congress documents, and specifically Comrades I.I. Melnikov, V.I. Musin, V.B. Nosov, and Yu.A. Prokofyev, should be more persistent in implementing this policy. In particular they should participate more actively in the work of the delegate club.

In what areas should the draft of the position paper of the city party organization be improved?

On the organizational plane I think we must take the most valuable from the rayon platforms and decisions of conferences and plenums, particularly from Sevastopolskiy. We should continue to refine it in the gorkom commissions and the delegates club, taking into account feedback from communist voters, and we should make this document public in the city mass media.

Regarding content and tone, I think we should work out the time factor more precisely. There should be no "I wish today" or "I wish now." It should be noted what happened the day before yesterday and yesterday, what is happening today, what can be done tomorrow, and what will have to wait until the day after tomorrow.

Because much—yes, much is already generally known and unquestionable—is said about the distant past, but extremely little is being said about the extraordinarily dynamic processes of recent months. And there are absolutely no predictions, even for the next half year. In the description of the current moment I would single out this feature—the militant anticommunist statements in the press and in the programs of certain new parties objectively impede democratization in the party no less than the attempts of the orthodox conservatives. The party has been forced to protect itself under these conditions. Therefore certain proposals are regarded as hasty, particularly having to do with withdrawal from labor collectives. Now we should not leave them but, on the contrary, go to the people, explain our position, and maintain the tie with the labor collectives. This in no way contradicts the processes of democratization of the party.

In the prognosis I would draw attention to the disclosure of the methods and means of party work that have already been noted in practice, that is, what is being done and will be done by communists in the soviets of the labor collectives, the local self-control committees, the trade unions, and the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League]. I would explain how party

training should be fundamentally changed in order to avoid dilettantism, oversimplification, and belief in dogma. How can we help communists gain a real knowledge of Marxism. How will we construct party unions, blocks, and coalitions in order to protect the interests of the workers and solve socially significant problems.

But I would recommend doing everything possible to avoid two things in the document: first, confrontational methods like "against," "anti," and so forth. Internecine struggle with potential allies today is an absolutely inadmissible luxury.

In the second place, we must not repeat a mistake we have already made; I have in mind the normative approach, the attraction to the previously given, bureaucratic schema for construction of something, including a party, and certain new models of the CPSU.

Even our comrades from the Democratic Platform cannot get rid of this disease. And what is the definition of a "parliamentary party" under the conditions of a sharp break in social relations? Where has this kind of political party been seen in domestic or world political practice? Neither the cadets nor the socialist revolutionaries limited themselves to work in the Duma. This is simply an abstract construct. Just as we do not know who thought up the idea of a "party of ideological pluralism." Do you really think this comes from real life—ideological pluralism within the framework of a single party?

I think that too much in the critical attacks on the CPSU comes precisely from the normative approach, from things given ahead of time, from some ossified image in people's minds. But is our Moscow organization today the same as it was in 1984 or even last fall? After all, we have already had competitive direct elections in the districts. Can we really not provide, say, for expression of the opinions or positions of the minority? Here is a typical example: Comrades from the Democratic Platform write in the press and hold their own meetings and conferences. Just as the proponents of the Russian Communist Party or the Marxist Platform do, with all of their differences. That is, the rights of the minorities are really being provided for today. There are horizontal structures, particularly the general Moscow Conference of Secretaries which everybody knows about. In Moskvoretskiy and a number of other rayons the right to admit and expel people from the party have been turned over to the local organizations. Other constituent parts of the priority of local organizations are also being expanded. We are also gaining experience in federalist party structure, and not just in the Baltics.

Therefore it would be more correct to proceed from life, from reality, and then generalize from these new beginnings with their merits and costs and to concentrate attention on them. And we should not propose institutionalizing, destructive, crushing tendencies which destabilize rather than democratize the party.

It is on precisely this path of practical, if not sufficiently mature, steps that we could develop new party qualities and actually democratize it and place it in the service of the people.

Gidaspov Criticized at Leningrad Meeting

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[Report by TASS correspondents John Polishchuk and Aleksandr Rachko]

[Text] Leningrad, 28 June (TASS)—The extraordinary conference of the Leningrad Oblast CPSU organization, which numbers over half a million communists, ended today with virtually no serious constructive decisions.

The decision to convene the conference was made at the CPSU oblast committee plenum which took place two days ago. Those who took part in it severely criticized First Secretary Boris Gidaspov for the vagueness of his stance toward the constituent congress of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party.

In his address today Boris Gidaspov expressed disagreement with the attacks at the constituent congress on the CPSU Central Committee, the Politburo, and Mikhail Gorbachev.

In their statements the delegates rejected the thesis that the organization of the republican communist party before the 28th CPSU Congress represents a return to the orthodox model of organization of communists. The delegates spoke of the need to consolidate the healthy forces of the party and of the Russian people on the platform of perestroika, and to cooperate constructively with the soviets at all levels. An appeal was approved to ensure the unity of the CPSU and the equality of all Union republic party organizations.

Candidates to the elective bodies of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party were approved at the conference.

The conference is scheduled to continue following the 28th CPSU Congress.

Gidaspov Interviewed on Russian, Union Congresses

PM1806140790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Jun 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with B.V. Gidaspov, first secretary of Leningrad CPSU Obkom, by PRAVDA correspondent V. Gerasimov; place, date not specified; under the rubric "Toward the 28th CPSU Congress and the Russian Party Conference": "Path of Common Sense"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Leningrad—There has been a marked drop in the number of people frequenting the corridors of the Smolnyy. Quite recently you could meet anyone there—enterprise workers, top-ranking scientists, prominent ministry officials, blockade veterans, sovkhoz [state

farm] milkmaids, theater stars, students, worried economic managers.... Now people come less frequently—and only perhaps through inertia—to the party committee for help in resolving problems of concern to them, problems that are undoubtedly important but are effectively personal problems—functions of power have been transferred to the soviets. Today business life, for instance, has shifted to the Mari Palace, the home of the Leningrad Soviet. Commissions of deputies with adequate powers and the duty of deciding the fate of the townspeople and the city itself operate there. But there is a relative hush at the “headquarters of the revolution.” The apparatus has been cut back and reorganized, there is one party committee instead of two—the obkom and gorkom [oblast and city party committees]. It is not only the obkom's structure that has changed but also the very nature of its activity: Determining the political line held by the communists' oblast organization is now more important than, as in the past, replacing careless or incompetent soviet and economic workers. However, those people who have remained in the Smolnyy at the helm of the party organization have no more spare time as a result of these changes. That is why our meeting with B.G. Gidaspov, first secretary of Leningrad CPSU Obkom, took place within a quite rigid time limit.

[Gerasimov] Boris Veniaminovich! The course of the united party conference graphically demonstrated at the first stage how differently delegates view the pressing questions of the CPSU's place and role in perestroika and the renewal of the party itself and its methods of work. The Russian communists' conference will open in a few days, and the 28th CPSU Congress will be held soon. What ideas and expectations are you taking with you to these events in the party's life?

[Gidaspov] As for our party conference, it took place, as expected, amid creative polemics. After the first stage, oblast, city, and rayon committees had a chance to study more fully the opinions held not only by Communists but also by nonparty Leningraders and their suggestions and advice, to take into consideration the influence of public movements and politicized groups on the sentiments and consciousness of various strata of the population, and to take into account definite changes—not as yet for the better—in the economy and the social sphere. Let me be blunt and say that the situation compels us not to linger and waste time and effort on what is sometimes futile verbiage but to seek common approaches to resolving practical and theoretical problems as quickly as possible. This was by and large achieved during the second stage of the conference owing to well-considered constructive dialogue and mutually acceptable compromises and assessments.

Having handed over power to the soviets, the CPSU is not shirking responsibility for the fate of perestroika; it was, after all, the party that started off this process. Thus, even in our new role we communists are obliged to “insure” society against mistakes which in a crisis situation can only increase our common misfortunes. Only the consolidation of all healthy forces interested in

renewing social relations and improving the moral climate will help make these misfortunes less painful and reduce and then eradicate them altogether. We are striving to achieve this unity by revealing all the useful rational elements in the process of debate and sometimes during embittered disputes. The Leningrad communists' political statement to the coming party congress is, in effect, the fruit of collective questing, reflection, and opinions. I think that Leningrad's delegates will also bring its fundamental ideas to the Russian conference.

[Gerasimov] A critical mood prevails within society today. People have abused the party, its leadership, and communists without even taking the trouble to argue their case and are blaming the CPSU for every conceivable and inconceivable ill. Many complaints are indeed justified. But I think there is a greater need for constructive suggestions on how to set our common affairs to rights.

[Gidaspov] People are indeed shyer about making suggestions. It is far easier to criticize or point out accomplished facts than to anticipate the emergence and development of adverse tendencies. I believe that our task today resides in anticipating events and not lagging behind them or standing still waving goodbye as the trains pull out of the station. Communists have to listen to most crushing criticism and not panic but learn to soberly analyze: Who is abusing or praising you? From what standpoints? The statement we are now talking about may be taken badly by some people. What is to be done? That is the communists' opinion. There is no point in burying your head in the sand: We must face up to the truth straight. Leningrad's communists consider the situation within the country and the party on the eve of the congress to be extremely alarming and close to catastrophe. The increase in crisis phenomena was prompted by deep-seated deformations of socialism, the party's alienation from the people which has still not been overcome, and mistakes in the implementation of the perestroika policy. The crisis of confidence in the party, institutions of power, and the country's political leadership is worsening. There is increasing confusion over the ideological muddle and devaluation of former moral values. Two dangerous trends have become visible—a desire on the part of conservative forces to revive the administrative-edict system and, on the other hand, an increase in anticommunist sentiments.

While acknowledging its historical responsibility for the distortions of socialism, the arbitrary rule, and the lawlessness of the time of the personality cult and stagnation, the party must tell the people equally openly and truthfully: We—today's communists and party leaders—have been unable over the last three years to take charge of the processes of renewal, have committed a number of mistakes, and have for that reason lost our credit of trust. It will be increasingly difficult to regain this—today we are having to deal with ideological disorder and the threat of a split within the party itself. The Russian party conference may quite well prevent this undesirable train of events. On two conditions, I believe:

If all honest communists true to October's ideals of democracy and liberation join forces there and the conference itself becomes the constituent congress of the Russian Communist Party within the CPSU.

[Gerasimov] I confess this is a somewhat unexpected conclusion, Boris Veniaminovich. Aren't you afraid of entering into confrontation with public opinion, the press, and television once again: A number of the central and local mass media have not, after all, hitherto ceased to reject the very idea of reviving the Russian Communist Party, whereas the idea of setting up other parties has met with favorable support.

[Gidasov] I admit that it is no source of comfort to find oneself yet again under fire from all sides, I cannot get accustomed to this—I have been given enough labels. But, permit me to ask, what kind of political pluralism is there to be, then, what kind of glasnost, if a Communist does not have the right to voice his ideas openly, aloud, and what kind of debate can there be within the party? Or should we perhaps bite our tongues once again as we did during the time of Stalin of grievous memory and "not dare to have our own opinion"?

The idea of reviving the Russian Communist Party has long been in people's minds, but it took a long time for it to get somewhere through debates. It may be said to have been won through suffering. It has its enemies and its supporters. That is logical and normal. The former's main argument is as follows: Russia has lost its political and economic sovereignty, and has ended up in an unequal position vis-a-vis a number of other republics. The second group retort that setting up an independent RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party within the CPSU will cause the state to split and disintegrate. It must be said that these fears are not unfounded. If right-wing forces prevail within the Russian Communist Party, it will be reactionary and will endeavor to reverse history. I was told that elements of this kind crept into speeches by some participants at April's Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party in Leningrad. The appearance of the well-known Nina Andreyevna at the congress also elicited a negative reaction in the press. How did she come to be there? The congress' organizers later investigated and announced in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA that this incident—which was set up by anonymous individuals—is extremely redolent of planned provocation. Be that as it may, it worked. But the rest was dependent on journalists' professional probity.

The creation or revival of the Russian Communist Party with its own Program and Statutes as a consolidating force for all republic communist parties is an urgent necessity. I do not like everything in the Initiative Congress' documents, and by no means all the assessments and proposals are well-considered and right. But this is after all no excuse to reject them out of hand—they are to be discussed and finalized, and they must be finalized without fail. The debate will reveal the leaders—the Russian party, like any other, needs them. The

obkom did not hamper the second stage of the Initiative Congress, just as it did not hamper meetings held by other unofficial movements. The two-day conference held by supporters of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" ended recently. It was also held in the obkom's House of Political Enlightenment and also won comment in the union press. What am I getting at?

We must learn to listen to and hear one another without imposing our will on our opponents and without overwhelming them with menacing growls and prohibitions, but try to enlist allies by conclusive arguments. The Russian Communist Party's supporters share a common weakness with the Democratic Platform's supporters, in my opinion—lack of realistic socioeconomic sections in their programs. They need to work on these sections most attentively, bearing in mind the current state of society and the impending radical change in relations, preferably of course using civilized methods. It is time to show both "right-wingers" and "left-wingers" that there is no way back. We have to sail in the same boat toward progress, row more harmoniously, and not throw one another overboard. There is still time to share out the portfolios, but it is more important that they should not prove empty.

[Gerasimov] Excuse me, Boris Veniaminovich, this question is for you in your capacity as a USSR people's deputy. I recently read a commentary entitled the "Law Is the Same for Everyone," signed by two deputies—V. Lapinskiy and D. Greys—in VECHERNIY LENINGRAD, the Leningrad Soviet newspaper. Both are members of the leadership of a standing commission—on questions relating to public and sociopolitical organizations. One of the authors of the commentary—D. Greys—is a member of the coordinating council of Democratic Platform supporters. Both men questioned the lawfulness of holding the Initiative Congress of the Russian Communist Party and demanded that the "documents needed to authorize the holding of this congress" be submitted to their commission "in accordance with existing regulations." Resolutions adopted by the USSR Council of People's Commissars 15 May 1935 and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars 20 July 1935 (!!!) figured among the "protagonists." Let me recall that quite recent decisions by the former Leningrad Soviet regarding regulations for rallies and meetings were disputed and rejected, yet suddenly the champions of glasnost and democracy at the helm of local power are appealing to documents that hark back to the height of the Stalinist regime! Isn't that strange?

[Gidasov] It is one of my rules not to discuss and particularly not to condemn actions taken by people's deputies. That would be unethical on my part. They have been elected by the people just as I have. It is for them to pass judgment on our virtues and shortcomings. Regardless of your, so to speak, tactless question, I will just point out that the thirst for self-promotion has gripped extremely intelligent people today: They are endeavoring to make additional appearances on television, hurt their

opponent as much as possible and discredit him, without balking at the means used, and turn a debate into a means of settling personal scores... I believe that this is caused by bitterness, the idea that you will no longer feel pain yourself if you tread on someone else's toes. Nothing of the kind! As we know, suppression of dissent has not done any good but has only deprived people of their reason and prevented society from taking the path of common sense. Having relinquished dogma and hackneyed stereotypes in favor of renewing social relations, raising standards, and improving things in the economy, we must create an alliance of forces based on socialist choice..

[Gerasimov] This choice will hardly be facilitated by price hikes, a mixed economy with a private sector, and a so-called regulated market...

[Gidasov] Many of the government's proposals will undoubtedly prove unpopular. It is simple to jump headlong into the seas of the market and the unruly forces of uncontrolled prices. You have to think about the consequences. We know what they may be in the initial stages from our country's history and from certain countries which are now flourishing—namely unemployment, hunger, suicide. We are obliged to do our utmost to protect people from potential disasters during the difficult and painful transition. After all society is now socially hotbed up.

A regulated market is not the vain undertaking that some people are trying to make it. It is managed at government level in all countries. It is necessary and inevitable. Otherwise we would apparently have to bid the idea of progress farewell. But can we cope with the task of management? That is the question. We communists must make the right choice. The political future of the party that has renounced its monopoly on power directly depends on its ability to renew and preserve itself as a consolidating force in Soviet society.

Leningrad Party Declaration to CPSU Congress

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[Political declaration of Leningrad communists to 28th CPSU Congress: "For Historical Truth, Civil Peace, and Social Justice"]

[Text]The statement of the Leningrad communists to the 28th CPSU Congress was dictated by their alarm at the destiny of the country and the party, whose activity has become detached from the life of Soviet society.

The draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee, "Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism," which was supported with respect to a number of principally new points contained in it, evoked dissatisfaction from the majority of Communists of Leningrad because it was detached from real life.

The goal of the present political statement is to suggest to the party the basic conditions and means of overcoming its detachment from the realities of perestroika, which is suffering from a lack of clarity concerning the prospects for its development.

1. Assessment of the Current Moment. The Historical Responsibility of the CPSU to the Soviet People

The situation in the country and within the party on the eve of the 28th congress is extremely alarming and close to being catastrophic. The increased signs of crisis have been generated by profound distortions of socialism reflected in the dominance of the administrative-command system; in a certain detachment of party leaders from the party masses up to now, and the party from the people; and inconsistency and mistakes in the perestroika policy.

The crisis of confidence in the party, the institutions of power, and the country's political leadership is being aggravated.

Under these conditions two dangerous tendencies have emerged: first, the desire of the conservative forces to retain the administrative-command system which has not yet been totally smashed, and, second, the growth of anticommunist sentiments.

Leningrad communists are convinced that at this critical moment of its history the party should show political courage and admit from the podium of the 28th congress:

—its historical responsibility for the entire process of the development of the Soviet society and its results. The party must fundamentally and irrevocably distance itself from the mistakes and crimes made in the past and hold their initiators and perpetrators personally responsible to the party. An immense majority of communists have served the people honestly and are still doing so, and they are not to blame for the mistakes of the country's political leadership during the years of Stalinism and stagnation. But no communist who is worthy of the name has the right to relieve himself of his responsibility for the party, for its present and future;

—the decline of its political authority to the critical mark during the past three years of perestroika. The CPSU has not been able actually to take charge of the processes of renewal of the society and the advance of confidence given to it by society and the people has been taken away;

the existence of a theoretical crisis in the CPSU, the results of which were ideological confusion and instability, the threat of a split within the party, and mass withdrawal from it. There has been a danger of breaking it up completely and a no less tendency to return to the disgraceful past—to look for enemies among those who think differently.

Leningrad communists think only the complete truth and the self-sacrificing activity of the CPSU in the name of the people will protect it from groundless accusations. Only the people have the right to judge and justify.

The CPSU is not relieving itself of its responsibility to the people for the fate of the country and the future of perestroika. It is prepared to share this responsibility with all progressive sociopolitical forces.

Fidelity to the ideals of democracy and liberation of October requires the unification in the CPSU of everything that is honest and intelligent in it.

II. Radical Renewal of the CPSU and the Possibility of Its Democratic Unity

Leningrad communists consider it necessary to make the theoretical activity in the CPSU creative and release its ideological sphere from dogmatism and scholasticism.

At the 28th congress the party must declare:

- communist ideology was raised to the rank of being artificially implanted by the state, which was the main reason for the appearance of anticommunism in Soviet society; the monopoly of a single ideology was one of the main reasons for the deformation of intellectual culture and the degradation of the moral and spiritual life of society;
- the CPSU has before it long and painstaking work to restore and promote the scientific foundations of communist ideology in various forms of theoretical discussion and to liberate people's minds from distorted elements of social improvement projects and a utopian vision of the communist future;
- the CPSU regards the communist future as a common human value, as the fullest embodiment in the historical future of long-suffering humanity of the ideal of spiritual freedom of the individual, genuine humanism, and social justice. The party suggests and does not impose it on society;
- the party suggests to Soviet society, as an immediate goal which determines the program minimum, the formation of humane, democratic socialism;
- the CPSU subscribes to the scientific theory of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, singling out as the main part of it the dialectic method of cognition and not the concrete historical content of their works;
- the dialectic method is perfected in creative theoretical discussion with the ideological and political opponents of communists. The party condemns and rejects violence as a method of realizing ideology and policy.

The foundation of the party's social base has been and still is the working class, which has undergone essential structural changes under the conditions of the change-over of production from the industrial type to the scientific-industrial type.

But the radical renewal of the CPSU is unthinkable without an updating of ideas about its social base, whose durability is determined by the party's ability and readiness to reflect and protect the interests of all the workers.

The CPSU should declare that the archaic ideas about the working class that are still around, which do not take the deep structural changes into account, actually lead to a socially and politically dangerous confrontation between workers and intelligentsia. The party is losing its influence among the workers.

It is necessary to restore and transform into the practice of the day Lenin's slogan—"To the masses!"

The local party organizations should direct their efforts toward protection of social justice and social protection of each worker, wage a battle against bureaucratism and privileges, and make sure that each member of the labor collective participates in the management of its affairs.

The crisis in society and the party demands that we try to take advantage of all possibilities for achieving democratic unity of the CPSU.

To do this, as a minimum we must:

- recognize the exercise of power by the party masses as the guiding principle of the life and activity of the party, expand the rights of the local party organizations, and grant them the rights of a corporate body in resolving the issue of their financial- economic and publishing activity. The party budget must be formed openly and monitored by the party masses;
- recognize the indisputability of the principle of party equality and eliminate privileges;
- recognize the fact that the type of party is determined not so much theoretically as practically, in keeping with what society needs for its normal development; a party of both the vanguard and parliamentary type has the right to exist if it operates on a constitutional basis;
- renew the principle of democratic centralism with mandatory codification in the CPSU Regulations of the following mechanisms of democracy within the party: determination of the majority will in general party discussion on strategic issues of party life and social development; recognition of multiple platforms as normal for the life of the party and the possibility of elections on the various platforms to the All-Union Party Conference and the Party Congress when there are disagreements on radical issues; a guarantee of the right of the minority to freedom of theoretical discussion through all the mass media with the observance of the political line developed by the majority; proportional representation of the minority in all organs of party leadership, right up to the Central Committee;
- finally relieve the CPSU of the functions of a state party (reach a point where the activity of workers of the procurators' office, the courts, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the KGB are regulated only by

legislation, provide for effective monitoring of their work by the USSR Supreme Soviet, define the new status of the political organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR Armed Forces as civil education organs, and place them under the jurisdiction of the corresponding ministries, thus limiting the functions of party organizations and political organs);

- recognize the need for the most rapid restoration of the moral authority of the party, and to do this, include on the agenda of the 28th CPSU Congress the question of holding personally liable to the party members the country's political leadership who have besmirched the honor of the party with political and moral crimes during the years of stagnation and perestroika.

Democratic unity of the party is unthinkable without its ideological unity, which is based on the socialist choice of social development.

Democratic unity is also impossible without a clear determination of the opinion of each party member regarding the radical issues that have ended up at the center of pre-congress discussion—the communist future, the party's name, democratic centralism, the principle of party construction, and party property.

Leningrad communists suggest to the 28th CPSU Congress that it determine the expediency of conducting a partywide referendum concerning these issues.

III. The CPSU—a Party of Civil Peace Under the Conditions of Political Pluralism

Having relinquished its monopoly on power, the CPSU is fighting for the position of ruling party of the Soviet society.

Its political fate depends directly on its ability to preserve itself as the consolidating force of the Soviet society and its performance of its historic duty—to create conditions for the formation of a civilized multi-party system.

Leningrad communists are confident that the CPSU must defend its right to social leadership, for which it must:

- become the party of civil peace and arm itself with the tactics of a unified front whose essence today lies in consolidation of democratic forces for the protection of the achievements and prospects of perestroika;
- enter the path of searching for possible and necessary political blocks and coalitions with parties of the socialist choice and all progressive social and worker movements;
- contribute to the recognition in reality of the priority of the soviets in the life of the country with respect to the political activity of the CPSU and any other party operating within constitutional limits;

- contribute to the immediate adoption by the USSR Supreme Soviet of the law on parties;

- take the initiative for creating a crisis committee from representatives of all sociopolitical forces.

Civil peace can be achieved not through constant concessions and half measures on the part of the CPSU—it can be achieved only if communists master the art of modern political struggle for the minds and attitudes of the masses, through more complete and consistent reflection and coordination of the interests of the workers—of all classes and social groups, nations and nationalities.

IV. The CPSU—the Party for Radical Renewal of the Soviet Society

The party sees the possible paths for society to emerge from its socioeconomic crisis in the exercise of economic freedom by its citizens on the basis of equal rights of state, leasing, collective, and individual labor forms of property, the establishment of constitutional guarantees of their immediate creation, and the enforcement of antimonopoly legislation;

- in the creation of a scientifically substantiated concept of a stage-by-stage changeover to a regulated market economy which takes into account all the social and political consequences of the proposed reforms;
- in the development of a reliable mechanism for social protection which includes the rights of citizens to a guaranteed minimum income which takes price changes into account, the retention of state subsidies for the basic food products and other necessities, and the implementation of a program of work placement for individuals affected by the structural rearrangement of the economy;
- in the implementation of a balanced youth policy which combines equal conditions for training and entry into labor life with the encouragement of people with talent in all spheres of the national economy;
- in the development of a reliable mechanism for legal protection of all citizens.

In the spiritual and moral sphere the party proclaims as a priority in its policy the development of education, culture, and science and the provision of their financial and material-technical base as an equal and full-fledged constituent part of the state budget and the budgets of the soviets at all levels.

This requires:

- a radical change in the role and position of the intelligentsia in the society, freedom of intellectual labor, all-around stimulation of the creativity of the intelligentsia, protection of the rights of intellectual property;

—rejection of any forms of monopolism and cliquishness in the cultural and spiritual sphere, especially in the mass media;

—restoration and proliferation of national cultural traditions and the classical spiritual legacy.

In the sphere of national state building it is necessary: to conclude a new Union treaty which should envision equalizing the rights of all peoples of the country, determine the minimum of rights that each republic delegates to the central authority, and the proclamation and legislative determination of the sovereignty of the Russian Federation—including the creation of a better system of organs of state power and the political and social institutions of Russia.

Communists of the Leningrad party organization call all members of the CPSU to democratic unity. Both communist and nonparty members associate with the 28th Party Congress the realization of their long-held expectations for improvement of affairs in the country. We do not have the right not to justify these expectations.

New Leningrad Leader Elected, Interviewed

LD2406201190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 24 Jun 90

[Interview with Leningrad Mayor A. Shchelkanov by correspondent Dukhavin, place and date not given, from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The Leningrad Soviet took quite some time in the election of the city mayor.

[Dukhavin] This happened exactly two and a half months after the Leningrad Soviet began its work. Shortly before this, the vacancy for the post of the Executive Committee's leader was announced, for which any inhabitant of the city could apply. And it must be said that there was no shortage of applicants. There were 40 of them, among them enterprise bosses, workers, scientists, and even a taxi driver. Five made it to the finish, but the session chose Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Shchelkanov, USSR people's deputy. [video shows soviet in session]

How do you intend to act?

[Shchelkanov] It is necessary to give a serious, critical evaluation of the situation up to 1 July in all spheres of the city economy, in all spheres of social life, and of the implementation of all the decisions of state and government programs. For not knowing the illness itself, not knowing its causes, it is impossible to begin to cure it. Once we have this picture, and having reported it, naturally, to the soviet and having reported to the people of Leningrad—the people must know, at last, what condition its authority is entering into, the authority which they elected: the Leningrad Soviet, the chairman of the bureau, and the chairman of the executive committee. After this, specific steps will be undertaken to get rid of these pains. [video shows interview in progress]

Kaliningrad Oblast Called Fourth Baltic State

LD2806123890 Moscow TASS in English 1145 GMT
28 Jun 9

[By TASS political news analyst Aleksandr Antsiferov]

[Text] Moscow June 28 TASS—The American CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR newspaper carried an article on June 20 by Johann Fink who "discovered" that, in addition to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, "there is also a fourth Baltic state—the northern half of old German province of East Prussia" which is camouflaged, as the author of the article put it, by "a label that is a cartographer's nightmare—the Kalinigrad Oblast of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic."

"After 45 years of silence this region is beginning to stir," Fink maintains. And it did not escape his penetrating eye that "the chilly waters of the Baltic are heating up."

These social and natural anomalies were brought about, according to the article, by an alleged agreement between West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev "to use this oblast as the locals for a German-populated constituent republic of the Soviet Union."

The author of the article apparently needed rather vague historico-geographical digressions to substantiate his version of events which, in his view, will involve not only the Soviet Union and West Germany but also Lithuania and Poland. "Warsaw has been dickering with the Kremlin for several years to have Moscow cede the Kaliningrad Oblast to Poland," he wrote.

Is this backed up by facts? No, it is not.

According to a spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry, there is and was no agreement between the Soviet and West German leaders about the establishment of a new union republic on the territory of the Kaliningrad Region. Neither are there any territorial disputes between Warsaw and the Kremlin over this subject. The situation in the region is normal.

One could have paid no attention to these geo political fantasies of Mr Fink—let him toy with the idea. However, when playing at sensation is being conducted on the pages of a reputable newspapers, this cannot but give rise to surprise.

However, the hyping of real problems which require a delicate, well-considered, and unfussy approach. New realities taking shape in Europe belong to precisely this category.

New Islamic Party Established in Dagestan ASSR

NC1906122390 Tehran International Service in Turkish
1700 GMT 16 Jun 90

[Text] A new political party, the Islamic Resistance Party, has been established in the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in Azerbaijan [as heard] to

support recognition of the rights of the Soviet Muslims. The establishment of the new party was reported by CRESCENT INTERNATIONAL today. The newspaper said that the new party's work will be aimed at securing freedom for the publication of religious material and recognition of the rights of the Soviet Muslims.

According to CRESCENT INTERNATIONAL, which is published in Canada, the new party also called for the unrestricted right for all Soviet Muslims to visit Mecca on pilgrimage. The newspaper noted that the Islamic Resistance Party sent a delegation to Moscow to convey the party's demands and views to Kremlin officials during the first week of June.

'Unity' Association Holds Founding Congress

PM1906162190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Jun 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin under the "Direct Line" rubric: "'Yedineniye' Association Founded"]

[Text] Moscow—The constituent congress of the "Yedineniye" all-Russian association for lovers of our literature and culture concluded its work 15 June in Moscow.

The association's program of action, adopted at the congress, also included the following lines: "Every period puts across a main message. Today is a time of most alarming experiences for the whole of Russia; hard times have come, whose outcome will determine not just the future, but the very existence of our fatherland and people. The main word that defines the most acute and profound demands of the time is YEDINENIYE [unity]. Unity in whose name, in the name of what? In the name of Russia and its past and future. "The general and basic sense of the 'Yedineniye' movement," the program says, "is to sow the feeling of PATRIOTISM and a blood tie to the Russian soil, people, and spiritual world."

Delegates at the congress represented practically all the republic's autonomous oblasts, large industrial centers, and agricultural regions. Activists from the movement, which was founded a year ago, I recall, gathered in the P.I. Tchaikovsky Concert Hall. Literary figures, artists, theater and cinema figures, representatives of the clergy, servicemen, teachers, and workers—people with the most varied professions, united by a common concern for Russia's future—outlined the movement's main guidelines "on the path of gathering together all patriotically-minded intellectual forces."

The speakers at the congress spoke about the critical state of Russian culture and the lack of spirituality and unbelief which have infected the people like a plague. To prevent the country from breaking down into appanage principalities, to put an end to interethnic hostility, violence, and the inflaming of political passions, and to bring back love for the fatherland to a person's soul, and pride in belonging to his people—this is part of the much

longer list of tasks that the members of the "Yedineniye" association have set themselves.

Yu. Bondarev was elected president of the association and Yu. Prokushev vice president. A 70-strong "Yedineniye" presidium was also elected. It included figures from our culture famous throughout the country, such as L. Leonov, Ye. Isayev, P. Proskurin, V. Krupin, A. Ivanov, V. Belov, A. Prokhanov, S. Vinulov, S. Kunyayev, V. Bokov, N. Damdinov, and M. Ganina; film director S. Bondarchuk; People's Artist of the USSR L. Zykina; sculptor V. Klykov, and composer G. Sviridov...

The founders of the "Yedineniye" association are: The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Writers Union, the All-Russian Culture Fund, the newspaper LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, the "Sovremennik" publishing house, the All-Union Yessenin Committee at the USSR Writers Union, the Fellowship of Russian Artists, the periodicals MOSKVA, SLOVO, SOVETSKIY VOIN, OBSHCHESTVO RUSSKOY KULTURY, and OTECHESTVO, the first Moscow Clock and Watch Factory, and the all-Russian "Kniga" association.

Proceeding on the basis of the plans envisaged, "Yedineniye" will be involved in general cultural and publishing activity, the creation of youth clubs for lovers of Russian literature and culture, and historical work and the study of local lore, the setting up and development of ties with compatriots abroad, material assistance to theaters, libraries, and museums, the restoration of places of worship, and nature protection.

The congress adopted a number of documents, including the associations' program and statutes, an appeal to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and an appeal to all Creative Forces in the Ukraine and Belorussia and to the Peoples of the Fraternal Slavic Republics, calling on everyone who cherishes our common fatherland to join this movement.

Western Republics

Donbass Miners To Stage 'Political Warning Strike'

LD2806212590 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Video report from Donetsk by correspondent S. Makarskiy; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [video shows pithead, miners, cutting to shots of indoor meeting at which vote is being taken] Will the hoists which bring coal to the surface grind to a standstill on 11 July? Will the coal trains stop running on the pit sidings? Will the conveyor belts also come to a halt? These questions were discussed today at a joint meeting of the workers' strike committee of Donetsk town and the workers' council of the Donetskgol production association. Opinions were divided: The members of the strike committee favor a strike, but the workers' council is against such action. [video cuts to shots of interview

with N.N. Volynko, cochairman of the Donetsk town workers' strike committee, on city street, with passers-by in background]

[Volynko] Yes, we favor a strike. Our aims are as follows: support for the resolution takes by the first congress of the country's miners, the resignation of the USSR Government, the nationalization of the CPSU's assets, and the depoliticization of the Soviet Army, the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the courts, and the procuratorate.

[Makarskiy] So, the strike will have a political character, one may say?

[Volynko] Yes, it will be political.

[Makarskiy] Do you consider that striking is the only method at your disposal now?

[Volynko] All other methods have already been exhausted, more or less. [video cuts to shots of street interview with V.S. Trizna, Ukrainian people's deputy and chairman of the Donetskgol workers' council]

[Makarskiy] Are you against a strike?

[Trizna] Yes. Let me explain why. I believe this could open the way to a right-wing coup. That is the first thing. Second, the newly elected Soviets must be given an opportunity to resolve the question in a parliamentary way. [video cuts to shot of miners taking a break outdoors]

[Makarskiy] Speaking at the recent miners congress in Donetsk, People's Deputy Nikolay Ilich Travkin also asked the miners to freeze their strike plans. But the final decision will be taken by work collectives themselves.

[Announcer] Well, after viewing that reportage together with you, I'm gripped by certain doubts. On the one hand, one can of course understand the miners. Their plight is indeed extremely grave. One can understand their disillusionment, their annoyance and disappointment. But at the same time it seems to me that Nikolay Ilich Travkin was right. I think one needs to be especially careful and thoughtful before taking such decisions, given the critical situation in which the country finds itself. There is no need for haste or hurry. That's what I think, at least.

Regional Council Meets

LD2806174690 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 28 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Unfortunately we have just received the following news from our correspondent in the Donbass. A conference of the regional council of Donbass strike committees has ended in Gorlovka. It was attended by representatives of 30 mining towns in Donetsk, Lugansk, and Dnepropetrovsk Oblasts. They adopted a resolution on

holding a one-day political warning strike on 11 July. Representatives of 25 towns voted for the strike.

Pro-CPSU Youths in Clashes in Donetsk Region

LD2906115590 Moscow World Service in Russian
0944 GMT 29 Jun 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] According to an INTERFAX correspondent, in the central square of Donetsk, a group of youths shouting slogans in defense of the CPSU attacked people selling the newspapers of informal organizations. The home-made publications were removed by force and burned on the spot.

Masol Relected Council of Ministers Chairman

LD2806120190 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1130 GMT 28 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Stanislav Volyanskiy]

[text] Kiev, 28 Jun—Vitaliy Masol has been reelected chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers. The elections, on an alternative basis, were held at the republican Supreme Soviet session today.

Vitaliy Masol has held this post since 1987. The prime minister made a speech in which he set out his program. He had to listen to quite a number of reproaches for his personal complicity in the economic chaos in the republic.

Vladimir Chernyak, people's deputy of the USSR, doctor of economic sciences, and head of a section of the Institute of Economics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, ran against him. He represents the opposition and is the author of an alternative program of the economic development of the republic, put forward by the Ukrainian popular movement for perestroika, the Rukh.

Of the 403 deputies who took part in the latest, third, round of voting, 229 voted for Vitaliy Masol. One hundred and thirty-four people voted for Vladimir Chernyak.

Vitaliy Masol, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, was born in 1928. He graduated from Kiev Polytechnical Institute. He worked in industry. In 1972 he became first deputy chairman of the republic's State Planning Committee. From 1979 he was deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the Planning Committee. Eight years later he came to head the government of the Ukraine for the first time.

Controversy Marks Ukraine 'Liberation'

LD2806182290 Moscow TASS in English 1817 GMT
 28 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Lilia Novitskaya]

[Text] Odessa, the Ukraine, June 28 TASS—The population of Ukrainian areas along the Danube river—Russians, Ukrainians, Moldavians, Bulgarians and Gagauzes—today marked the 50th anniversary of these areas' joining the Soviet Union.

In the period between the two world wars these areas, together with the Danube port of Izmail, were occupied by Romania.

Numerous exhibitions described the "plight" of people in conditions of the occupation and the "triumphal meeting" of Soviet soldiers by the local population.

Simultaneously, the parliament of neighbouring Moldavia passed a resolution saying the celebration of the anniversary, which is marked every year as the "holiday of Bessarabia's liberation and reunification with the Soviet homeland," was "inexpedient."

The Moldavian parliament described the 1940 events as a "collusion" between the Soviet Union and fascist Germany, and the proclamation of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic on August 2, 1940, as "illegal."

The parliament's resolution said the transfer of part of Bessarabia to the Ukraine "contradicted the historical truth and the ethnic realities of that time."

Participants in a rally at the city of Bolgrad, near Odessa, protested against these territorial claims. A similar protest was expressed by historians who gathered in Bolgrad for a conference marking the anniversary.

Bolgrad was founded in 1821 by Russian General Ivan Inzov. The whole of Bessarabia joined Russia as a result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1806-1812.

The public protest was sent to the Moldavian parliament today.

In Moldavia, several local councils in areas near the Dniestr River refused to recognise the Moldavian parliament's resolution abolishing the holiday and marked the anniversary.

Moldavian Supreme Soviet Appeal Published

90UN2166B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
 in Russian 8 Jun 90 p 1

["Appeal of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet to the President of the USSR, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics"]

[Text] The first session of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, 12th convocation, informs you that on 5 June 1990 the highest agency of state authority in our republic considered the question of the so-called first congress of

deputies to soviets at various levels and a number of cities and rayons in the Dnestr region, and deemed it to be invalid, and the decisions to create parallel structures of agencies of authority and administration to have no legal force.

These unconstitutional decisions, combined with the ignoring of the Laws governing the language and the state flag of Moldavian SSR and with the boycotting of the parliament's work on the part of those who are attempting to preserve at all costs the pre-perestroika orders and who are exerting crude pressure on the population and resorting to intimidating and disorienting that population, are destabilizing the sociopolitical situation in the republic and bringing it to the point of extreme and acute tension.

With all responsibility we declare that the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, 12th convocation, has not enacted a single law or decree that infringes upon the rights of Moldavian SSR citizens. But conservative forces are attempting to discredit the movement for the national rebirth of the republic as a whole, and set up various kinds of barricades between the Moldavians and the citizens of other nationalities. For this purpose, using as a scarecrow the individual excesses that have been occurring in the republic, these forces are intensively circulating unfounded rumors concerning the secession of Moldavian SSR from the USSR, and concerning the infringement upon the rights of the national minorities in the republic.

The administrative figures in the rayons in the Dnestr region, including certain people's deputies, not only fail to share the striving for the national rebirth of the republic's nation, but also are using their own illegal actions in an organized way to hinder this process that is natural under the conditions of developing democracy, and this is leading to the aggravation of the interethnic relations and the intensification of separatist tendencies.

A matter of particular concern is the fact that these forces have been attempting to militarize the public movements and form so-called self-defense detachments.

Such political actions are becoming the permanent behavioral style for the anti-perestroika forces which, in combination with the same kind of forces in the other union republics, are creating a real threat to perestroika.

Unfortunately, certain union-level mass media, by their incautious, one-sided, and unreliable communiques, frequently disinform the public of the country and the world, and promote the formation in them of an inadequate idea concerning the true state of affairs in Moldavian SSR and concerning the persons responsible for destabilizing the situation.

We are convinced that everything that has been stated above must evoke the concern not only of the Moldavian parliament. The Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet assumes that the overcoming of the dangerous situation

that has arisen is beyond the capability of a single republic. It is only by the joint, coordinated efforts of the center and the national republics that it is possible to achieve the stabilization of the sociopolitical situation in the country and thus to guarantee the irreversible nature of the democratic reforms in society, and to create favorable conditions for the transition to the new stage of development on principles of parliamentarianism, the multiparty system, and the new Union treaty, which must guarantee the sovereignty of all nations and the observance of human rights in our country.

Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, to avoid the unforeseen development of events, has deemed it necessary to inform the President of the USSR, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Supreme Soviets of the union republics concerning the increase in Moldavia of the illegal actions perpetrated by the opponents of perestroika and by separatists who are being encouraged by similar anti-perestroika forces in the other regions of the country.

Adopted at the 6 June 1990 session of Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Moldavian Decree on Lithuanian Independence

90UN2166A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 8 Jun 90; p 1

[Decree: "Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Decree Concerning the Recognition of the Independent Lithuanian Republic"]

[Text] On 11 March 1990 the new Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic passed an act concerning the restoration of the independent Lithuanian state.

The Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet:

- unconditionally recognizes the right of the Lithuanian nation, like any other nation, to self-determination and the creation of an independent state;
- recognizes the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic as a parliament that was elected by the nation in a legal and democratic manner, and also recognizes the government of the Lithuanian Republic;
- declares that the Moldavian SSR does not have any economic, financial, or other claims against the Lithuanian Republic. In the event that problems of this kind should arise, they must be resolved by means of negotiations;
- confirms the desire of the Moldavian SSR to maintain direct diplomatic, political, economic, and cultural ties with the Lithuanian Republic and proposes to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic the exchanging of permanent representations;

—states its position in favor of discontinuing the economic blockade of Lithuania and calls upon the governments of the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic to engage in constructive dialogue.

[Signed] M. Snegur, chairman of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Kishinev, 31 May 1990.

Amendments to Moldavian Criminal Code Noted

90UN2166C Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 8 Jun 90 pp 1-2

["Moldavian SSR Law Governing the Making of Amendments and Additions to the Moldavian SSR Administrative Violations Code, and to the Moldavian SSR Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes"]

[Text] The Moldavian SSR Supreme Court decrees:

I. To introduce into the Moldavian SSR Administrative Violations Code that was approved by the 29 March 1985 Moldavian SSR Law (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA I PRAVITELSTVA MOLDAVSKOY SSR, 1985, No. 3, Article 47; 1986, No. 6, Article 49; 1987, No. 8, Article 106, 108; No. 11, Article 145; 1988, No. 8, Article 128; 1989, No. 6, Article 119), the following amendments and additions.

1. To add to the Code a new Article 174.2, with the following content:

"Article 174.2. Deliberate Violation of the Procedure for the Use of National-State Symbols.

"The deliberate violation of the established procedure for the use of national-state symbols (coat of arms, flag, anthem) of the USSR, the Moldavian SSR, or any other union or autonomous republic, entails the imposition of a fine in the amount of R500 to R1,000.

"The actions stipulated by Part 1 of this article, which were committed as a result of prior agreement by a group of persons, entail the imposition of a fine from each of them in the amount of R1,000 to R2,000, or corrective labor for a period of one to two months with the withholding of 20 percent of their earnings, and in exceptional instances, if, on the basis of the circumstances surrounding the case and with a consideration of the violator's individual situation, the application of these measures is deemed to be insufficient, administrative arrest for up to 15 days.

"Actions stipulated by Part 1 of this article, which were committed by officials responsible for the observance of the procedure for the use of national-state symbols, entail the imposition of a fine of R1,500 to R2,000."

2. In Article 209, after the figures "174.1," add the figures "174.2."

3. In paragraph 1 of Part 1 of Article 248, after the words "during the commission of petty hooliganism," add the words "deliberate violation of the procedure for the use of national-state symbols."

4. In Article 249, part 3, after the words, "persons who have committed petty hooliganism," add the words "who deliberately violated the procedure for the use of national-state symbols."

5. In Part 2 of Article 264, replace the words "and 174.1 of this Code" by the words "174.1 and 174.2 of this Code."

6. In Part 1 of Article 281 and Part 2 of Article 311, after the figures "174.1," add the figures "174.2."

II. To introduce into the Moldavian Criminal Code that was approved by the 24 March 1961 Moldavian SSR Law (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA MOLDAVSKOY SSR, 1961, No. 10, Article 41; VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA I PRAVITELSTVA MOLDAVSKOY SSR, 1966, No. 10, Article 135; 1982, No. 12, Article 124; 1984, No. 1, Article 13; 1989, No. 4, Article 73; 1989, No. 9, Article 230), the following amendments and additions:

1. To add to Article 38 paragraph 3.1 with the following content:

"3.1. Commission of a crime on the basis of national and racial hatred or disdain."

2. To reword Article 67 as follows:

"Article 67. Appeals to the Forcible Overthrow or Change of the Soviet State and Social System or to the Forcible Violation of the Unity of the Territory of the USSR and the Moldavian SSR.

"Public appeals to the forcible overthrow or change of the Soviet state and social system or to the forcible violation of the unity of the territory of the USSR and the Moldavian SSR, which unity is firmly established by the USSR Constitution and the Moldavian SSR Constitution, as well as the dissemination for this purpose of materials with that content, are punished by incarceration for a period of up to three years or by a fine of up to R10,000.

"The same actions committed for a second time or by an organized group of persons are punished by incarceration for a period of up to seven years or by a fine of up to R20,000.

"The actions stipulated by Parts 1 or 2 of this article, which have been committed on assignment from foreign organizations or their representatives, are punished by incarceration for a period of up to ten years, with or without confiscation of property."

3. To add to the Code Article 203.1 with the following content:

"Article 203.1. Resisting the Execution of the Requirements of the Moldavian SSR Constitution and Other Moldavian SSR Laws.

"Persons who actively hinder the execution of the requirements of the Moldavian SSR Constitution and the other Moldavian SSR laws by means of open civil disobedience, or those who incite other persons to take such actions:

"—are punished by incarceration for a period of up to three years, or corrective labor for a period of one to two years; or by a fine in the amount of R1,000 to R3,000.

"The same actions combined with an appeal for mass civil disobedience (resistance) against the requirements of the Moldavian SSR Constitution and other Moldavian SSR laws, or the organizing of such actions:

"—are punished by incarceration for a period of up to three years, with exile for a period of from one to five years.

"Actions stipulated by Parts 1 and 2 of this article, which were committed by administrators of agencies of state authority and administration, state, cooperative, public, or other enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and that harm the state and social interests:

"—are punished by incarceration for a period of from three to ten years, with exile for a period of from one to five years."

4. To reword Article 203.2 as follows:

"Article 203.2. Outrage Directed Against the National-State Symbols.

"An outrage directed against the national-state symbols (coat of arms, flag, anthem) of the USSR, Moldavian SSR, or other union or autonomous republic:

"—is punished by incarceration for a period of up to three years, or by corrective labor for a period of up to two years, or by a fine in the amount of R3,000 to R5,000.

"The same actions, committed for a second time or on the basis of prior agreement by a group of persons:

"—are punished by incarceration for a period of from three to seven years, or by a fine of R5,000 to R10,000.

"Actions stipulated by Part 1 of this article, which were committed by officials responsible for the observance of the procedure for the use of national-state symbols:

"—are punished by incarceration for a period of from three to seven years, or by a fine of R10,000 to R15,000, with removal from the position occupied."

5. To add to the Code Article 203.3 with the following text:

"Article 203.3. Deliberate Violation of the Procedure for the Use of National-State Symbols by Officials.

"The deliberate violation of the procedure for the use of national-state symbols (coat of arms, flag, anthem) of the USSR, the Moldavian SSR, or any other union or autonomous republic by officials responsible for the observance of that procedure after the application to them of means of administrative punishment for such actions:

"—is punished by incarceration for a period of up to three years, or by a fine of from R5,000 to R10,000, with removal from the position occupied.

"Malicious violation of the procedure for the use of the national-state symbols by officials responsible for the observance of that procedure, that is, the deliberate and repeated refusal to use the national-state symbols in the established procedure, which refusal is linked with the nonfulfillment of the decisions of the republic's highest agencies of state authority and administration and which harms the state and social interests:

"—is punished by incarceration for a period of from three to seven years, or by a fine from R10,000 to R15,000, with removal from the position occupied."

6. To consider the currently effective Article 203.3 to be Article 203.4.

III. To make the following amendments and additions to the Moldavian SSR Criminal Procedure Code that was approved by the 24 March 1961 Moldavian SSR Law (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA MOLDAVSKOY SSSR, 1961, No. 10, Article 42; 1963, No. 16, Article 71; VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA I PRAVITELSTVA MOLDAVSKOY SSR, 1986, No. 6, Article 49; 1987, No. 11, Article 143, 146; 1989, No. 4, Article 73; 1989, No. 9, Article 230):

1. To Article 26, after the figures "190-194," add the figures "203.1," and after the figures "203.3," add the figures "203.4."

2. To Part 3 of Article 107, after the figures "200.4," add the figures "203.1," and after the figures "203.3," add the figures "203.4."

IV. This Law is to go into effect on the day of publication.

*M. Snegur, chairman of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet.
Kishinev, 5 June 1990.*

Caucasus

Armenian Communist Party Committee Plenum Opens
NC2906091690 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian
0500 GMT 29 Jun 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] The regular plenum of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee opened on 28 June 1990. The

plenum discussed the draft platform of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee prepared for the 29th Congress of the Armenian Communist Party. Movsisyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, delivered a report on that issue. The participants in the plenum proposed to present the report to the labor collectives and party organizations for broad examination, and with this in mind they also proposed to adjourn the plenum's work until after the 28th CPSU Congress.

A working group was set up to produce a final draft platform of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee for the congress of the republic's Communist Party.

The plenum adopted an appeal addressed to the 28th CPSU Congress on the exacerbation of the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. The text of the appeal will be published.

The plenum also heard a report about the results of the elections of delegates from the Armenian Communist Party to the 28th CPSU Congress. The report was presented by Dilanyan, secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the republican electoral commission.

The plenum will continue its deliberations after the 28th CPSU Congress.

The paper has published a front-page report on the plenum. The paper has also published the list of delegates from the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Congress Platform Discussed

LD2806212690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1800 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] A plenum of the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party was held in Yerevan today. Those attending discussed the republican party organization's platform for its 29th congress. It was noted that the communists of Armenia support the policy of radical change in order to renew and humanize socialism; they support the country's transition to a market economy, and the sovereignty and independence of the Union republics.

A large section of the platform is devoted to the party's nationalities policy at the present stage.

At the plenum, the results of the elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the republic's party organization were summed up.

Armenian Party Leader Comments on Situation
NC0206200690 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian
0600 GMT 30 May 90

[Interview with Vladimir Movsisyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, by

unidentified ARMENPRES correspondent; place and date not given—read by announcers]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] Comrade Movsisyan, this interview is taking place at a time when the situation in our republic has become extremely complicated. Naturally, the first question has to be on this topic. Late on the night of 27 May you appealed on television to the population of our republic and called on them to be well aware of the real danger threatening our fatherland and the people.

[Movsisyan] The armed clash provoked by irresponsible persons on that day resulted in a new tragedy and claimed new victims. The situation has been deteriorating daily for the last few months. Imprudent and irresponsible persons and isolated groups have resorted to moves which posed a threat to the security of our people. Their instigatory actions have led to bloodshed. Our people were again disturbed and troubled on the eve of the anniversary of the restoration of Armenian statehood. If, in the coming days, we fail to make the right decisions and be aware of each step we take, then we will find ourselves facing a national crisis. The necessity for national unity and solidarity has never been so urgent and pressing as it is at this moment. We must resolutely say no to national discord. We must refuse to submit to the instigatory calls of irresponsible elements, in order not to spoil the ideals of our national movement and in order not to endanger the future of our sons, daughters, sisters, and mothers.

The deterioration of the situation is determined by a number of factors. The popular movement (?engendered by the democratization) splintered, giving way to divergent forces which are intolerant of each other. This is fraught with dangerous consequences. Now, (?to this is added) a crisis of power. Many executive and law-enforcement organs are inactive. Exploiting this, some forces are trying to channel the wave of popular discontent into anti-state and anti-national provocations. The lawlessness of the last two months and the tragic events of 27 May are evidence of this.

The press has published the various calls by the supreme organs of the republic for the return of the arms accumulated by the various groups. Yet what was the result? The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers have often called for the return of the arms that are in the hands of the various groups. We appealed and counseled, set timetables, all in vain. The implementation of the decision of the Supreme Soviet to set up a national security council is also proceeding slowly.

The unnecessary and criminal use of arms amongst the peaceful population is negatively affecting people's sense of security and dignity; it is also fragmenting the general strength, and defaming the idea of self-defense.

It is incomprehensible how anyone can stroll about armed in small and large settlements in broad daylight.

The republic's Internal Affairs Ministry logs are becoming more alarming each day. Criminal elements have accumulated a large quantity of arms; the situation has become unbearable. The stolen weapons must be returned to the republic's authorities, the sooner the better. There is no other alternative.

At the whim of a group of [words indistinct] persons the statues of a number of public, political, and cultural activists were removed and dishonored. Certain forces are bent upon exacerbating the already tense situation by various means. We are convinced that the overwhelming majority of our people are opposed to such [word indistinct] steps. The people justifiably demand that we establish law and order, protect them from attacks by bandits, and apply the strictest measures envisaged by the law. Often, worries are expressed (?to the effect that) the republic is on the brink of internal clashes which might lead to civil war. In fact, do the abovementioned facts lead to any other conclusion?

[Correspondent] From what you say, should one conclude that you consider the republic's situation hopeless?

[Movsisyan] No. I am not of that opinion. There is a way out and it lies in the unity of all the healthy forces of our society and in the passage from unproductive speeches to concrete actions. [passage indistinct] We are saying to the formal and informal public organizations: Come, let's listen to each other and cooperate. We need a national concord council to bring together all the healthy forces of the nation. You already know that plans are under way to convene a pan-Armenian congress with the participation of high-level representatives from Armenia, Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKA0]], and the internal and external diaspora. We hope that this congress will examine and formulate basic principles for national revival and survival.

As regards the protection of legality, we are taking every measure to enable people to feel themselves protected and to enable the law-enforcement organs of the republic to function properly. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] The situation in the NKA0 is tense and alarming. The social, economic, spiritual, and cultural life of the oblast remains unsatisfactory.

[Movsisyan] Lately, I met a delegation from the NKA0. We thoroughly examined the problems which are perturbing our compatriots at present. The representatives of the oblast mainly put forward demands for the recognition of the oblast soviet and the upgrading of the status of the oblast. The lifting of the blockade is of vital importance. It is also important to extricate the oblast from the impasse [word indistinct]. That means, first of all, the possibility of ensuring the safety of the Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert road. It would also be admirable if the military units were redeployed in the border regions and in the areas of mixed settlement. In that case, no clashes like the recent exchanges of fire would have taken place. Now, concrete steps are being taken, including negotiations, to solve these problems. As regards the

Artsakh problem, in general it may be unequivocally stated that the problem should be solved on the principle the right of nations to free self-determination through constitutional means. [passage omitted]

Armenian Favors Single Presidential Candidate

*NC2906120790 Yerevan International Service
in Armenian 1530 GMT 28 Jun 90*

[Text] During the regular public rally [organized by the Armenian Pannational Movement] at Freedom Square, a statement was read in which Paruyr Ayrikyan announced his decision to become a member of the Armenian Pannational Movement.

In answer to the many inquiries made by listeners, we are presenting Paruyr Ayrikyan's 22 June explanatory note addressed to the members of the National Self-Determination Association and to all Armenians:

By taking this step I have tried to remove the existing barrier between organizations which were sharply different in the past but which are now alike ideologically. Personal and organizational egoism and self-centerism might be calamitous at this transitional period. With this step, I also want to set an example for cooperation and brotherhood. I was a member of the National Self-Determination Association and today, when almost all of Armenia with its many different organizations has become the Self-Determination Association, I am still a member of the association. Those who remember 1988 know that to be a member of the National Self-Determination Association meant to be a potential citizen of independent Armenia. The psychological transformation in Armenia in this direction is already a fact and this transformation manifests itself most conspicuously in the advancement and ideological ascendancy of the Armenian Pannational Movement. When I return to Armenia, I will be able to contribute more effectively to the coalescence of the healthy national forces. From my present position, I can contribute to that task by giving my consent to the suggestion of the national popular forces to field a united candidate at the presidential elections. Paruyr Ayrikyan concludes: I have been and remain the servant of my people and a soldier of independence.

Armenians Reportedly Kill Azeri Shepherds

*LD2806185490 Moscow TASS in English 1802 GMT
28 Jun 90*

[Text] Kedabek, Azerbaijan June 28 AZERINFORM-TASS—In an attack on the village of Geyali in Azerbaijan's Kedabek district, a group of Armenian militants killed three local shepherds.

The militants were dressed in Soviet Army and police uniforms and were armed with automatic rifles and carbines, an AZERINFORM correspondent learned.

A police sergeant, wounded in a shot-out, was hospitalized. Another police officer is missing

The militants stole 170 sheep.

NKAO Elects Delegates to CPSU Congress

*NC2706120290 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian
1850 GMT 25 Jun 90*

[Text] Despite the extremely difficult conditions at the party organizations of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], the oblast party organization was nevertheless able successfully to organize the elections of delegates from the NKAO to the 28th CPSU Congress.

An ARMENPRES correspondent asked Eduard Vaanovich Vardanyan, chairman of the oblast party organization control committee, to describe the way the elections were held. He said: Our communists had on many occasion raised the issue of securing the participation of the NAKO delegates in the upcoming CPSU party congress. Earlier on, the oblast party had submitted relevant proposals to the CPSU Central Committee. In view of the fact that it was impossible for us to convene a party congress in Artsakh [NKAO] under the state of emergency and in prevailing political conditions, the only acceptable way of electing the delegates was to hold elections at the party's primary organizations, this being in conformity with the regulations set down by the March 1990 plenum of the CPSU. We acted on these regulations. The city and rayon party committees decided to form an oblast electoral commission last month. The entire preliminary work was conducted in an organized manner. Organized meetings were also held on 21 June at the primary party organizations to elect delegates by direct and secret ballot in strict conformity with the CPSU regulations and instructions on the election of party organizations. It is worth mentioning that nearly 80 percent of the oblast communists participated in this political campaign which is so important for us. It is possible that our opponents might advance the pretext that the oblast electoral committee was not set up by the oblast party committee plenum. But it is not our fault that the functions of that body has been suspended. And, as you know, the Azerbaijan republic has not passed a decision providing for the holding of such elections in the NKAO. Finally, Vardanyan noted: We are hopeful that the credentials committee of the CPSU will recognize the mandates of the NKAO delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

The Artsakh communists will be represented in the country's party congress by Valeriy Abgarovich Atadzhyanyan, first secretary of Stepanakert City Party Committee; Vaan Mikayelovich Gabrielyan, first secretary of Mardakertskiy Rayon Party Committee; and Oleg Yesayovich Yesayan, first secretary of Martuninskiy Rayon Party Committee.

Azerbaijan Central Committee View NKAO Problem

*NC2806120790 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
0440 GMT 27 Jun 90*

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The newspapers published a detailed report today on the meeting that was held at the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee on 25 June. The meeting examined matters related to the establishment of security for the people in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], the full normalization of the situation in the NKAO, and ways and means of resolving the problems related to the NKAO's social and economic development. The leading officials of the republic's party, soviet, and law enforcement organs, ministries, main administrations, and [word indistinct] organizations and representatives of social establishments participated in the meeting.

Viktor Polyanichko, second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, briefed the meeting on the situation. Speeches were made. President Ayaz Mutaibov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the gathering. The president assigned a number of tasks to the pertinent ministries and main administrations in connection with the normalization of the situation in the NKAO.

Azerbaijan Central Committee Officials Elected

LD2606112190 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY
in Russian 10 June 90 p 1

[Editorial Report] Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian on 10 June carries a front-page article on the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee plenum. The article notes the first plenum elected by the 32d Communist Party of Azerbaijan Congress was held on 9 June. The plenum elected the following officials of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee:

Second Secretary	V.P. Polyanichko
Secretaries	F.G. Muradaliyev
	F.E. Musayev
	T.Kh. Orudzhev
	A.F. Dashdamirov
Bureau Members	A.N. Mutaibov
	R.A. Agayev
	S.N. Alekperov
	G.A. Gasanov
	V.A. Guseynov
	A.F. Dashdamirov
	A.D. Dzaliyev
	E.M. Kafarova
	F.G. Muradaliyev
	F.E. Musayev
	T.Kh. Orudzhev
	V.P. Polyanichko
	N.I. Popov
	T.N. Rzayeva

The following heads of Azerbaijan Communist Party departments were approved:

Ideological Department	R.G. Agayev
Socioeconomic Department	Z.A. Samed-zade
Agrarian Department	A.K. Ragim-zade
General Department	A.Kh. Gadzhiyev

O.K. Shakhbazov was approved as Central Committee charge d'affaires. The plenum approved T.I. Rustamov as editor of KOMMUNIST, G.G. Glushkov as editor of BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, Yu.M. Ivanov as editor of VYSHKA, A.G. Askerov as editor of SOVIET KENDI and K.N. Ragimov as editor in chief of the journal KOMMUNIST AZERBAYDZHANA.

Georgia Discusses Law on Economic Independence

PM2806154190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
0830 GMT 27 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report by N. Gongadze and V. Khundadze, identified by caption]

[Text] [Newscaster] We have received the following report from Georgia, where the draft law "On the Fundamentals of the Republic's Economic Independence" is being widely discussed.

[Correspondent] Among the population, in labor collectives, and at enterprises nationwide discussion of the new draft law "On the Fundamentals of Georgia's Economic Independence" is currently under way. This document affects the interests of all the republic's citizens. Its four chapters define the main issues—the essence of economic independence, questions of ownership, social guarantees for the population, and state regulation of the economy.

The draft favors implementing an independent economic policy, switching to a market economy, establishing a national banking and credit system—including a Georgian currency—improving the population's living standards, and adopting ecological protection measures.

[T.N. Chikvaidze, deputy director of the Georgian Academy of Sciences Economics Institute, identified by caption] The draft law states once again that the decisive precondition for Georgia's economic independence is its sovereignty. However, it is necessary to clarify this concept, to explain what is meant by sovereignty. It is necessary to show that the basis of economic independence is political independence, political sovereignty. The draft also stresses that private ownership must be provided with the same conditions as other forms of ownership and that it can be based on individual as well as hired labor.

Economic independence needs to be provided with a social basis, not just with social guarantees, but with a social basis. This includes the training of skilled cadres—

this is a very important question; measures to ensure higher living standards, and so on and so forth.

[Correspondent] One month has been allowed for the discussion of this draft law. After it has been examined by the Council of Ministers, the Georgian Supreme Soviet will adopt the final version.

Central Asia

Tashkent City Official Favors Party Unity

LD2806133890 Moscow TASS in English 1304 GMT
28 Jun 90

[Text] Tashkent June 28 TASS—The consolidation of Uzbekistan's state sovereignty cannot be achieved without the greater independence of its Communist Party, said Atkhambek Fazylbekov, head of the Tashkent city committee of the Uzbek Communist Party. In an interview with the local PRAVDA VOSTOKA newspaper, he emphasized the need to define the status of the republic's Communist Party and ensure its right to influence decision-making in the Soviet Communist Party.

He believes that for this purpose the principles of shaping the Soviet Communist Party's leading bodies should have proportional representation in the leading bodies.

At the same time, Fazylbekov favours the unity of the Soviet Communist Party and close cooperation between communist parties of all Soviet republics. "We shall never" agree to the party's being turned into a parliamentary club having no unity of principles and action and torn by faction strife," he said. Fazylbekov said that he will speak at the 28th party congress against the split.

Tajikistan Party Central Committee Holds Plenum

LD2806212290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1800 GMT 28 Jun 90

[Text] A regular plenum of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee was held in Dushanbe today. Information was heard on the results of the June meeting

of the leaders of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. It was emphasized that the meeting had resulted in drawing up a document of fundamental importance for the destinies of the peoples of the Central Asian region—an intergovernmental agreement on economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation between these republics. The plenum adopted a decision on the position of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee at the 28th CPSU Congress.

Society Formed To Aid Tajikistan Migrants

PM2806115790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Aleksandr Karpov under "Direct Line" rubric: "Migration Society"]

[Text] Dushanbe—Many nonindigenous residents of Tajikistan have declared their wish to leave the republic.

"However, this intention involves a lot of problems," G. Belgorodskaya, Dushanbe City Soviet deputy and member of the coordinating committee of the recently formed "Migration" society, claimed. "Many, as a rule, do not have anywhere specific to go to obtain housing or work in their specialized field. Our society's main task is to help them."

As is evident from the "Migration" society's regulations and program, the society certainly has no intention of campaigning to persuade anybody to leave Tajikistan, realizing that an exodus of cadres from the national economy will adversely affect the situation in the economy. They undertake to assist only those for whom departure is inevitable. The forms of assistance are varied. The society's coordinating committee has contacted, for example, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet in order to ascertain the regions and population centers where workers and specialists are needed and suggest them to the migrants.

As for the housing problem, "Migration" is to set about forming construction detachments from among the departing people. These will include both migrants who are professional construction workers and people who agree to retrain temporarily so that the housing problem in the new location is solved more quickly.